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SPECIAL ISSUE

**Migration and Social Change
in Australia, France and Germany**

**Edited by
Michael Bommers, Stephen Castles
and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden**

Preface

The *IMIS-Beiträge* is a series which publishes various articles based on research projects at IMIS; lectures given in the IMIS lecture series; and occasionally outside articles dealing with subjects pertinent to the Institute's research scope and agenda.

This volume is a ›special issue‹ comprising some of the results of an international research project on ›Intercultural Relations, Identity and Citizenship: A Comparative Study of Australia, France and Germany‹, funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. The articles deal with the social changes brought about by immigration after World War II in Australia, France and Germany. The project's main assumptions are that all three countries have been immigration countries after World War II; that this has brought about important social changes in all three countries; and that these changes had major effects on historically established forms of social identity and citizenship.

The project was carried out at the Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies at the University of Wollongong, Australia, at the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales in Paris, France, and at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies at the University of Osnabrück, Germany. It was directed by Stephen Castles, Catherine Wihtol de Wenden and Michael Bommès.

Thanks are due to Sigrid Pusch and Jutta Tiemeyer who kindly prepared the manuscript for publication.

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Introduction

This volume of the IMIS-Beiträge reports on the results of an international research project on ›Intercultural Relations, Identity and Citizenship: A Comparative Study of Australia, France and Germany‹ (IRIC), funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and the Australian Research Council. It is a collectively authored book, the authorship lies with the researchers mentioned below who have all contributed in one way or another. The research was carried out from 1996 to 1999 by interdisciplinary teams at:

- The Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies (CAPSTRANS, formerly the Centre for Multicultural Studies) at the University of Wollongong, Australia, coordinator: Stephen Castles; other researchers: Maureen Dibden, Colleen Mitchell, Ellie Vasta and Gianni Zappalà.
- The Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) in Paris, France, which is part of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, coordinator: Catherine Wihtol de Wenden; other researchers: Anne Dumasy, Sabrina Guérard and Vasoodeven Vuddamalay.
- The Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS), University of Osnabrück, Germany, coordinator: Michael Bommers; other researchers: Matthias Liedtke and Ingrid Schumacher.

The book presented here is the first of three volumes to be published as a result of the IRIC project. The other two, which will follow in 2001 and 2002, will be entitled:

- Immigration and the Social Sciences: the Experience of Australia, France and Germany;
- Challenges to National Identity and Citizenship: Post-war Immigration in Australia, France and Germany.

One of the central aims of this project is the development of a theory on how immigration and resulting changes in intercultural and interethnic relations affect forms of collective social identity, especially citizenship which is still the most important form of collective identity in modern society. The project set out to develop this theory on the basis of an international study, comparing:

1. The immigration processes in Australia, France and Germany since World War II;
2. The socio-structural impact of these immigration processes in each of these countries and the consequences for related forms of social organisation and mobilisation;

3. The effects of these socio-structural impacts on the socially established forms of collective self-description and on the institutionalised concepts of citizenship as political forms of inclusion.

In view of the variety of national experiences, there are certainly no stringent criteria for the choice of countries for a comparative study. Indeed, comparison of virtually any countries which have experienced large-scale immigration would be of interest, although existing organisational and research linkages are clearly of importance for the selection. However, the choice of Australia, France and Germany does offer some important benefits. France and Germany differ considerably in their approaches to citizenship and are usually discussed as the classical opposite cases. Another important difference is that France has been an immigration country for a long time due to colonial traditions as well as demographic factors, while Germany had repeatedly experienced de-facto immigration since the late 19th century, but had declared itself to be a non-immigration country on the basis of a model of citizenship founded on ethnicity. However, the two countries are currently converging (partly through common policies within the European Union) in their attempts to limit immigration from the East and the South. Australia, on the other hand, is a classical immigration country, which since the 1970s has pursued a policy of multicultural inclusion of immigrants. Yet Australia's social policies are rooted in European welfare traditions – which in Europe are one of the main contexts for attempts to close off immigration. The development of the linkages between intercultural relations, interethnic relations, forms of identity ascription and shifting notions of citizenship in the three countries must be sited in varying contexts. The research project therefore starts from the assumption that a comparative analysis of the three countries should offer new insights for social scientific theory.

Cross-border migrations appear under specific conditions mediated by nation-states. Regulations of migration processes by nation-states can be systematically grasped by differentiating two dimensions: Migrants are regulated by nation-states according to a) their potential political loyalty, and b) their relation to the different sources of welfare provided by states. The specific national definitions of the conditions of immigration and residency function as political filters of varying effectiveness for entry and for the opportunities of migrants to gain access to the social realms of the economy, law, politics, education, health and the family. One consequence of the diversified rights of immigration, residency and political participation are highly differentiated chances of social inclusion for migrants, and, as a result of this, highly differentiated processes of socio-structural positioning of migrants and corresponding forms of social organisation and mobilisation.

The research project makes three central assumptions:

1. The relations of migration and their socio-structural effects differ in each of the three countries depending on the politically defined starting conditions of immigration;
2. As a result of these effects, different types of intercultural and interethnic relations evolve;
3. Migration processes since World War II and their social consequences had major feedbacks on the starting conditions, especially on the institutionalised »imagined communities« (Anderson) in each country, on the valid social limits of belonging, on the corresponding forms of ascribing »strangeness« and on the foundations of citizenship as the focal form of political inclusion and collectivity in the modern nation-state.

In order to achieve its research aims, the project proceeded in several working steps. The first step included the collection of the existing social-scientific literature on the relevant immigration flows in the three countries since World War II, on their socio-structural consequences and on the resulting forms of social organisation and mobilisation of migrants. This literature was evaluated with respect to the main research questions by each of the participating teams. On the basis of this evaluation, each of the teams produced several summary papers for each country. In order to secure comparability of these papers, a common heuristic pre-understanding of the central categories such as migration, intercultural and interethnic relations and collective identity was developed, and the research was based on a preliminary understanding of the double meaning of citizenship as both a political form of inclusion and a politically institutionalised form of collective identity. This pre-understanding was heuristic in the sense that the intention of the project was to use the comparison of the three countries as a test of the capacity of existing theories to understand the full complexity of the relation between migration, intercultural relations, identity and citizenship and to account especially for the differences between the three chosen countries.

The next step included the reconstruction of the historical starting conditions for immigration after World War II in each of the three countries. The main questions here were: What kind of prior emigration and immigration experiences did each of the three countries have? What kind of concepts of citizenship and forms of collective identity had been established during the historical course of nation-state building? How did these historical experiences and preconditions become relevant for the options and the course of immigration since 1945 in each of the three countries? The results of these two research steps were then used as a background of interpretation for the reconstruction of the effects of post-war immigration and their socio-structural consequences for existing forms of collective identity, concepts of citizenship and images of national belonging.

For the development of a theoretical frame of reference which allowed the comparison of the three countries and a discussion of the consequences of their differences for theory building, it proved useful to include an originally unforeseen research step. This was the construction of a kind of sociology of knowledge analysing the different national approaches to migration research. This allowed the researchers to make explicit the dominant perspectives of research on migration and intercultural relations in the three countries. It forced each of the research teams to elaborate its own theoretical and conceptual tools. This research made it obvious that the differences in scientific approaches can be explained to a large extent if they are seen as part of the negotiation processes in each of the three countries about the social appropriateness of descriptions of national identity and citizenship. The results of this analysis will be published in a second book based on the IRIC project entitled ›Immigration and the Social Sciences: the Experience of Australia, France and Germany‹.

The concluding step of the research project is the summary and comparison of the extensive country studies in order to develop a theory on the relation between migration, intercultural and interethnic relations, collective forms of identity and citizenship. It is the central assumption of the project that migration challenges nation-states and the historically institutionalised collective forms of identity which have developed in them. The modern nation-state relies on the claim of sovereignty over a territory and the population living on this territory. The world-wide diffusion of this political form of organisation differentiates the world population into national populations. This presupposes that each individual is a member of only one state, and of one nation. Citizenship refers to the formal structure of political inclusion in the state, linked with the nation and national identity as a social form of integration of individuals into a national, culturally homogeneous or homogenised community. In this way, the nation-state and its form of inclusion, citizenship, combines the formal category of membership with a collective and cultural category of identity, i.e. the belonging to a national community. Migration challenges this institutionalised division of the world population into national, culturally homogeneous populations and undermines historically established categories of identity and the connected patterns of cultural and national or ethnic (self-)description. This challenge has different effects depending on the structural contexts in which it becomes relevant. This will be shown by a comparative and theoretical description of the effects of immigration on the socially valid forms of identity and citizenship in the three countries chosen. This study will form the third book of the IRIC project, entitled ›Challenges to National Identity and Citizenship: Post-war Immigration in Australia, France and Germany‹.

The present volume summarises the research results of the three teams on post-1945 experiences of immigration in Australia, France and Germany, its socio-structural effects and the resulting forms of social organisation and mobilisation. With the presentation of these results we want to make accessible our understanding of the social effects of post-war immigration in the three countries. This will be used as the basis for our comparative theoretical work in the two later volumes.

A final introductory remark on the opportunities and difficulties of international comparative research needs to be made here. Generally, this type of research is highly valued, especially in the field of migration. However, taking it seriously means more than editing volumes containing the contributions of researchers from different countries. Such collaboration makes the participant researchers realise that they are part of scientific traditions which are still to a large extent nationally framed. Taken-for-granted theoretical perspectives, arguments and distinctions become problematic, and the limits of the empirical data which are used as a proof for the legitimacy of theoretical assumptions have to be taken seriously. But none of the participant researchers can easily jump out of the frame which forms his or her basis of doing research. The chapters of this book lay open some of the differences of perspective of the participating teams. This should not be taken as a defect but as a necessary starting point for comparative work, since doing this kind of research implies accepting that comparison cannot be limited to the subject of study – here, the consequences of migration for intercultural relations and citizenship – but includes necessarily the scientific approaches used by the participating researchers. To discuss and to relate these different approaches to the prior assumptions of each research study is the first step towards the genuine acceptance of differences. For the production of this volume, the research teams have agreed on the main topics which should be dealt with in each of the country studies. Apart from this, we have made no major effort to diminish differences of perspective, instead using them as the starting point for further work. The forthcoming publications of the research project will have to demonstrate whether this has been done successfully.

We wish to thank those who have supported the work of the team and provided the conditions necessary to bring it to completion. The CERI in Paris (especially Carmen Mitrea who compiled the bibliography), the University of Wollongong (especially Lyndall Manton, Colleen Mitchell, Kim Oborn, Mark Rix and Jenny Wark who provided essential administrative support and assistance with editing and proof reading), the IMIS at the University of Osnabrück (especially Sigrid Pusch, Ingrid Schumacher and Jutta Tiemeyer who prepared the manuscript for the publisher and did the final proof reading) and the Robert-Schumann-Centre at the European University Institute in Florence/Italy which provided a friendly and comfortable envi-

ronment where the research teams could meet, discuss their work and agree on further proceedings. Last, but not least, the authors and researchers thank the Volkswagen Foundation (Hanover, Germany) and the Australian Research Council for funding the research project. This support gave all the members of the three teams the opportunity to participate in an important experience of international comparative research.

Post-1947 Migration to Australia and the Socio-Political Incorporation of Migrants

Introduction

When the program of mass immigration began in 1947, Australia was very different from the Australia of today in cultural and social terms. This is not just stating the obvious, for had the then planners' intentions of populating Australia with British ›stock‹ succeeded, the Australia of 1998 might be quite similar to that of fifty years ago. In fact, the arrival of immigrants from non-English speaking background (NESB) countries increased Australia's ethnic and cultural diversity to the point that the notions and myths of the Australian nation then current were challenged. The Australian model for managing this ethnic diversity has gone through three main stages: assimilationism up to the late 1960s, multiculturalism from the 1970s to 1996, and a period of ambivalence since then. Here we examine immigrant incorporation into various sub-systems of society in these three key periods. First, however, we briefly outline some of the main features in the development of the nation and national identity in Australia from British colonisation in 1788 to 1947, and describe Australia's post-war immigration program.

The Nation and National Identity in Australia 1788–1947

Like other ›settler‹ or ›new‹ societies that grew away from but in the shadow of their European colonisers, questions of identity and nation formation in Australia are problematic.¹ Discussion of the Australian ›nation‹ and national identity is complex and at times confusing because most of the core symbols, beliefs, values and institutions in Australia continue to be British derived.

Despite periods of ferment, social struggle and at times progressive political reform, one of the unique features of Australian history is that during the 19th century, no consolidated nation-state evolved.² Indeed, it is unclear to many when the Australian nation-state came into being, for there is no

1 Louis Hartz (ed.), *The Founding of New Societies. Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia*, New York 1964; Daiva Stasiulis/Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.), *Unsettling Settler Societies. Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class*, London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi 1997.

2 Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Radical Culture of Australia*, in: Hartz (ed.), *The Founding of New Societies*.

single event that marks emancipation from British rule.³ A key date is 1901, when the various colonies federated into one indissoluble Commonwealth, with a constitution that distributed the state's powers between the new Federal Government and those of the states (the six former colonies). However, it was not until 1931 that the Statute of Westminster was enacted, which granted the British dominions legal autonomy. To confound matters, Australia did not ratify the Statute until 1942, and this had more to do with the fear that Britain had deserted Australia militarily, than any nascent signs of Australian independence.⁴ This period has been the focus of much debate between scholars as to whether the pre-Federation movements were nationalist, and therefore represented the emergence of a distinctively ›Australian‹ people and culture⁵, or an amalgam of commercial, imperial and populist sentiments that led to the creation of a nation-state dependent on imperial dominance.⁶

Four arenas are particularly important in understanding Australian nationalism and identity between 1788 and 1947: the political economy, racism, militarism and Empire. Until the 1830s, the main non-indigenous population consisted of transported convicts from Britain and a class of officers and colonial administrators to rule over them. Land, expropriated from the original inhabitants, was the major means of production in early Australian capitalism.⁷ In the mid-19th century, the demand for labour meant that the colony's population needed supplementing by free immigrants. Settler capitalism financed immigrants' passages from Britain through the sale of land (often to British interests). Land was also granted to ex-convicts and officers. The de-

3 Stephen Castles/Mary Kalantzis/Bill Cope/Michael Morrissey, *Mistaken Identity. Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia*, 3rd ed. Sydney 1992.

4 Even so, imperial ties continued to be important in economic policy in the post-war period through the creation of the ›sterling area‹ which provided a new kind of economic complementarity between the imperial centre (London) and the periphery (colonies and dominions). Despite Australia's own desire for internal economic development (which required the import of capital goods from dollar countries such as the U.S. and a mass immigration program), it remained, at least until the 1950s, a loyal and compliant member of the sterling area. See Gianni Zappalà, *The Decline of Economic Complementarity. Australia and the Sterling Area*, in: *Australian Economic History Review*, 34. 1994, no. 1, pp. 5–21.

5 Robert Birrell, *A Nation of Our Own. Citizenship and Nation-building in Federation Australia*, Melbourne 1995.

6 Ken Buckley/Ted Wheelwright, *No Paradise for Workers. Capitalism and the Common People in Australia 1788–1914*, Melbourne 1988; Luke Trainor, *British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism. Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century*, Melbourne 1994.

7 Buckley/Wheelwright, *No Paradise for Workers*.

sire to make money dominated colonial culture; freedom meant partaking in the system rather than overthrowing it.⁸

The imperial link also influenced the development of Australian citizenship. Although Australia's formal rules of citizenship were based on the principle of *ius soli* (law of the soil), behind this lay an ethno-blood notion of the ›national family‹, which made Australia similar to countries whose citizenship laws were based on *ius sanguinis* (law of the blood).⁹ The 1948 Nationality and Citizenship Act reflected this reality, by confusing these two related but separate notions. In 1948, a separate Australian citizenship was created for the first time, though Australian citizens remained British subjects and British citizens did not need to naturalise.

The importance of the ›other‹ in constructions of the Australian nation has led some historians to argue that racism was central to Australian nationalism and patriotism towards the Empire.¹⁰ Hostility and fear of ›Asians‹ had been a constant in the development of the colonies since the 1840s. This fear was based on both economic factors (competition for jobs and lower wages) and fear that ›racial‹ intermixture would result in a ›lower‹ form of people. Influenced by the then dominant views of Empire, races were structured in a clear hierarchy, with white Anglo-Saxon at the top and Asians and indigenous at the bottom. Assumptions about blood and white superiority »were the amniotic fluid out of which the nation was born«. ¹¹ As Cochrane has argued, the paradox of Australian culture was that these assumptions co-existed with notions of egalitarianism and a »fair go«, »another meaning for ›white‹ at that time was fair or decent«. ¹²

Exclusion of the other was therefore always part of nationalism and nation building in Australia. This is reflected, for instance, in the fact that one of the first laws passed by the new Federal Parliament was the Immigration Restriction Act (commonly known as the White Australia Policy). The restriction of non-European immigration was to remain a mobilising force for

8 The colonial culture also meant that the role of the state in economic development was accepted much earlier than in other countries. It has been described as a form of ›state capitalism‹ where the relative strength of organised labour (mediated through the state after 1901) allowed workers to achieve some success (e.g. the world's first 8 hour day); Buckley/Wheelwright, *No Paradise for Workers*. This relative strength also influenced the development of political institutions, so that by 1859 all of the colonies (except Western Australia and Tasmania) had introduced universal manhood suffrage, and several other democratic reforms were introduced far earlier than in other countries.

9 Alastair Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen. Australian Citizenship in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge 1997.

10 Humphrey McQueen, *A New Britannia*, Ringwood 1970.

11 Peter Cochrane, *Race Memory*, in: *The Australian's Review of Books*, 1996, p. 9.

12 *Ibid.*

workers, their unions and their political party (the Australian Labor Party, ALP) until the 1940s and 1950s.¹³

Married to the notion of racial purity was the myth of the ›citizen-warrior‹. Militarism played an important part in Australian nationalism throughout this period: The Boer war of 1899 saw 16,000 Australian soldiers participate by the end of the campaign.¹⁴ World War I saw the new nation commit 330,000 volunteer troops that remained under imperial command. And while it was to satisfy imperial demands that the tragedy of Gallipoli occurred, it is this event that is often seen as the founding moment of the nation.¹⁵ The imperial framework remained the context of Australian nationalism until World War II, when it was further strengthened by the extremely conservative and Anglophile Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, declaring that »as Britain is at war Australia is also at war« (although it should be remembered that after the fall of Singapore and with Labour in government Australia moved closer in military and strategic terms to the United States). Between the two wars, any distinctively Australian nationalism that may have been evident in the last decade of the 19th century was transformed into loyalty to the flag (emphasis on the Union Jack) and Monarch. This Empire loyalty may have been a response to Australians' isolation and fear of invasion, yet it also created social conservatism and reinforced the dependent nature of Australian identity.

This brief discussion brings us to the eve of 1947 and the onset of mass immigration whose composition and later consequences would challenge this conception of the Australian nation.¹⁶ Global geopolitics were changing: U.S. influence had increased and the Empire was in its terminal phase, soon to be reconstituted as the British Commonwealth. Nevertheless, Australia's economic, social and foreign policies in 1947 were still framed within an Empire rationale. Although this began to change in the post-war years, accelerating after 1972, if we were to travel back in time to 1947, we would find ourselves in a society which saw itself as ›British‹ and whose points of reference were London and the Empire. In 1947, the Australian ›nation‹ was only 46 years old, the previous 5 years had seen its soldiers enter another war alongside Britain and its immediate geographical environs of the Pacific had come un-

13 Castles/Kalantzis/Cope/Morrissey, *Mistaken Identity*.

14 Stephen Alomes/Catherine Jones, *Australian Nationalism*, Sydney 1991, p. 151.

15 The Gallipoli campaign involved Allied troops, mainly British, New Zealand and Australian, in an attempt to force Turkey out of World War I and open a safe sea route to Russia. The first landings on the Gallipoli peninsula were made in April 1915. Turkish resistance was strong, resulting in the withdrawal of Allied troops, but not before 8,587 Australians were killed, and 19,367 wounded.

16 Ann-Mari Jordens, *Redefining Australians. Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity*, Sydney 1995.

der threat from the Japanese. Its population was only 7.5 million, of whom 95 per cent were of British and Irish origins. Over 90 per cent were locally born and 99 per cent were European (white). For all intents and purposes, Australia was a monocultural and homogeneous society. It was also insular, conservative and afraid of its Asian neighbours.

The society stood at what we would call a crossroads. The realities of being a small and distant outpost of the British Empire in a large Asia-Pacific region had been brought home through the experience of the war. Although Britain had begun to wash its hands of Australia militarily and economically, Australia still hoped that the British would come to the rescue through further injections of ›British stock‹. This is the context within which the ›bold experiment‹ outlined below should be seen. Despite the contradictions and insecurity, however, by 1947 Australians had also »developed an almost universally held conception of ›the real Australian‹.¹⁷ This conception was flimsy, it was illusory, and it was dependent. Yet it was sufficiently strong and widespread that the first policy towards the post-1947 immigrants could be assimilation. As some have argued, this policy was in many ways the first significant manifestation of nationalism in Australian history.¹⁸ As in the past, it drew on processes of exclusion (concerning indigenous peoples) but it was now also to draw on the processes of incorporation (non-British immigrants as labour for the developing nation).

The Post-war Immigration Program

World War II changed Australians' view of the world: The initial defeat of the British forces in Asia and the Pacific by Japan made it clear that the Royal Navy could no longer defend Australia. The slogan used to sell the immigration policy to a suspicious population was ›populate or perish‹ – a reincarnation of the old ›yellow peril‹ spectre, that if there were not enough white people to hold Australia it would be taken over by ›Asia's teeming millions‹.

As it was believed that non-British immigration would threaten national identity and social cohesion¹⁹, initially there were to be ten British immigrants for every ›foreigner‹. The failure to recruit sufficient immigrants from Britain, however, led the Australian Government in the late 1940s to recruit in Displaced Persons Camps in Europe. Refugees from Baltic and Slavonic countries, perceived as both ›racially acceptable‹ and anti-communist, were given preference. Altogether 180,000 Eastern Europeans migrated to

17 Ibid., p. 3.

18 Castles/Kalantzis/Cope/Morrissey, *Mistaken Identity*, p. 110.

19 Wilfred David Borrie (ed.), *A White Australia. Australia's Population Problem*, Sydney 1947; Janis Wilton/Richard Bosworth, *Old Worlds and New Australia*, Ringwood 1984.

Australia from 1947 to 1951, making up 37 per cent of immigrants in those years.²⁰ There was also considerable immigration from Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia.

Immigration levels have ranged from a minimum of about 50,000 to 185,000 settlers per year since World War II. Immigration has accounted for 40 per cent of the growth in population, which currently stands at about 18 million. At the same time, the ethnic composition of the country was transformed with approximately 22 per cent of the population born overseas (see Table 1). Moreover, with the second generation (20 per cent of the total population), two out of five Australians are closely linked to the migratory experience – a higher proportion than in any other developed country. Indigenous Australians today account for only 2 per cent of the population.

Table 1: Australian Population, 1947–1996

Census Year	Overseas-born	Total Population	Overseas-born as Percentage of Total
1947	744,187	7,579,385	9.8
1954	1,286,466	8,986,530	14.3
1961	1,778,780	10,508,186	16.9
1971	2,579,318	12,755,638	20.2
1976	2,718,318	13,548,448	20.1
1981	3,003,834	14,576,330	20.6
1986	3,247,301	15,602,163	20.8
1991	3,689,128	16,407,045	22.5
1996	3,908,213	17,892,418	21.8

Sources: Bureau of Immigration Research, *Australian Immigration. Consolidated Statistics*, no. 15, Canberra 1989; Bureau of Immigration Research, *Community Profiles: Non-English Speaking Born*, Canberra 1991; Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing*, Canberra 1997.

In the 1950s, British and Irish immigrants made up one third of all entries. However, the Cold War virtually stopped Eastern European migration, while economic revival in Northern Europe gradually reduced movements from that region. There was great reluctance to admit Southern Europeans, who were seen as culturally different and politically suspect, due to the strength of the communist parties of Italy and Greece. But the pressing need for labour led to recruitment agreements with most Southern European countries.

20 Jock Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land. Australia's Post-war Immigration*, Sydney 1991, p. 24.

Table 2: Settler Arrivals: Top Ten Countries of Birth, 1966/67 and 1996/97

1966/67			1996/97		
Country of Birth	Number	Per cent	Country of Birth	Number	Per cent
U.K. & Ireland	75,514	54.5	New Zealand	13,072	15.2
Italy	12,888	9.3	U.K.	9,674	11.3
Greece	9,826	7.1	China (exc Taiwan)	7,761	9.1
Yugoslavia	7,550	5.4	Hong Kong	3,894	4.5
Germany	3,491	2.5	South Africa	3,211	3.7
New Zealand	2,751	2.0	Vietnam	2,966	3.5
U.S.A.	2,337	1.7	Philippines	2,808	3.3
Netherlands	1,870	1.3	India	2,681	3.1
Lebanon	1,717	1.2	Taiwan	2,180	2.5
India	1,651	1.2	Bosnia- Herzegovina	2,059	2.4
Sub Total	119,595	86.2	Sub Total	50,306	58.7
Other	19,081	13.8	Other	35,446	41.3
TOTAL	138,676	100.0	TOTAL	85,752	100.0

Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), Fact Sheet, no. 24, Canberra 1997.

Immigration remained high throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and was widely seen as a major cause of Australia's prosperity. An average of over 100,000 immigrants per year entered in the late 1960s, but it was becoming hard to attract Southern European workers, and many were returning to their homelands. The result was a series of measures to attract and retain migrants: further liberalisation of family reunion, recruitment in Yugoslavia and Latin America, and some relaxation of the White Australia Policy. Exceptions were also made for educated and professional Asians – mostly from Commonwealth countries – to enter Australia. But Asian intakes were small and averaged only 8 per cent of the total immigrant intake for the 1960s.²¹

In the 1970s, immigration policy was changed to gear migrant intakes more closely to the changing employment needs of the economy: Applicants now had to have a high level of skills that were in demand in Australia. With the abolition of the White Australia Policy under the Whitlam Government in 1973, a non-discriminatory immigration policy was introduced with biparti-

21 Ibid., p. 24f.

san political support. But it was not until the fall of Saigon in 1975 that ›non-whites‹ began to feature significantly in Australia's immigration intakes as Vietnamese refugees began to arrive in large numbers.

Since the 1970s, Australia's immigration patterns have demonstrated an increasing reliance on immigrants from Asia: While Australia has received immigrants from 160 different countries, by 1990/91, eight out of the top ten source countries of Australia's immigrants were Asian, and they have been the fastest growing overseas-born population group in Australia in the past decade (see Table 2). In 1996/97, Asian immigrants comprised about 40 per cent of all settler arrivals, and today make up nearly 5 per cent of Australia's population.

Australia's official immigration policy since 1945 has been one of permanent immigration, with control facilitated by Australia's isolated geographical position. Various names, terms and conditions were applied to the programs by which permanent immigrants have entered Australia since 1945, but throughout this period there have been two main official avenues: one program for family migration or skilled entrants, and another for humanitarian entrants. The Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement permits people from New Zealand to arrive as permanent immigrants without the need for a visa. Illegal and temporary immigration make up the remaining categories but without land frontiers Australia has not experienced significant numbers of illegal immigrants. Numerically, entry into Australia is dominated by short-term temporary immigration which has grown strongly in recent years with the annual temporary intake doubling since 1987/88.

We turn now to examine how immigrants were incorporated into Australian society in the three key periods: 1947–1972; 1973–1996; and post-1996.

Modes of Incorporation I: Assimilation 1947–1972

The dominant policy of the Australian government up to 1964 was assimilationism – the incorporation of immigrants into Australian society through a one-sided process of adaptation. Immigrants were expected to give up their distinctive cultures and values and become indistinguishable from Anglo-Australians. Considered ›New Australians‹, they were to live and work with Anglo-Australians and rapidly become citizens. Cultural pluralism and the formation of ›ethnic ghettos‹ were to be avoided at all costs. The recognition in the early 1960s that this was not possible, that immigrants did not shake off their cultures and identities, and would return home if forced to, led to the adoption of the policy of integration in 1964, and the official name change of the ›Assimilation Section‹ of the Department of Immigration to the ›Integration Branch‹. Various social measures were also implemented to assist new immigrants. Such measures, however, did not mean abandonment of the long-term aim of assimilation. Immigrants were still seen as the problem: It

was up to them to adapt, by learning English and adopting Australian customs. But it was now recognised that it was necessary to take special measures to deal with immigrants' disadvantages and to encourage social adaptation.

Citizenship

As was argued above, before 1947 conceptions of the nation in Australia were tied to Britain. So much so that, until 1949, ›Australians‹ were solely British subjects. It was only with the introduction of the Nationality and Citizenship Act in 1948, that a new category of ›Australian citizen‹ was created besides that of British subject. Yet what the difference between being an Australian citizen as opposed to a British subject involved was not clear to either the population or those who administered the Act: Citizenship²² continued to be seen in cultural and ethnic terms rather than in terms of rights and responsibilities.

This conception of citizenship led to positive discrimination in favour of British immigrants and obstacles against non-British immigrants. Non-British immigrants, for instance, were only eligible for citizenship after having been resident in Australia for 5 years and 2 years after making a ›Declaration of Intention to Apply for Naturalisation‹. Furthermore, they had to renounce any previous allegiances at public naturalisation ceremonies.²³ In contrast, British immigrants could apply for citizenship after only one year in Australia. Non-British immigrants had limited property rights, only partial access to income protection, and no voting rights. British immigrants (even non-citizens) faced none of these restrictions. They could claim age, invalid and widows' pensions (restricted to British subjects only), had access to public housing (also restricted to British subjects) and had the right to vote (even if they had not been naturalised). It should not be surprising therefore that many British immigrants did not take up Australian citizenship, as for all practical purposes, their rights were the same as those of native Australians.

Although newcomers were encouraged to become Australian citizens, many did not, which caused several government inquiries and campaigns to encourage citizenship take-up amongst immigrants. The low level of take-up was seen primarily as the result of a lack of loyalty; immigrants failed to fulfil their side of the ›bargain‹. There was little understanding that the complexity of the regulations, poor English language ability and having to renounce

22 The section on citizenship borrows from the three recent works in the area: Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*; Jordens, *Redefining Australians*; idem, *Alien to Citizen. Settling Migrants in Australia, 1945–75*, St. Leonards 1997.

23 John Lack/Jacqueline Templeton, *Bold Experiment. A Documentary History of Australian Immigration since 1945*, Melbourne 1995, p. 13.

one's country of birth made citizenship an unattractive option for many immigrants. Furthermore, many could not understand why they had to take an oath of allegiance to a foreign Monarch to become ›Australian‹ citizens.

Various amendments were made to the 1948 Act. In 1955, the need for the ›Declaration of Intent‹ was removed and the fee for naturalisation certificates reduced, then abolished in 1959. Despite evidence that suggested the requirement of renunciation of an immigrants' former nationality was a key factor in low citizenship take-up rates, in 1966 the government incorporated the renunciation into the Oath of Allegiance to the Queen. It was also in 1966 that the restriction of age, invalid and widow's pensions to British subjects was removed. In 1967, in the context of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, conscription for aliens was introduced, giving them a major responsibility of citizenship whether they wanted to become naturalised or not. Yet throughout the 1960s, just over half of all eligible aliens had applied for citizenship. Government leaders and opinion makers were concerned that many immigrants still lacked commitment to Australia.

It had become obvious that low naturalisation rates had perhaps less to do with administrative complexity (although their gradual easing and simplifying did help) and more to do with the failure of assimilationist policy. This realisation meant that changes to the Act after this period began to alter the terms of how citizenship was conceptualised in more significant ways. Symbolic changes were also introduced. After 1964, the heading of the Australian passport was changed from ›British Subject‹ to ›Australian‹, although the words ›British passport‹ still appeared under the Australian coat of arms.²⁴ In 1969, the initial five-year waiting period for naturalisation was reduced to three but only for aliens who could read and write English. The wording of the Act was also changed to read that an Australian citizen had the ›status‹ of a British subject, rather than stating that an Australian citizen was a British subject.²⁵ It was not until 1973, however, that substantial changes to the 1948 Act began in earnest. We turn to these below.

Labour Market

The need for labour after the war led to recruitment of Eastern European refugees and recruitment agreements with most Southern European countries. Post-war migration was mainly concerned with recruiting low-skilled workers for manufacturing and construction. Thus, the main issue was the incorporation of workers into the working-class. Nevertheless, a two-class system of immigration developed with British immigrants, and many Northern Europeans, enjoying full labour-market and civil rights upon arrival

24 Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*, p. 88.

25 *Ibid.*

while those from Eastern and Southern Europe were directed into undesirable jobs and were generally treated as inferior.²⁶ Non-British immigrants were often tied to unskilled jobs for two years: Regardless of qualifications, they were employed as manual workers on large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Snowy River Hydroelectric Scheme, steelworks or factory production-lines. Many migrant workers became concentrated in the expanding manufacturing industries of Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide.

Workers found that entering the labour market at the bottom made it difficult to gain the education and training needed for promotion. Certain types of work therefore turned into a »Southern European occupational ghetto«. ²⁷ Typical of such jobs for men were car assembly lines, construction sites and foundry work and, for women, clothing, textiles and food processing. Service occupations such as catering, refuse collection, office cleaning and unskilled jobs in public utilities also became known as »migrant work«. ²⁸ The structural factors and discriminatory rules that led to initial low status caused enduring patterns of labour market segmentation. Even gaining full labour market rights did not necessarily lead to an improved work situation. Two decades on, the migrant workers of the early waves remained highly concentrated in the original sectors. ²⁹ This applied particularly to migrant women, whose situation was affected both by patriarchal structures in the countries of origin and gender discrimination in Australia.

Welfare

The evolution of the welfare system reflects a history of strong unions and labour shortages in the 19th century, which made Australia into a »working-man's paradise«. The basic principles of the welfare state were laid down by 1910: flat-rate benefits; means-tests rather than entitlement for all; and financing through general taxation, rather than through insurance schemes. ³⁰ The Australian model differs markedly from that developed in Western Europe after 1945. Many of the social benefits delivered through state transfer systems in European countries are provided by a combination of the occupational system and legally enforced state guarantees in Australia, and thus, the welfare system has been highly vulnerable at times of recession. ³¹

26 Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land*, pp. 23f.

27 Constance Lever-Tracy/Michael Quinlan, *A Divided Working Class*, London 1988, p. 82.

28 See Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land*.

29 Ibid.

30 Francis Castles/Deborah Mitchell, *Designing for the Future. An Institutional View of the Australian Welfare State*, Canberra 1995.

31 John May, *Social Welfare*, in: John Henningham (ed.), *Institutions in Australian Society*, Melbourne 1995, pp. 196–222.

The only special social services for immigrants before 1947 were assistance in paying for the voyage, and initial help in finding housing and work on arrival. After 1947, with the increasing diversity of source countries of immigrants, welfare state institutions had to deal not only with issues of social disadvantage of immigrants, but also with cultural difference. Special social policies for immigrants included hostels for new arrivals, help in finding employment and basic English courses. Immigrants also quickly obtained access to general social services. Assimilationist social policies were developed by the ALP Government and maintained by the conservative Menzies Government from 1949 to 1972. The government subsidised voluntary efforts to assist the cultural assimilation of the newcomers, particularly through the 'Good Neighbour Councils' and the annual 'Citizenship Conventions'.³² Once admitted, most migrants were treated as future citizens – indeed, as stated above, citizenship was the key to political assimilation.

By the 1960s, however, researchers found that many migrants were living in isolation and poverty – especially in the event of illness, accident or family breakdown.³³ Immigrant children were failing at school, often due to lack of support in learning English. Departure rates were increasing and it was becoming harder to attract new immigrants. Several policy changes were implemented, including immigrant welfare grants for community agencies, a Committee on Overseas Professional Qualifications, a special law providing for English courses for children and adults, English language courses on television and at the workplace, and the first steps towards a Telephone Interpreter Service.³⁴

Ethnic Community Formation

The concentration of particular ethnic groups in specific areas and locales in Australia was the result of several factors, such as the process of chain migration, economic considerations such as proximity to employment, cheaper housing, the siting of government migrant hostels in particular areas and discrimination and racism from the host society. The process of ethnic community formation has usually followed several stages and developed in a circular rather than linear-chronological fashion. In the early stages, chain migration often brought about strongly localised patterns of settlement³⁵, pro-

32 Andrew Jakubowicz, *The State and the Welfare of Immigrants in Australia*, in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 12, 1989, no. 1, pp. 1–35.

33 Jean Martin, *The Migrant Presence*, Sydney 1978.

34 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA), *Don't Settle for Less*. Report of the Committee for Stage 1 of the Review of Migrant and Multicultural Programs and Services, Canberra 1986, p. 31.

35 Ian H. Burnley, *Resettlement of Immigrant Communities in Urban Australia*, in: Margarita J. Bowen (ed.), *Australia 2000. The Ethnic Impact*, Armidale 1977, pp. 142–173.

viding a critical mass of people to start the process of what Robert Pascoe has called ›placemaking‹.³⁶ The creation of ethnic institutions such as social and cultural organisations, ethnic small businesses, churches, newspapers, and so forth all followed and reinforced one another to form distinctively ethnic neighbourhoods or ›spaces‹.³⁷ Such neighbourhoods were also reinforced through bonds of kinship, regional and folk loyalties, so that they developed complex social networks and viable sub-cultures.³⁸

The nature of these kinship and non-kin bonds and networks not only reinforced residential segregation, but also helped to maintain a sense of ethnic solidarity and identity amongst both first and second generations. The intense and repeated nature of contacts, usually within the same geographic location, reinforced experiences of discrimination suffered outside, and acted as a protected ›space‹ from a hostile environment. Indeed, sociologists studying ethnic communities at the time suggested that their nature and existence in Australia showed that theories of urban isolation and loss of community were not always correct.³⁹

The assimilationist policies of the 1950s and early 1960s were based on the idea that adult migrants would quickly adapt by working and living among Australians, and needed no educational measures beyond some basic English instruction. Children were to become Australians by going to ›normal‹ schools and being immersed in classes taught in English. They were thought to need no special educational provisions. While based on the desire to avoid ethnic segregation and to maintain an homogeneous national culture, the assimilationist model was also regarded as egalitarian: Normal schooling was seen as offering equal opportunities and the chance of upward mobility. The result was a *laissez-faire* approach to immigrant children. No special language classes, nor specially trained teachers were provided, and remedial classes for children from quite different education systems were seen as unnecessary. Instead newcomers were often put in classes well below their age level. Immigrant children were meant to fit in, and if they did not,

36 Robert Pascoe, *Place and Community. The Construction of an Italo-Australian Space*, in: Stephen Castles/Caroline Alcorso/Gaetano Rando/Ellie Vasta (eds.), *Australia's Italians. Culture and Community in a Changing Society*, Sydney 1992, pp. 85–97.

37 Rachel Unikoski, *Communal Endeavours. Migrant Organisations in Melbourne, Canberra 1978*.

38 Charles A. Price, *The Immigrants*, in: Alan F. Davies/Solomon Encel/Michael J. Berry (eds.), *Australian Society*, 3rd ed. Melbourne 1977, pp. 331–355; Ian H. Burnley, *Neighbourhood, Communal Structure and Acculturation in Ethnic Concentrations in Sydney, 1978*, in: idem/Solomon Encel/Grant McCall (eds.), *Immigration and Ethnicity in the 1980s*, Melbourne 1985, pp. 167–197.

39 Gillian Bottomley, *Community and Network in a City*, in: Charles Price (ed.), *Greeks in Australia*, Canberra 1975, pp. 112–142.

this was seen as an individual problem. Often parents were blamed, because they went on speaking their mother tongues at home.

Education authorities were convinced that immigrant children were doing well at school.⁴⁰ In reality, they were experiencing serious problems.⁴¹ Migrant parents were furious, for they saw their dream of upward mobility for the children disappearing due to official ignorance and neglect. By the late 1960s, education authorities had been forced to change their policies. Migrant children were now seen as having special needs, and it was the task of the school to address these through remedial classes and intensive English teaching. The laissez-faire model had been replaced by an ethnic deficit approach. State governments trained and appointed special teachers and announced programs to improve schooling for migrant children. In 1971 the Federal Parliament passed the Immigration (Education) Act, to provide funding for special teachers of English as a Second Language (ESL), capital equipment such as language laboratories, and suitable teaching and learning materials.

Immigrant parents were concerned not only with participation in mainstream schooling but also that their children should maintain knowledge of their mother tongue and culture. Ethnic communities had therefore established their own schools – generally as after-hours or weekend classes.⁴² After 1947, part-time ethnic schools increased in number, having strong roots in their respective ethnic communities, and providing a focus on language and cultural heritage.⁴³ Language maintenance among subsequent generations of the first waves of NESB immigrants has proven critical in maintaining a strong sense of community and ethnic identity.⁴⁴

Ethnic Minorities and the Australian Political System

During this period, there was little involvement of ethnic communities in the formal political system. There are several reasons for this: First, the initial years of settlement were taken up with survival and settlement issues and forming and creating a sense of community and ›space‹. Second, the bulk of immigrants had not yet taken up Australian citizenship. Hence, interest or activity within mainstream political affairs was circumscribed by law. Third, political institutions and culture in the host society were largely hostile to

40 Immigration Advisory Council (IAC), *The Progress and Assimilation of Migrant Children in Australia*, Canberra 1960.

41 Martin, *The Migrant Presence*.

42 Desmond Cahill, *Education of Immigrants and Ethnic Education*, in: James Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People*, Sydney 1988, pp. 878–882.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 879.

44 Michael Clyne, *Community Languages. The Australian Experience*, Cambridge 1991.

immigrants and their active participation in politics, especially as ›ethnic groups‹. All major parties and trade unions (which had a major influence in the ALP) accepted the assimilationist approach to immigrants. In any case, interest in politics during this early period was mainly focused on homeland issues. Other factors such as not being fluent in English, the foreign nature of Australia's system of government, as well as host society hostility were enough to make immigrants seem invisible politically.

However, the major parties, and in particular the ALP, soon realised that the increasing numbers of immigrants had to be reached. In the mid-1950s, the Victorian ALP established its first New Australian Council (NAC) as a way of integrating non-British immigrants into the party. Its aim was to put forward policies within the party and to attract and campaign amongst ›New Australians‹.⁴⁵ Similar structures were established in the Liberal Party and the right-wing Catholic-oriented Democratic Labor Party (DLP). The consensus is that these multi-ethnic bodies were not effective and most had sporadic existences and were largely disbanded or not operational by the early to mid-1960s.⁴⁶

The failure of these initial attempts by the major parties at involving and mobilising immigrants led to some of the larger ethnic communities forming ›extra-party adherent organisations‹⁴⁷: organisations which supported parties such as the ALP by distributing literature in the relevant language and encouraging coethnics to vote for the party. Although many were members of the ALP, the organisations themselves remained outside any official party structures. While also largely unsuccessful, the experience demonstrated to the ALP that such organisations were capable of mobilising widespread support among the ethnic community.

It is not surprising therefore, that there were few, if any, elected representatives from ethnic background in the various legislatures during this period. There was, however, beginning to be some ethnic representation at the local council level by the mid-1960s.⁴⁸ Local level politics provided the best opportunity for the development of ethnic representation in mainstream politics, partly because it was possible to achieve some unity on local issues, and partly because ethnic concentrations were most felt in local voting wards. In contrast, state and federal parliamentary constituencies were much

45 Lyle Allan, *Ethnic Politics in the ALP*, in: Peter R. Hay/Jim Halligan/John Warhurst/Brian Costar (eds.), *Essays on Victorian Politics*, Warrnambool 1985, pp. 134ff.

46 Lynn Richards, *Displaced Politics. Refugee Migrants in the Australian Political Context*, in: James Jupp (ed.), *Ethnic Politics in Australia*, Sydney 1984, pp. 149–161; Allan, *Ethnic Politics in the ALP*.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 134.

48 James Jupp/Barry York/Andrea McRobbie, *The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in Australia*, Canberra 1989, p. 37.

larger, generally including areas with diverse class and ethnic composition, which made ethnic politics fairly problematic.

Another area of political mobilisation amongst immigrants that began in this period was in trade unions. In the early post-war years, the unions tended to see ›foreign‹ immigrants as a potential threat to wages and conditions, particularly at times of recession. This attitude often made migrants feel unwelcome in the labour movement. Indeed, at this time unions had an ambivalent attitude towards the mass migration program, often treading the delicate line between enlightenment and xenophobia.⁴⁹ Immigrants were often excluded or simply ignored. As a result, in the 1950s and 1960s a number of immigrant workers' unions emerged. These did not last, mainly because the Anglo-Australian labour movement found the idea of a separate union of minorities unacceptable and succeeded in breaking the minority unions. These ›immigrant unions‹ did not make a serious impact on immigrant workers since they did not build a strong representational role. On the other hand, immigrant workers' clubs were set up by Greeks, Italians and other groups. These clubs played an integrative role for immigrant workers into the mainstream unions, though their impact on the culture of the Anglo unions was still minimal.⁵⁰ Immigrant worker conferences were held in the 1970s, which were important in fostering the changes in wider social policy that occurred after 1973. At the same time, immigrants began to arrive from areas with strong union traditions, such as Turkey and Latin America. As migrants began to show more confidence in their political voice, the trade union movement began to take notice of them. Later on, the unions realised that a split in the working-class harmed local workers, too, and made efforts to organise migrants and to fight the more blatant forms of exploitation, but by then discriminatory attitudes and structures were well established.

Modes of Incorporation II: Multiculturalism 1973–1996

From about 1970, ALP leaders began to realise that NESB immigrants formed a distinct part of Australian society with special needs. In 1973, Immigration Minister Grassby spoke of multiculturalism for the first time in a speech on ›the family of the nation‹. Grassby explicitly rejected assimilation, seeing the increased diversity of society as a cultural and economic enrichment. It is often argued that this speech marks the beginning of Australian multiculturalism, but actually the emphasis in ALP policies was not on cultural pluralism but on improving welfare and education systems.⁵¹ Nevertheless, multicult-

49 Lever-Tracy/Quinlan, *A Divided Working Class*, p. 133.

50 *Ibid.*, p. 119.

51 Castles/Kalantzis/Cope/Morrissey, *Mistaken Identity*, p. 59.

turalism was supported by all major political parties throughout this period. It is based on the idea that ethnic communities, which maintain the languages and cultures of their areas of origin, are legitimate and consistent with Australian citizenship, as long as minorities accept basic institutions and democratic values. Multiculturalism also means the recognition of the need for special laws, institutions and social policies to overcome barriers to full participation of various ethnic groups in society.⁵²

Citizenship

The period following 1973 saw several important changes to the laws governing citizenship and, as a consequence, the conception of citizenship. Indeed, the 1948 Act was retitled the Australian Citizenship Act in 1973, an official »shedding of the nexus between nationality and citizenship«. ⁵³ The privileged status of British immigrants was also abolished in 1973, with both British and other immigrants required to live in Australia for only 3 years before they could apply for citizenship. British immigrants were now also required to take the oath or affirm their allegiance to become citizens of Australia, although it was only in 1984 that British immigrants who now came to Australia no longer had automatic voting rights. Further changes to the Act were made in 1984, 1986 and 1994. These included a further reduction in the residence requirement from 3 to 2 years, and replacing the allegiance to the British Monarch with allegiance to Australia and its people. In brief, these changes continued to simplify and ease the process for immigrants to become citizens, and reflected the realisation that »Australia was no longer simply British«. ⁵⁴ By the 1990s, despite a reluctance to officially accept dual citizenship, the changes to citizenship requirements »completed a long evolution from a formal official recognition of multiculturalism to an almost nationality-neutral Act«. ⁵⁵

Consequently, citizenship take-up rates increased from their levels in the pre-1973 period. In 1991, 70 per cent of eligible overseas-born residents were Australian citizens. The highest rates of naturalisation of immigrants in Australia for at least ten years (over 95 per cent) were shown by people from Greece, Lebanon, Poland, Vietnam and the Philippines. The lowest rates (below 50 per cent) are found among people from the United Kingdom and New Zealand. ⁵⁶ Several factors are involved in why different groups may have different citizenship rates, for instance, length of residence and type of migration.

52 Ibid.

53 Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*, p. 88.

54 Ibid., p. 89.

55 Ibid., p. 119.

56 Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Australia in Profile*, Canberra 1993, p. 19.

The massive non-British immigration documented above has been at the root of a »long process of legislative, administrative, and eventually cultural change«. ⁵⁷ Australia is shifting away from a culturally-bound notion of citizenship towards a civic one permitting equality of rights for all Australians irrespective of their origins. Citizenship is thus based on the principle of territoriality, that is, residence on the territory of the Australian state. The changes to the practice and conceptions of citizenship are important in reflecting changes that have occurred in the identity of the nation in the post-1947 period.

Labour Market

During this period, the labour market was characterised by recessions, restructuring and high unemployment. The three major recessions of 1974/75, 1982/83 and 1990/91 resulted in much higher unemployment rates, generally, but until 1977 there was no substantial difference in the unemployment rates for NESB immigrants, ESB immigrants and the Australian-born. The second major recession, however, had a much more dramatic effect on those born in a NESB with NESB immigrants disproportionately represented among those in poverty. ⁵⁸ This change was also accompanied by increasing differentiation in the duration of unemployment, again with NESB immigrants disproportionately represented among the long-term unemployed (out of work 52 weeks or more).

The above is directly attributable to the industry sector through which immigrants entered the Australian labour market. Between 1986 and 1995, 32,000 manufacturing jobs – where the majority of NESB immigrants were located – disappeared, yet in the same period, the Australian-born workers increased the number of jobs they held in this sector by 19,000. Furthermore, immigrants are not necessarily finding work in the expanding sectors: In the construction sector, the overseas-born were 30.3 per cent of the labour force in 1986 and 25 per cent in 1995; over 300,000 new jobs were created in retail and wholesale trade over this period yet the overseas-born proportion of the workforce in this sector declined by over 8 per cent. ⁵⁹

Small business ownership has become one method for immigrants to overcome »blocked mobility« in the formal labour market. ⁶⁰ This trend has

57 Jordens, *Redefining Australians*, p. 1.

58 See Marc Lombard, *Income Distribution in Australia. 1983–1989* (Working Paper Series, no. 118), Macquarie University School of Economics and Finance, Sydney 1991.

59 Michael Morrissey, *The Politics of Ectoplasm. Multiculturalism and the ALP 1983–1996*, Sociology Seminar Series, Wollongong University 1996.

60 Jock Collins/Kathy Gibson/Caroline Alcorso/Stephen Castles, *A Shop Full of Dreams. Ethnic Small Business in Australia*, Sydney 1995.

continued with the more recently arrived immigrants such as the Vietnamese.⁶¹ The strong presence of NESB immigrants as self-employed, and in small and big business as owners and employers in Australia suggests that inequality exists between and among immigrant groups, just as it does for the non-immigrant majority. Furthermore, the changing patterns of immigration in Australia in the last decade or so have ensured that recent NESB immigrants – other than refugees and immediate family – have higher skills, better qualifications and are more proficient in English than their predecessors. Hence many Asians are now employed in managerial or professional jobs, with higher remuneration than earlier generations of NESB immigrants. Generally, NESB immigrants have been the most vulnerable in the labour market during times of recession and restructuring. Earlier immigrants who entered the manufacturing sector suffered most hardship during the downturn in this sector. In addition, racism and lack of recognition of overseas qualifications have ensured a higher rate of unemployment even for skilled immigrants.

Welfare

The strongly reformist Whitlam ALP Government from 1972 to 1975 did much to improve the welfare system. Between 1972 and 1976, social expenditure increased by 118 per cent.⁶² The Australian Assistance Plan – the centre-piece of social policy reform – put special emphasis on migrant disadvantage. Migrant Task Forces were set up to consult with migrant groups. Specific measures included the right to invalid and widows pensions, migrant housing and low-interest loans, family health insurance, and child-care programs employing workers of appropriate ethnic backgrounds.⁶³

The ALP saw involvement by immigrants and other marginalised groups in welfare planning as a way of countering the entrenched resistance to change of a highly conservative bureaucracy. Nonetheless, consultation mechanisms and community development policies did treat immigrant groups as communities with leaders and common interests. Social policy was thus closely linked with the emerging policy of multiculturalism. This furthered the process of politicisation of migrant welfare, and encouraged the formal constitution of ethnic lobby organisations, such as the Ethnic Communities' Councils (ECCs) and their national umbrella body, the Federation

61 Nancy Viviani, *The Indochinese in Australia 1975–1995. From Burnt Boats to Barbeques*, Melbourne 1996, pp. 88–90.

62 May, *Social Welfare*, pp. 202f.

63 Andrew Jakubowicz/Michael Morrissey/Joanne Palser, *Ethnicity, Class and Social Policy in Australia*, Sydney 1984, pp. 60f.

of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia (FECCA).⁶⁴ However, the reform policies of the Whitlam Government foundered in the first severe post-war recession. High unemployment and falling state revenue ended the only serious attempt in Australian history to build a European-style welfare state.

The election of the Liberal-Country Party Coalition in 1975 led to a reversal of many of the social policies introduced in the previous phase. Cuts in general welfare services, such as the abolition of the public health service and reductions in eligibility for various types of benefits, hit migrants hard. The government acknowledged the need for action, with a new Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA) taking on the task of coordinating public and private welfare services for immigrants. In 1978, the Galbally Committee of Enquiry into Post Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants recommended the allocation of 50 million Australian dollars over three years to improve migrant services. The Galbally report asserted the primacy of ethnicity in social relations, and recommended that ethnic community organisations should have a major role in welfare provision. Migrant welfare was partially removed from the mainstream social welfare system through a system of grants to ethnic organisations. This provided welfare on the cheap, since pay, staffing levels and conditions could be lower than in government agencies.⁶⁵ Thus by the late 1970s, multiculturalism based on an ethnic group model had emerged as a major government strategy, concerned simultaneously with maintaining social order in an ethnically diverse society, cutting government expenditure, and enhancing social control over minorities.

Key principles of the ALP Hawke-Keating Government (1983–1996), elected in 1983, were economic rationalism and managerial efficiency, linked to policies of internationalisation and deregulation, reduction of government spending and privatisation of state enterprises. Expansion of education and training played an important part in the strategy to increase international competitiveness, including measures to improve access to education for disadvantaged groups. Similarly, the desire to increase economic efficiency led to stress on effective use of immigrants' skills and removing barriers to recognition of their qualifications. Immigration and cultural diversity thus played a key role in strategies of modernisation and internationalisation. The ALP attempt to combine economic rationalism with social justice meant a shift away from an ethnic group model of multiculturalism to a 'citizenship model'. The rights to cultural difference and to social equality were seen as important not just for ethnic minorities, but for all members of Australian society. Multicultural policies were institutionalised through a whole range of

64 DIEA, *Don't Settle for Less*, pp. 31–34; Lois Foster/David Stockley, *Australian Multiculturalism. A Documentary History and Critique*, Clevedon/Philadelphia 1988, pp. 26–29; Castles/Kalantzis/Cope/Morrissey, *Mistaken Identity*, pp. 58–65.

65 Jakubowicz/Morrissey/Palser, *Ethnicity, Class and Social Policy*, p. 81.

special agencies and policies at both the federal and state levels. However, this took place in the context of severe constraints on government social policy expenditure. The result was that eligibility to general welfare services and benefits was severely restricted, in favour of a system of targeting those considered most in need.

For immigrants this meant a move away from services for specific ethnic groups. The notion of ›mainstreaming‹, introduced in the mid-1980s by the New South Wales (NSW) Government, was generally adopted as a principle for restructuring government services. This implied that all government agencies should be aware of the needs of the various groups within the population, and plan their services to be accessible to everybody. The principle of Access and Equity (A&E) was introduced to ensure that all government departments and agencies provided their services in a manner appropriate to the needs of the various ethnic groups. Special agencies, such as the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) and the State Ethnic Affairs Commissions, had the task of ensuring the A&E principles were followed. At the same time, some welfare entitlements for migrants were cut. For instance in the early 1990s, new migrants were denied social security benefits, including unemployment benefits, for the first six months after arrival. Fees were introduced for English language courses for adult migrants, although some categories such as refugees were exempted. People sponsoring their relatives as immigrants had to give a two-year ›assurance of support‹.⁶⁶

Ethnic Community Formation

Residential concentration of particular ethnic groups has not been part of official policy nor had widespread public support, yet by the early 1970s it had become accepted as part of the Australian urban environment. Neighbourhoods where a specific ethnic group was large enough to affect its appearance, culture and social structure were found in both Melbourne and Sydney. Public perceptions of ethnic neighbourhoods have shifted. The ›little Italies‹ and the ›Chinatowns‹ of the big cities are now often seen as a cultural enrichment and as an integral part of Australia's multicultural society. Such areas as Carlton in Melbourne or Leichhardt in Sydney are no longer areas of Italian residential concentration, but rather gentrified areas with commercial activities based on European products and culture. Their acceptance has also been assisted by the policies of multiculturalism pursued in this period.

It has also become clear that much of the clustering by the earlier waves of immigrant groups was a transitory phenomenon, linked to class position, location of initial workplaces and unfamiliarity with the new society. As the economic situation and the English-language ability of immigrants im-

66 That is, a promise to support their relatives if they were unemployed or in need.

proved, their housing tended to become more dispersed. Social and residential mobility of the second and subsequent generations as well as intermarriage further erode concentration. Neighbourhoods retain their ›ethnic‹ character because immigrants (including the subsequent generations) continue to patronise speciality shops, clubs, churches and functions in these areas.

Renewed debate and criticisms over ethnic concentrations, however, arose with the acceptance of Indo-Chinese refugees after 1975, who have followed the trajectories of previous immigrant groups by establishing neighbourhoods and a community presence in areas around Richmond (Melbourne) and Cabramatta (Sydney). In the mid-1980s, some claimed that Asian immigrants were becoming highly concentrated in particular areas. They saw the ›Asianisation of Australia‹ as a threat to ›ordinary Australians‹, who would lose out in the competition for jobs, housing and education.⁶⁷

This debate has continued in the 1990s, with some social scientists claiming that certain groups are forming enclaves.⁶⁸ Some argue that certain immigrant groups – notably the Vietnamese, Lebanese and Turkish-born – tend to be highly concentrated, to have high rates of dependency on welfare benefits, and not to disperse over time, comparing this situation with U.S. studies on the black ›underclass‹.⁶⁹ The picture looks different, however, when one examines Vietnamese-born people as a whole. Viviani shows that simultaneous processes of concentration and dispersal are at work.⁷⁰ About two thirds of Vietnamese-Australians live fairly dispersed throughout urban Australia. Due to their lack of resources as refugees, most started out in fairly low-status jobs, and lived in poorer urban areas. Over time, many have achieved upward and outward mobility. But a minority of Vietnamese people (between a quarter and a third) have not followed this trajectory. They remain concentrated in areas of initial settlement, but share them with other disadvantaged groups, both immigrant and Australian-born. The characteristics of the population in such areas are: high unemployment, especially of youth, women and people over 50; poor English proficiency and low standards of education; lack of recognised skills relevant to the Australian labour market; and experience of racial discrimination and abuse. The situation is thus one of concentration of disadvantaged groups, rather than ethnic concentration. There are no areas of complete segregation of one ethnic group from the rest of the population. This is confirmed by research showing unequivocally that there are neither ethnic enclaves nor ghettos in Australian

67 Geoffrey Blainey, *All for Australia*, Sydney 1984.

68 Semus Grimes, *Residential Segregation in Australian Cities. A Literature Review*, in: *International Migration Review*, 27, 1993, no. 1, pp. 103–120.

69 Ernest Healy, *Welfare Benefits and Residential Concentrations Amongst Recently-Arrived Migrant Communities*, in: *People and Place*, 4, 1996, no. 2, pp. 20–31.

70 Nancy Viviani, *Vietnamese Concentrations. A Response*, in: *ibid.*, no. 3, pp. 20–23.

cities.⁷¹ But even if claims of ›ethnic enclaves‹ or ›ghettos‹ are inaccurate, they continue to influence public debate through the media and political speeches.

During this period, changes were also introduced to education and language policy. One aspect of this was intensive English teaching through the Child Migrant Education Program, renamed the English as a Second Language (ESL) Program by 1976. Attitudes towards ethnic schools also changed, with policymakers recognising these as a legitimate way of maintaining cultural heritage and strengthening students' self-esteem. Funding for part-time ethnic schools was provided by state and federal governments, and help was given to improve teaching standards. ›Insertion classes‹ were set up to provide mother-tongue teaching for migrant children within normal schools. Some full-time ethnic schools were permitted, often with a religious character. By 1980, there were estimated to be 97,000 students studying 45 different languages in about 1,400 after-hours schools and insertion classes, managed by some 500 ethnic school authorities.⁷²

In 1979, the Federal Government introduced a Multicultural Education Program aimed at all students, not just immigrants.⁷³ This had three official aims: a) to foster understanding, tolerance and respect for different cultures, and to raise the cultural awareness of Anglo-Australian children; b) to raise the self-esteem of migrant children by celebrating their cultures and showing their relevance to the whole community; and c) to encourage children to learn community languages. However, the program had limited funds and was mainly a way for the Federal Department of Education to influence the practices of education providers at the state level.⁷⁴ The program was considerably cut in 1986.⁷⁵ Following widespread protests by migrant parents and ethnic community organisations some of the funding was restored.

After 1986, the emphasis began to shift away from cultural pluralism towards concern with the role of education in securing social equity. This led to the concept of mainstreaming – the idea that the whole education system,

71 Ian H. Burnley, *The Geography of Ethnic Communities*, in: Shirley FitzGerald/Garry Wotherspoon (eds.), *Minorities. Cultural Diversity in Sydney*, Sydney 1995, pp. 174–191; see also Frank Jones, *National Identity and Social Values*, in: *People and Place*, 4, 1996, no. 4, pp. 17–26; Peter Marcuse, *Is Australia Different? Globalization and the New Urban Poverty* (Occasional Paper 3, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute), Melbourne 1993, especially Ch. 3.

72 Mary Kalantzis/Bill Cope/Greg Noble/Scott Poynting, *Cultures of Schooling*, London 1990, pp. 22f.

73 *Ibid.*; Mary Kalantzis/Bill Cope, *The Experience of Multicultural Education in Australia. Six Case Studies*, Wollongong 1989; Lois Foster, *Diversity and Multicultural Education*, Sydney 1988; Cahill, *Education of Immigrants and Ethnic Education*.

74 *Ibid.*, p. 881.

75 Desmond Cahill, *Immigration and Schooling in the 90s*, Canberra 1996.

rather than just special services – should take account of the special situation and needs of NESB children which, as seen above, was first introduced in NSW in the mid-1980s.

There has been considerable debate among educationalists and sociologists about the degree to which children of immigrants have achieved social mobility. The main indicators used have been school retention rates, access to tertiary education, qualifications gained, and occupational distribution. The research findings, however, are quite uneven. The >optimistic< view is that the children of European immigrants have been astonishingly successful in education, and should no longer be regarded as a disadvantaged category.⁷⁶ Others claim that the evidence for educational success is patchy, and often based on methodologically dubious data and analysis.⁷⁷ Although there is clearly upward mobility in some ethnic groups, others have had far less positive experiences.

Ethnic community formation and identity in this period have also been strengthened through the growth and consolidation of the ethnic media. Australia has long had a range of journals and newspapers published by the various non-Anglo communities in their languages of origin.⁷⁸ In 1986, there were over 120 newspapers in more than 30 community languages.⁷⁹ The ethnic press serves social, political, economic, cultural and psychological needs amongst ethnic communities.⁸⁰ The development of broadcasting was closely linked to the emergence of multicultural policies. By 1986, there were public ethnic radio stations in all Australian capital cities. In other areas, public broadcasters provide some programs in community languages, along with English-language services.

76 Robert Birrell/Siew Ean Khoo, *The Second Generation in Australia. Educational and Occupational Characteristics* (Statistical Report, no. 14), Canberra 1995; see also Siew Ean Khoo, *The Second Generation in Australia*, in: *BIMPR Bulletin*, August 1995, no. 14, pp. 11–18; Kee Poo Kong, *Socio-economic Attainments of Immigrants and Later-generation Australians*, Canberra 1992; Ian Dobson/Robert Birrell/Virginia Rapson, *The Participation of Non-English-Speaking Background Persons in Higher Education*, in: *People and Place*, 4, 1996, no. 1, 1996, pp. 46–54.

77 Cahill, *Immigration and Schooling*, pp. 35–50.

78 Michael Clyne, *Community Languages*; Gaetano Rando/Franko Leoni, *The Italian Language in Australia. Sociolinguistic Aspects*, in: Castles/Alcorso/Rando/Vasta (eds.), *Australia's Italians*, pp. 69–83; Caroline Alcorso/Cesare Giulio Popoli/Gaetano Rando, *Community Networks and Institutions*, in: *ibid.*, pp. 106–124.

79 Clyne, *Community Languages*, p. 146.

80 Phillip Bell/Sandra Heilpern/Michael McKenzie/Joan Vipond, *Different Agenda. Economic and Social Aspects of the Economic Press in Australia* (Working Paper 8), Wollongong 1991; Rogelia Pe-Pua/Michael Morrissey, *Content Analysis of Australian Non-English Language Newspapers*, Canberra 1994, 1995, 1996.

Multicultural television started up in 1980 under the aegis of the government-funded Special Broadcasting Service (SBS). The new service was controversial. Some ethnic leaders saw it as further tightening of government control over the ethnic media while certain Anglo-Australians regarded multicultural television as an assault on national culture. Others criticised the ›high-brow‹ approach of SBS TV, with its serious news and current-affairs programs, and ›film-festival‹ type movies in a variety of languages. But when the government decided to merge SBS with the other government-funded network, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) in 1986, ethnic associations leapt to its defence. Their protests made the government back down. SBS TV has survived, though inadequate funding has forced it to include advertisements and sponsorship.

Ethnic Minorities and the Australian Political System

From about 1970, ALP leaders realised that immigrants represented a significant section of working-class voters, and that their votes could be decisive in inner-city areas.⁸¹ Party leaders attended ethnic community meetings and functions, and it seems partly attributable to this practice that the ALP won the 1972 election. The Whitlam Government's concern with immigrant welfare, and the first steps towards multiculturalism were logical consequences.

It was in this period that the first serious and successful attempts at immigrant incorporation within the political party system occurred with the creation, by the ALP, of ›ethnic branches‹ which were based on single ethnic groups which had large residential concentrations at the time. The most successful ethnic branches have been the Greek-based ones, of which there were at least eleven by 1985. These were used effectively by the Greek membership of the party to secure Greek representation in all three levels of government. This strategy has continued and has ensured that the Greek community is one of the most represented and influential ethnic group in Australia. Similarly, the Victorian ALP created ethnic branches for other NESB immigrants in the early 1980s. Although such branches have been most influential in Victoria, a national survey of the party in 1989 revealed that ethnic branches of the ALP also existed in several other states (by the late 1990s, ›ethnic branch stacking‹ had become a very controversial issue for the ALP, especially in NSW and Victoria). The 1980s and 1990s have been characterised by more extensive participation of immigrants from NESB within political parties and the political system more generally.⁸²

81 Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land*.

82 Ernest Healy, *Ethnic ALP Branches. The Balkanisation of Labor*, in: *People and Place*, 1. 1993, no. 4, pp. 37–42; Gianni Zappalà, *The Phases of Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in Australian Politics*, in: *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 20. 1999,

By 1981/82, there were NESB members on 17 councils in Melbourne, 10 in Sydney and 6 in Adelaide. Representation continued to grow through the 1980s, with significant NESB representation in the four major metropolitan areas of Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and Perth.⁸³ Ethnic representation also increased during this period especially at the local and state levels. Despite this, immigrants still remain underrepresented in relation to their share in the population.⁸⁴ This is particularly the case at the federal level. In 1990, there were only 7 NESB members (born overseas) in the House of Representatives in the Federal Parliament compared to 14 of English-speaking background (born overseas) and 202 Australian-born.⁸⁵ The immigrant (especially NESB) membership of the Australian Parliament has changed very slowly over the past 20 years. In 1995, 71 per cent of all legislators and appointed officials at the three tiers of government were locally-born with both parents born in Australia (as against 56 per cent of the population).⁸⁶ At the 1996 dissolution of the Parliament before the March election, only 3.1 per cent of the members of both houses were born in NESB countries.⁸⁷

While various reasons are advanced for poor ethnic representatives at all levels of government⁸⁸, a major factor working against greater ethnic representation is that ethnic Australians are viewed as a minority and do not have a legitimate place in positions of power. As Jupp recently stated: »The problem is not necessarily one of lack of talent but rather of the residual attitude that power rightfully belongs to ›real‹ Australians.«⁸⁹

As was noted above, the beginning of the 1970s also saw changed attitudes towards immigrants by trade unions. Nevertheless, immigrant workers continued to face major problems in the workplace, including lack of knowledge about their industrial rights; being played off against Anglo-Australians

no. 1, pp. 65–79; James Jupp, *Identity*, in: Richard Nile (ed.), *Australian Civilisation*, Melbourne 1994; Jupp/York/McRobbie, *The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities*; Allan, *Ethnic Politics*; idem, *Ethnic Transition in Inner-Melbourne Politics*, in: James Jupp (ed.), *Ethnic Politics in Australia*, Sydney 1984, pp. 39–48; Michael Daly, *Ethnic Political Power. Myth or Reality?*, in: *Australian Rationalist*, 1995, no. 38, pp. 21–27.

83 Jupp/York/McRobbie, *The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities*, p. 37.

84 *Ibid.*

85 James Jupp/Marie Kabala, *The Politics of Australian Immigration*, Canberra 1993, p. 259.

86 James Jupp, *Citizenship, Social Justice and Ethnic Diversity*, in: Solomon R. Davis (ed.), *Citizenship in Australia. Democracy, Law and Society*, Carlton 1996, pp. 104ff.

87 *Ibid.*

88 See for example James Jupp, *Arrivals and Departures*, Melbourne 1966, p. 92; idem, *Citizenship, Social Justice and Ethnic Diversity*, p. 104; idem/York/McRobbie, *The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities*.

89 Jupp, *Citizenship, Social Justice and Ethnic Diversity*, p. 106.

and other migrant workers for overtime and job allocations; and lack of proficiency in English. These problems have acted as major barriers to immigrant worker militancy in this period. One study in NSW between 1982 and 1986 indicated that most unions had still done very little to deal with the needs and difficulties of migrant workers. It found immigrant men and women severely underrepresented in union bureaucracies, which were dominated by men of Anglo-Saxon background. This led to isolation and lack of participation in union activities.⁹⁰ Despite these barriers, migrant workers have been involved in numerous struggles over pay and work conditions. Cultures of resistance have emerged among migrant workers, both male and female. In the 1980s, the advances made by the women's movement also had beneficial effects for migrant women in Australia.⁹¹

Modes of Incorporation III?: 1996–1999

On 2 March 1996, the Liberal-National Party Coalition was elected with a large majority as the new Federal Government. During the election, racism played an unexpected role, with several conservative candidates criticising provision of special services for minorities. In one Queensland electorate, the Liberal Party candidate, Pauline Hanson, attacked services for Aboriginal people in such an extreme way that she was disendorsed as a candidate by her own party. Despite this, she won the seat as an Independent, with one of the biggest anti-Labor swings in the country. This was widely taken as a signal that anti-minority discourses were accepted by a large share of the population. After the election, government leaders and media commentators started to attack Aboriginal and immigrant rights in a way that had not been seen in Australia for many years.

Before the election, the Coalition parties had promised to retain the social safety-net, but also to cut government expenditure and deregulate the labour market. However, in August 1996 they began to dismantle major elements of the welfare state, announcing cuts to many government services, including measures for the unemployed, health services, aged care and tertiary education. Major cuts were introduced in the immigration and multicultural area. The immigration intake for 1996/97 was cut by 11 per cent. Fees for visas were increased drastically and costs for English language courses for new immigrants were more than doubled. At the same time, many occu-

90 Loucas Nicolaou, *Trade Union Involvement*, in: James Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People*, Sydney 1988, pp. 961–963; see also: idem, *Australian Unions and Immigrant Workers*, Sydney 1991.

91 Ellie Vasta, *Australia's Post-War Immigration. Power, Identity and Resistance*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Brisbane 1990; idem, *Immigrant Women and the Politics of Resistance*, in: *Australian Feminist Studies*, 18. 1993, pp. 5–23.

pational English courses were abolished. The largest cut was to be achieved by increasing the waiting period for eligibility for most welfare benefits from six months to two years for new entrants. These changes to welfare provision in part reflect the popular view that immigrants are placing too much burden on the social security system.⁹² The most important political change was the abolition of the Office of Multicultural Affairs, which previously had considerable influence on government policies from its location in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Some remnants of the Office were integrated into a (re-named) Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), but with very limited resources, and no political weight. This was a clear signal that the current government did not see multicultural policy as an important area.

In September 1996, Hanson made her inaugural speech in Federal Parliament. She again attacked Aboriginal people, called for the stopping of immigration, the abolition of multiculturalism and warned of ›the Asianisation‹ of Australia. Public opinion polls and talk-back radio showed considerable support for her opinions, especially among the working-class. Again, research indicated a failure to understand multiculturalism by many Anglo-Australians, as well as beliefs that immigration might cause Australians to lose their jobs. Political leaders were slow to condemn Hanson's views due to fear of losing voter support and it was not until October 1996 that the parliament passed a bipartisan resolution condemning racism. This resolution was motivated primarily by fears of losing Asian export orders, and reports from universities that Asian students were failing to enrol for courses. Even then, however, the Prime Minister refused to declare his support for multiculturalism, although it is official government policy.

Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, established in 1997, contested the Queensland State election in June 1998 getting 11 of the 89 seats in Queensland, 22.7 per cent of first preference votes. This was a watershed in Australian politics: For the first time since the 1950s, »a new political party [...] won a significant number of seats in a lower house of Parliament under a single member system«. ⁹³ Nine of these seats were won in regional and rural Queensland, where One Nation received 29.8 per cent of the vote. While the three major political parties in Australia all lost support with the rise of One Nation, the Coalition suffered the most with National Party support falling 11.1 per cent, resulting in their lowest number of first preference votes since World War II.⁹⁴

92 See Healy, *Welfare Benefits and Residential Concentrations*; Robert Birrell, ›Our Nation‹. *The Vision and Practice of Multiculturalism under Labor*, in: *People and Place*, 4, 1996, no. 1, pp. 19–27.

93 Gerard Newman, *Queensland Election 1998*. Research Note, no. 49, 1997–98.

94 *Ibid.*

Thus, at the time of writing, the Australian political landscape appears to be undergoing substantial change which may herald a shift away from multiculturalism as the model of immigrant incorporation in Australia. But the social forces that led to the development of multiculturalism have not ceased to exist, and elite opinion in Australia – as represented by big business, cultural leaders, the mass media and the public service – still favours a non-discriminatory immigration policy, anti-racist policies and multiculturalism.⁹⁵ Such policies are seen as vital for good relations with Australia's increasingly powerful Asian neighbours. It is this elitist opinion, however, that many Australians are voting against, with claims that the elite are ›out of touch‹ with ›ordinary Australians‹.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the incorporation of Australia's post-war immigrants into Australian society in three key periods: 1947 to 1972, when the dominant approach was one of assimilation; 1973 to 1996, when the dominant approach to managing ethnic diversity shifted towards the policy of multiculturalism, and in the indeterminate period since the election of the Coalition government in 1996.

Such modes of incorporation were in part conditioned by but also in turn influenced the dominant notions of the nation and national identity that existed in each period. Assimilation, for instance, was consistent with and reinforced the pre-1947 national identity, based on the British cultural heritage and a belief in the superiority of the white Anglo-Saxon ›race‹. The policy of multiculturalism was in a sense inevitable once it was clear that the previous mode of incorporation was no longer sustainable. The increased cultural and ethnic diversity, with its attendant processes of community formation, could not do anything but challenge the previous myths and symbols of Australian identity. This shift was best seen through the changes that occurred in the practice and conception of citizenship in the 20th century. However, no absolute distinction can be made between assimilation and multiculturalism, for the new approach would not have been possible without the preceding effects of assimilation policy in making most immigrants into citizens and thus giving them the opportunity to make political demands within mainstream institutions.

Since the 1980s, however, the view that immigration and multiculturalism are a threat to social cohesion and national identity has become widespread amongst certain sections and groups within Australian society. Assimilation affirmed that a national norm or type existed, whereas multicult-

95 See for example Stephen Castles, *Multiculturalism in Australia*, in: James Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People*, 2nd ed. [2000].

turalism began to challenge the position and place of such norms in a modern, open and diverse society.

Identity politics is about struggle over symbols and who has the power to give legitimacy to some over others.⁹⁶ Thus, the debate over Australian national identity in the 1990s is not so much about an ›identity crisis‹ but a power struggle over who has the legitimacy to define it. The political developments post March 1996 can be seen as a victory for the traditionalist approach to identity, those who wish to preserve the links to Britain, who oppose multiculturalism and indigenous rights, and a loss for those who have pursued a more modernist approach, which emphasises a republic, cultural diversity and Aboriginal reconciliation.⁹⁷ The Coalition victory represented the reassertion of ›Old Australian‹ values, held by people who had felt excluded during the previous decade. Yet as some have rightly argued, the »Anglo constituency has not been *excluded* but it has lost its *exclusive* claim on this society and its resource«. ⁹⁸ The strength of the traditional view should not be underestimated: There is still a strong view that a ›true‹ or ›real‹ Australian is of Anglo descent.

At present, it is unclear whether multiculturalism can or should serve as a form of national identity as Australia enters the next millennium.⁹⁹ The events that have occurred since March 1996 are best seen as part of a longer term struggle between one group who has been accustomed to having the hold over the reins of power, the power to define and validate symbols of national and individual identity, and another more recent group, who are now in a better position to challenge that monopoly.

96 Geoffrey Stokes (ed.), *The Politics of Identity in Australia*, Cambridge 1997.

97 Jeffrey Archer, *Situating Australian National Identity in Theory and Practice*, in: *ibid.*, pp. 23–36.

98 Cochrane, *Race Memory*, pp. 8f., 30.

99 Castles/Kalantzis/Cope/Morrissey, *Mistaken Identity*; James Jupp, *The Ethnic Dimension*, in: Clive Bean/Scott Bennett/Marion Simms/John Warhurst (eds.), *The Politics of Retribution. The 1996 Australian Federal Election*, Sydney 1997, pp. 23–36.

Post-1945 Migration to France and Modes of Socio-Political Mobilisation

Introduction

According to most specialists, two distinct phases mark migration to France during the period from 1945 to the 1970s. The intense labour demands of the immediate post-World War II period were mostly satisfied by immigration from France's near neighbours, namely from Southern and Eastern Europe and the Maghrebian countries across the Mediterranean. More recent migratory waves increasingly include faraway and less familiar nationalities, ethnic and religious groups, which have introduced different modes of socio-political mobilisation and transformed the traditional French political landscape. What has been the main dividing line or watershed between the two phases? In July 1974, France officially put a stop to labour migration, which, between World War II and this period, was mainly thought to be transitory in nature, and thus temporary. These immigrants, however, settled, and the ensuing family reunion contributed to both community building and the development of distinctive ethno-religious groups. The massive post-war migrant labour recruitment, conceived essentially with economic considerations in mind (cost-benefit analysis, social cost and economic returns) has given rise to other concerns over the last 30 years.

To some extent, the issues arising during the post-1974 period were perhaps the most radical ones to challenge the French political system. The measures taken by the Socialist regime on their coming to power in May 1981 – for instance, the freedom to set up associations by foreign migrants – were also quite revolutionary. These associative networks were used, during the 1980s, as political platforms by the Maghrebian leaders to enter French politics. At the same time, the rise of the extreme-right *Front National* (FN) was used as a brake to hinder the progressive and democratic measures that should have been taken during the Socialist presidency. For instance, the immigrants' right to vote at a municipal level, promised by the Socialists, has yet to be granted. More repressive measures were taken when right-wing political parties came to power. The Commission on the Nationality Code was established by the Chirac government in 1986. Charles Pasqua, as Minister of the Interior in the Balladur government, renewed the traditions of the right in 1993, resulting in the infamous Pasqua Law on immigration, which was again altered by Jean-Louis Debré in 1996/97, only to be mostly can-

celled by the Guigou Law of 1998. Underlying all these political developments were the deeper socio-political changes brought about by the immigrant populations, and, more specifically, by their youth component. Diverse modes of socio-political mobilisation, for instance the political demonstrations, such as the march of December 1983, of the ›Beurs‹ (descendants of immigrants or *Harkis*) and the entry of Islam into the French public realm, were accompanied by challenges to the traditional ways of dealing with migrant populations in the French political system. Multiculturalism and modulated forms of Republican assimilationism hence affected the intellectual and socio-political approaches to managing immigration in France. Ethnicity, as a basic concept in the approach of most Western industrial states towards migrant minorities, is denied – this, too, is a component of ›French exceptionalism‹ on a global scale.

Immigrants as Objects of State Policy

Historical Background

Recalling the long-term history of foreign migration to France helps in the task of ›recontextualising‹ the immigrants' mobilisation processes. The first phases of migration and settlement in France were predominantly of European origin. Migration history since the industrialisation epoch, from the mid-19th century to World War I, was eurocentric (mostly from the neighbouring countries as Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, etc.). Among these, Italian immigrants were the least accepted, comparable in status to today's Maghrebians and Africans.

There are no immigration records prior to the first census taken in 1851. This census, coinciding with the commencement of the period of unrestricted immigration (1851–1888), enumerated 378,561 foreigners. The 1866 census recorded 635,495 foreigners, and the 1872 census 723,507 foreigners – mainly of European origin. This period also saw the first arrivals of Algerians (initially as carpet-vendors in Parisian streets and other major urban centres, later, from 1900 to 1905, as industrial workers). The period from 1888 to 1914 saw the beginnings of regulation and organised immigration. For the duration of World War I (1914–1918), ›*l'encadrement*‹ (the establishment of a controlled regime) for foreigners and colonial workers was the general rule. The years between the wars (1919–1939) were characterised by a tightening of migration policies. This is seen in the growing pragmatism and liberalism of government policies (1919–1930), then in a politicisation of debates and the subsequent rise of xenophobia and, from 1940 to 1945, in the repression and mobilisation of foreigners. Massive industrialisation and the colonisation of tropical countries from 1850 to 1914 provided the economic and political background to foreign labour migration to France. World War I saw the arri-

val of some non-Europeans, although most immigrants were still from neighbouring countries. In contrast, post-World War II migration was to be heavily marked by non-Europeans and an increased colonial presence inside French frontiers. However, it would not be until 1974 that immigrants became noticeably politicised with the ›Islam issue‹ gaining significance from the mid-1980s in France, and in Europe generally.

Almost all migratory waves during the 100 years from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century occurred in a predominantly Republican context, whereby some major sections of the diverse migrant communities became French through the process of naturalisation. The second generation, socialised in French schools and workplaces, was seemingly assimilated into the French nation. Immigrant populations during this period did not politically challenge the French sense of nation and national identity. However, as primarily economic migrants they were resented by indigenous workers as potential competitors. This resulted in a powerful nationalist upsurge from sections of the French political, military and civil society. This ultranationalist upsurge may be interpreted as part of the revolt against the Enlightenment (*les Lumières*), which helped to shape French and other Western societies from the 18th century.¹ French nationalism was explained in terms of endogenous traits of French society. Except for the Jews, no major reference was made to the foreign migrant communities as such, despite the fact that anti-foreign propaganda is seen as part and parcel of French nationalism.

As an old immigration country compared to its European neighbours, France has had a fairly stable foreign population over the past twenty years (3.6 million at the 1990 census). But the demand for migrant labour as well as political responses and public opinion towards immigration have varied greatly from 1945 to the 1990s. The main periods are as follows:

- 1945–1965: a period of economic growth and reconstruction when foreign labour demand was high, with a rapid turnover of nationalities and muted political reactions. The state wanted a planned migration policy but the employers' private interests won out in that they recruited directly in some of the sending countries.
- 1966–1974: a period in which the state perceived a strong need to achieve control of the flows of immigrants, without being able, however, to slow down the sudden rise of the ›birds of passage‹.
- 1975–1995: a period of strict border control due to economic recession and political choice in spite of migratory pressure, with some imbalance between state and market demands.

1 See the major work of Zeev Sternhell, *La droite révolutionnaire 1885–1914. Les origines françaises du fascisme*, Paris 1997 (1st ed. 1987). Sternhell started his work on French nationalism while undertaking his PhD at the Political Institute of Paris. See also: Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français, Paris 1978.

During the last twenty years, official political discourse opposed flows to stocks, mobility to integration, and emphasised the fact that illegal immigrants hinder regular migrants from achieving integration into French society. A left-right consensus was reached on the main objectives: control, integration, and security. From 1945 until now, recruitment patterns have shifted from mass migration to selective migration in a segmented labour market. If the traditional migrant working and residential reception areas – Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Lille-Tourcoing-Roubaix and some other big cities and their suburban areas – have remained the same, the emigrant countries have, on the contrary, increasingly diversified (from the Maghreb to the rest of the ›Third World‹). Growing entry of highly-skilled personnel and feminisation are the other specific dominant traits of the immigrant population. Presented in chronological order, the main changes of the post-war period are more easily understood.

The ›Thirty Glorious Years‹ (*Trente Glorieuses*), 1945–1975, were dominated by labour migration and marked by uncontrolled immigration. After a short period during which migration flows were controlled², state policy-making was rapidly overcome by the laws of supply and demand in the labour market. The period from 1945 to 1973 saw a rapid turnover of nationalities from the Iberians and Maghrebians to Black Africans, Yugoslavs and Turks. They were recruited mainly in the construction, vehicle, iron and steel industries, agriculture and the mining sectors. The typical immigrant was an unmarried working-class man, who, having left his family behind, was involved in the sending country's political struggles. His cultural and religious identity was denied as an essential factor in individual and collective behaviour. Much stress was laid on industrial strikes and class conflicts. The immigrant was reduced to his juridical and economic status: a non-national and a worker. At the end of this period (1969–1974), a plan to eliminate *bidonvilles* (shanty towns) was implemented in the Parisian suburbs (Chaban-Delmas Plan). These policies started a whole series of political struggles as, for example, street struggles led by Portuguese workers against expulsion from their neighbourhoods. Despite this, bilateral relations were maintained with the sending countries due to the need of labour. Illegal immigration was then increasing. Recruited directly by the employers and legalised afterwards, some of the immigrants were de-facto refugees fleeing from non-democratic regimes (namely, the military regimes of Spain and Portugal, with the latter then engaged in colonial wars). Beginning in 1969, new recruitment areas such as Yugoslavia and Turkey were also evaluated as sources of labour. At the same time, immigrants of earlier periods such as Algerians, Italians and Spaniards, were already in the process of family reunion.

2 The ONI (*Office National d'Immigration*) was set up in 1945. It monopolised labour recruitment except for workers from Algeria, then a French colony.

Politically, immigration in the immediate post-war period was not perceived as a serious issue, except for the aim of achieving a control policy and the need for assimilation of ›good‹ immigrants, especially Italians. Following several changes to the French Nationality Code since 1889, it was entirely revised in 1945, including changes to eligibility for French citizenship. In the same year, the ONI (*Office National d'Immigration*) was set up to organise the recruitment by the state of all foreign workers, except for those coming from Algeria. Assimilation policy was thus run in parallel with immigration policy. But foreign labour recruitment continued to be monopolised by employers, as it had been before 1945: In 1968, the ONI controlled only 18 per cent of new entries while 82 per cent of them were illegal.

The recession years (1975–1995): Following the ›Thirty Glorious Years‹ and intensive recruitment of foreign workers, France decided to stop labour migration. This was due both to the economic crisis and emerging political debates concerning foreign migrants (for example, the racist disorders in Marseilles in 1973). After the Marcellin-Fontanet circular (1972) which refused to regularise illegals, the cessation of labour migration in July 1974 had many unexpected consequences: the extension of family reunion; the intensification of illegal immigration due to the strong pull factors in the recruiting sectors (building industry, domestic services, clothing industry, restaurant and catering services); and the shift from industrial conflicts to political and socio-religious issues. Furthermore, labour demand did not decline; a situation that led to discrepancies between the economic and political arenas. In public discourse, two themes began to appear. The first developed between 1975 and 1977 and concerned the cost-benefit analysis of migration: It was believed that economic benefits of immigration were lower than the social costs. This, however, was refuted by Le Pors' field survey of 1976 on fund-remittances to sending countries and a macro-economic balance sheet of social welfare and economic revenue on a national scale.³ Le Pors' study showed that migrant labour was of benefit to the French economy. The second theme to dominate public opinion from 1977 concerned the attempt to replace foreign workers by French workers in the manual sector. The second State Secretary for Migration, L. Stoléru, inspired by the German return policy, offered 10,000 francs per returning worker to aid resettlement in the home countries. This policy was more successful among Iberians whom France wanted to integrate, than among Maghrebians whom it did not. In the mid-1980s, it became obvious that the latter would not repatriate.⁴

3 Anicet le Pors, *Immigration et développement économique et social. La Documentation française*, Paris 1977.

4 Gérard Fuchs, *Ils resteront*, Paris 1987.

The failure of the 1974 policies progressively brought many political changes in regard to migration: First, the policy of assimilation was replaced with that of integration. There was a growing awareness that conflicts would emerge less from socio-economic struggles (trade unionism in the firms) than in the political space of the city.⁵ New issues arose: the second generation, born in France or those who arrived as young children; housing and suburbs (Lyons, mainly in 1978–1980); schooling and employment; and the racist upsurge in local neighbourhoods. After the first and emblematic post of State Secretary for Immigration was set up, headed by Paul Dijoud in 1974, alongside the election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to the President of the Republic, emphasis was put on the home countries' cultures (orientation towards return), with bilateral agreements with sending countries. There was little new legislation on immigration during this period: Between 1945 and 1980, no law was introduced covering this issue, except for that against racism in 1972. The whole decision-making process was conducted through circulars, telephone calls, and telex – a procedure called *>infra-droit<* (infra-law) by the opponents.

Since the 1980s, immigration has become a real political issue. Political parties considered it an important issue between left and right and within the parties themselves. The coming to power of the left in 1981 brought changes to migration policy, specifically concerning immigrant status and the rights of the associative networks. Illegals became an issue, and sanctions against employers for employing illegals were envisaged. Demand continued for migrant labour in sectors where working conditions were hard, badly paid, and seasonal. Because of delays in the modernisation of some sectors (such as the clothing industry), migrant labour was still needed. After the hunger strikes by illegals in the late 1970s, 140,000 migrants were legalised in 1982/83, sanctions against the employment of illegal entrants were imposed in 1985 which were finally reinforced in 1989. These measures corresponded to the emergence of the FN at local elections in 1983. The populist idea that 3 million immigrants equals 3 million unemployed French was largely developed by that party. This notwithstanding, immigrants were legalised in the building industry (30 per cent), clothing sweatshops (12 per cent), domestic services (11 per cent), and restaurants (10 per cent) – all sectors that show a highly segmented migrant labour market in specific niches. From the mid-1980s until the present, the economic aspect of migration has been highly politicised through pressure from the FN. Globalisation of the economy is leading to the development of new recruitment areas. Asylum seekers, such as the newcomers from Asia and Africa, are portrayed as disguised immi-

5 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, *Les immigrés et la politique. 150 ans d'évolution*, Paris 1988.

grants. Skilled women and other members of migrants' families are entering through the process of family reunion. Each year, legal flows amount to roughly 100,000 entries, and those acquiring French citizenship amount to the same number.

Since the 1980s, immigration management has increasingly become a real political issue, which mainly consisted of the illusion that each newly elected government would have more efficient border control than its predecessors, while changing few essentials except in terms of symbols. At the decision-making level, a large left-right consensus had been reached for quite some time. In spite of a very stable number of foreigners (3.6 million since the beginning of the 1980s), border closure became a strong political concern. The flows of newcomers were counterbalanced by the increasing number of new French nationals through birth and naturalisation, and hence the foreign population was continuously renewed. The political discourse of ›zero immigration‹ was launched and repeated by Prime Minister Michel Rocard⁶ in 1990 as well as by the Minister of the Interior, Pasqua, in 1993.

As immigration control became one of the main concerns of policy makers, the tools of border control became increasingly dissuasive: Family reunion had been, since the 1983 decentralisation reform, decided by mayors and prefects. Marriage with undocumented immigrants was prohibited since 1993 as was polygamous family reunion where there was a suspicion of non-genuine relationships (›*mariage blanc*‹ – marriage of convenience). Hence, human rights associations began fighting for the right to live with one's family.

Meanwhile, sanctions against employers have been strongly reinforced since 1989, and entries were made more difficult by the introduction of compulsory visas for non-Europeans in 1986. In 1993, 550,000 visas were refused compared with 60,000 expulsions, repatriations, and discharges at the frontiers. Asylum-seeker policy also became much more restrictive since 1989 through the reform of the OFPRA (*Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et des Apatrides* – French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons). During recent years, almost 80 per cent of applications have been refused and some asylum seekers, namely from Yugoslavia and Algeria, have not been recognised as such because they were threatened by parts of the civil society rather than the state. Henceforth, asylum-seeker policy has been seen by public administration as an instrument of border control – only 5,000 persons obtained refugee status in recent years despite an annual flow of around 20,000 asylum seekers. The last restriction was introduced alongside the 1993 constitutional reform aimed at harmonising the French Constitution with the Schengen Agreements. Thus, reception of any person persecuted for

6 The political decision of reaching ›zero immigration‹ announced by the Minister of the Interior in 1993 had been preceded by the declaration in 1990 of Prime Minister Rocard that France cannot welcome ›*toute la misère du monde*‹.

their actions in favour of freedom was limited, in line with the Schengen and Dublin rules.⁷ Most of these measures, adopted or reinforced with the August 1993 Pasqua Law, testified to a more determined security-oriented policy that reinforced the image of foreigners as delinquent illegals in contrast to the official integrationist philosophy.

Other Socio-Economic Issues in French Society

Apart from the matters of labour migration described above, other migrant socio-economic issues have had to be dealt with. These include: the perpetuation of an immigrant working-class in the second or even third generation; ethnic entrepreneurship; spatial segregation; and education and social welfare. The present situation illustrates considerable continuity over several census periods. Basic data concerning migrant labour in France indicate that working-class occupational status (58 per cent in 1990, 46 per cent in 1997) still is the dominant trait of immigrants in France (besides the social stigma attached to the term *immigrés* in today's French society). However, the trend is showing a slow decline – especially among the Maghrebians who are still seen as the typical immigrants of France. This particular group is undergoing an embourgeoisement process, producing what is now commonly known as a ›*bourgeoisie*‹. However, the actual situation of the second and third generation is not known. As ethnicity or ancestry data are not recorded by official institutions, the second and third generations are recorded as ›French‹. Have they been absorbed in the French *creuset* (melting pot)? Or, are they seen as part of the ›fifth column‹ of a transnational Islam?

Is there a distinct immigrant labour force? Among the immigrant and ›Beurs‹ socio-political leadership, class consciousness is absent from both discourse and ways of thinking and doing things. Even if some have had an extreme-left upbringing and origin, they do not consider immigrant groups according to their position in the production process or in socio-economic terms. Some militants do introduce class criteria in their reasoning in order to distinguish themselves from their parents and hence identify the process of social mobility through which they have passed. Some of the leaders of associative networks believe that immigrants' children are more motivated and hence more mobile than the children of the French working-class. Castells' and Granotier's classist paradigms on immigrants would seem quite outmoded today.⁸ But it is a fact that immigrants and their offspring are still

7 That is, if a person had been refused asylum in one country, he or she could not be accepted as a refugee in another Schengen country.

8 Manuel Castells, *Travailleurs immigrés et lutte de classes*, in: *Politique aujourd'hui*, mars/avril 1975 pp. 5-27; Bernard Granotier, *Les travailleurs immigrés en France*, Paris 1976.

predominantly working-class, even though major differences do exist between the indigenous and Maghrebian working-classes. Thus the second generation's socio-professional insertion pattern is not clearly known.⁹ Has the second generation, confronted with the situation of underemployment, been able to explore and consolidate their position in the sphere of small business ownership?

Economic self-organisation: Is there really a ›will‹ among the diverse immigrant groups towards self-organisation, which implies a form of economic development distinct from the mainstream economy? Some subgroups may be separate from the mainstream economy, such as the trading castes, who have proved to be active proponents of a re-islamisation campaign among the Muslim immigrant community. But a history of Maghrebian entrepreneurship demonstrates the same model that most migrant groups have been through in other countries. No centralised organisation of the street-corner shops (Kabyl restaurants-café, Moroccan or Tunisian grocers, Algerian bazaars etc.) has yet appeared. Trading communities are present in ethnic urban neighbourhoods, but they have to adapt themselves to the rapid change of inner-city areas, where urban renewal has resulted in their gentrification and ethnic diversification. The existence of foreign traders and ethnic commercial areas is a very old feature. A chronology of Maghrebian trading activities will help us to understand their development in urban France.

The traders accompanied the North-African labour migrations and also led to the emergence of the first French urban ethnic areas in the early 20th century.¹⁰ The successive migratory waves, despite two world wars, resulted in the street-level concentration of café-hotel-restaurants. This geographic concentration tends to spill over on a neighbourhood or even a whole enclave (such as la Goutte-d'Or, la Porte d'Aix in Marseilles, la Place du Pont in Lyons). Immigrant landlords of boarding houses were among the first Maghrebian traders in France. Emerging at the same time as the hotel and catering businesses were the specialised ethnic grocers. In the late 1940s, fruit and vegetable sellers, carpet-vendors and grocers appeared. This diversification of trading activities is linked to increased migration and the beginning of family reunion. Other foodstuffs trades increased during the 1940s and 1950s. The emergence of textiles and jewellery industries corresponds to a qualitative change in the migratory process, and the migrant communities' increasing feminisation. During the 1980s, the second generation and the ›intermediary elites‹ (more often born in the home countries and often composed of women), situated in the trouble spots of the suburbs, tried with little success

9 One exception is that of the sample survey of Michèle Tribalat, *Faire France: une grande enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants*, Paris 1995.

10 Vasoodeven Vuddamalay/Paul White/Deborah Sporton, *The Evolution of the Goutte d'Or as an Ethnic Minority District*, in: *New Community*, 17. 1991, no. 2, pp. 245–258.

to develop other trades which would allow them to escape from the ›miserable‹ image attached to the first generations' trades (*les bouis-bouis*). Research financed by the French administration and published during the 1980s suggested that self-employment and ethnic business would help solve the problems of immigration and integration. One such report¹¹ asserted that the number of foreign traders, craftspeople and entrepreneurs had increased from 60,000 to 90,000 within only seven years.

Spatial segregation was examined in the 1970s within a ›threshold of tolerance‹ approach, where the ethical and moral undertones were implicit.¹² Housing problems and degraded inner-city areas called to undergo urban renewal programs and population change (Goutte-d'Or, Belleville, Ported'Aix) were studied within this approach. According to Freeman, it was also, to some extent, a reply to an influential civil servant in the French state apparatus, Michel Massenet, who spoke in detail about the ›threshold of tolerance‹ in the 1960s and 1970s.¹³ In a 1970 publication, Massenet stated that »in a primary school class, the presence of more than 20 per cent of foreign children slows down the progress of all students. In a hospital service, problems of coexistence arise when foreigners are more than 30 per cent of the patients. In apartment blocks, it is not wise to have more than 10–15 per cent of the families of foreign origin, when they are not accustomed to life in a modern building.«¹⁴

Income distribution is a forbidden subject concerning immigrant populations. Apart from the pioneer research on money remittances initiated by economists and political scientists¹⁵, there has been no real work on income distribution, such as could have been studied by the former institution CERC (*Centre d'Etudes des Revenus et des Coûts*).

Education also has rarely been studied as an autonomous research field, despite the fact that the social mobility of immigrants' children compared to their parents' generation could have been measured. This population could also have been compared with the population of the country in which they

11 Salvatore Pallidda (ed.), *Des immigrés créateurs d'entreprises. Un apport à l'économie française*, L'agence pour le Développement des Relations Interculturelles (ADRI), Ministère de la Solidarité, de la Santé et de la Protection sociale, Sept. 1990.

12 Véronique deRudder, *La tolérance s'arrête au seuil*, in: *Pluriel-Débats*, 1980, no. 21, pp. 3-13.

13 Gary Freeman, *Immigrant Labour and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies*, Princeton 1979.

14 Michael Massenet, *Communication à l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, in: *Vivre en France*, 1970, no. 8, pp. 239-260.

15 Georges Tapinos/Jean-Pierre Garson (eds.), *L'argent des immigrés. Revenus, épargne et transferts de huit nationalités en France* (Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, INED, Cahier no. 94), Paris 1981.

were born, especially its youth component. Rather, it has been approached negatively in the sense of ›problem areas‹ (ZEP, *Zone d'Education Prioritaire* – priority zones of education), suburban anomie, exclusion, and riots.

Integration: Several issues, including that of suburban Islam and transnational mediations, have increased in importance in the political arena since the early 1980s. Family reunion and unemployment unexpectedly became issues as a result of the cessation of labour migration in July 1974. The immigrants' world was radically changed from work, trade unionism, coffee shops and hotels to the world of schools and suburban family housing. Socio-economic claims concerning employment became suddenly political. The key areas of concern in the 1980s and 1990s have been the large public housing estates in the suburbs as well as in the inner cities. Most French suburbs have a distinct history of successive internal and external migration waves, industrialisation, economic crisis, the development of a popular culture, and of social field experiments. Several terms are used to describe these areas, such as *faubourg* (neighbourhood), *banlieue* (suburb), *zone* and *bidonville* (shanty town). Several images are conjured up, also, on mention of these areas: that of the dangerous working-classes (›*classes laborieuses, classes dangereuses*‹), of the communist red belt (in the inter-war and post-World War II period), of the *bidonvilles* or slums of the years of growth, of high rates of immigration and finally, of the ›Beurs‹, the Franco-Maghrebians.¹⁶

Immigrant families who had traditionally lived in the Maghrebian ethnic neighbourhoods of the inner cities began to acquire modern social housing in the suburbs (in the HLM, *habitations à loyers modérés*) of the major cities of Paris, Lyons, Marseilles and Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing. Black Africans increasingly replaced the Maghrebians in the hostels of foreign workers. During the last two decades, urban policy has been successively transformed, mainly through political change. After the 1981 suburban riots in Lyons, a National Commission for the Redevelopment of Urban Neighbourhoods (*Commission Nationale du Développement des Quartiers*) was set up in December 1981. It was headed by Hubert Dubedout, Mayor of Grenoble, and under the terms of the decentralisation policy defined contractual obligations between the state, the regions and the urban agglomerations. In 1983, priority zones of education were set up in some poor and deprived urban areas, and the original massive council buildings were demolished. Anti-delinquency measures, in the sense of prevention, were initiated in 1982 under the supervision of mayors, in particular Gilbert Bonnemaïson. In 1988, Prime Minister Michel Rocard set up the first Interministerial Delegate for Urban Affairs and a Na-

16 Annie Fourcaut, *Un siècle de banlieue parisienne (1859–1964). Guide de recherche*, Paris 1988.

tional Urban Council, while 300 sites were identified for social redevelopment programmes.

As a result of urban youth mobilisation and many deaths within the immigrant community¹⁷, urban policy became increasingly important, and a Minister of Urban Affairs, Bernard Tapie, was appointed in 1992. Contracts were set up with 400 urban neighbourhoods, 12 towns, and the whole Seine-Saint-Denis department. In 1993, 544 ZEP and 546 urban sites were identified, and an important debate on urban affairs was started by the new government. It emphasised specific policies of anti-discrimination in the poorer neighbourhoods, under the supervision of the Minister of Social Affairs, Simone Veil. At the local level, the prefects were in charge of urban policy. However, aided by social workers and municipal services, the mayors have the main responsibility within their towns, cities and villages, and are appointed as heads of each section for urban neighbourhood programmes.

French social welfare is quite unique when compared to the German or British systems, especially concerning immigrant issues. Set up in 1945 by Pierre Laroque, French social security was inspired by Beveridge's writings, especially his 1942 report on the welfare state.¹⁸ Despite Laroque's belief that British welfare is incompatible with French psychology, he succeeded in implementing the French social security system, which should, in principle, cover everyone. The French system differs from the British, however, in that it is based on eligibility through the workplace. Whereas the British stress education, health and housing, in France social security is related mainly to work. Foreigners' integration in French society is mainly accomplished through education, and social cohesion is produced in the school rather than at work. The state has much influence on social policies, with social security seen as an entitlement arising from employment. Thus, migrant welfare is integrally related to the labour market. Social help, in its technical aspects, can bring about conditions where a non-national is excluded, as being a national is a precondition of benefiting from it.

A >double-fiction approach< dominates debates on French social welfare and immigration: First, in the sense that migrants and their families benefit excessively from the welfare system and, second, that the French philosophy of social protection does not recognise any particularistic approach of any group. In an old immigration country like France, where the number of foreigners has been very stable during the last decade and where the awareness of immigration as part of its social history is relatively recent, there is a surprising absence of debate on links between welfare and immigration. Suspicion, and at times overt questioning, concerning the real sense

17 Such as illustrated by the riots in Vaulx-en-Velin, a suburban town of Lyons, in 1991.

18 William Henry Beveridge, *Reform Plan of the British Social Welfare*, London 1942.

of national allegiance of the Maghrebians seems to be a common discourse, though these immigrants are believed to benefit from the French welfare system. After having described the basic characteristics of the migration process since World War II, the main characteristics of public policy formulation and implementation will now be described.

Increasing Intervention of the State

Demand for migrant labour and firm management of immigration were the dominant traits of post-war migration. During the past 50 years, immigration policy has had little internal coherence. A chronological classification of the period will help delineate more precisely the difficulties faced during the different sub-periods. The attempt during the years 1946 to 1955 to organise immigration policy failed, leading to a decade (1956–1965) of rising uncontrolled immigration. During the succeeding years (1965–1972), the need for immigration control was reiterated, and from 1974 to 1981, a stricter immigration policy controlling inflows was implemented. This period of stringent measures was replaced by one of more flexible policies, but had a life span of only two years (1981–1983). Under constant political pressure from the FN and an aggravating economic crisis, the different governments stressed a more restrictive policy (1983–1996). The change to a left government in June 1997 has begun to cause some changes in policies (such as the regularisation of some undocumented migrants). Pasqua's and Debré's laws will, in the long run, be reformed or amended through Chevènement's and Guigou's laws of 1998.

The increasingly aggravating influence of migration issues in French politics since the early 1980s (as testified by the rise of the FN) has led the political elites to intervene more decisively in order to be able to prevent unforeseen and dramatic situations. But even then, such situations as the ›headscarf affair‹¹⁹ are still being quite haphazardly and badly mishandled. France has been an immigrant nation since the early 18th century (more so than its European neighbours) – a fact which has continually been forgotten. The French assimilation model most probably worked well during the early years, but today this model is considered to be out-moded by most experts on migration issues, even though some nostalgia for this ›golden age‹ might be held in some milieus. Since the post-war period, a number of institutions has been set up by the state to regulate migrant labour. These include the ONI in 1946 which later became the OMI (*Office des Migrations Internationales*

19 This arose in the late 1980s, when a number of young girls wearing the *foulard islamique* (Islamic headscarf) were banned from attending school. This incident led to a heated public debate about the response of France's secular institutions to immigrants' religions.

– Office of International Migration), the FAS (*Fonds d'Action Sociale* – Social Action Fund) in 1959 and the DPM (*Direction des Populations et des Migrations* – Division of Populations and Migrations) in the 1970s. During the early 1980s, when immigration began to pose serious problems at a local and, inevitably, national level, other institutions were set up such as the National Commission for the Redevelopment of Urban Neighbourhoods by the former Grenoble mayor, Hubert Dubedout, the DIV (*Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville* – Interministerial Urban Delegation) and the DSU (*Développement Social Urbain* – Urban Social Development). More recently, the position of the descendants of immigrants has been analysed in terms of social exclusion, that is, on the basis that they experience the same type of socio-economic, cultural and political problems as other socially excluded groups in French society.²⁰

A chronology of state interventions with regard to an increasing demand for labour shows firmer management of immigration between 1946 and 1974. A more precise balance was reached between social policy and flow control between 1974 and 1981. After Mitterrand came to power, between 1981 and 1983 a new deal was established which was followed by a return to a more restrictive policy from 1983 to 1996. Since 1993, under the right-wing governments (the second *cohabitation* under Mitterrand), more restrictive measures (Pasqua Law, 1993 and Debré Law, 1997) were devised in an obvious attempt at appeasing the extreme-right electorate. The sudden return of the Socialists and other left parties to government in June 1997 has again started to disturb the system set up by the right governments (for instance, through the regularisation of undocumented immigrants). Underlying and accompanying the institutional debates and arrangements, have been intense discussions on the legal and administrative status of migrants in French society. New definitions of citizenship and new laws concerning nationality have also been at the centre of discussions at all levels of the society (political elites, civil service, university, grassroots associations), reflecting the view that foreign migration has been posing unexpected challenges to society at the end of the 20th century.

Despite an increase in racism and the emergence of the FN as a major influence on public opinion since 1983, no race relations policy has been implemented. Since the 1980s, the only anti-racist law to be passed is that which penalises denial of the Holocaust (Gayssot Law, 1990). According to the large-scale field survey conducted in 1992²¹, and also according to Philippe Bataille,²² discrimination in access to work, police controls in public places

20 See Serge Paugam, *La disqualification sociale. Essai sur la nouvelle pauvreté*, Paris 1991; Pierre Bourdieu, *La misère du monde*, Paris 1993.

21 Tribalat, *Faire France*.

22 Philippe Bataille, *Le racisme au travail*, Paris 1997.

and suburban violence which sometimes results in death clearly show that race is a vital discriminatory factor. But the race issue has not been used as a prominent election tactic except by the FN. French political debates have privileged religious allegiance rather than skin colour, and the Muslim Arabs/Maghrebians who are seemingly better integrated than more recent foreigners continue to suffer racism on the basis of their appearance.

Immigrants as Actors of French Political Life

Citizenship, Nationality, Legal Status and Refugee Status

The French nationality law is mid-way between *ius sanguinis* (the law of the blood) and *ius soli* (the law of the soil). Until the French Revolution of 1789, nationality law was built on *ius soli*. Napoleon I replaced it with *ius sanguinis* by means of the Civil Code of 1804. Subsequently, the law once again included *ius soli*, since the country could not provide sufficient soldiers. In the 1880s, the slogan was: ›make Frenchmen out of foreigners‹. Thus, the Nationality Code changed often over a period of 150 years (1851, 1867, 1889, 1927, 1945 and 1973), in the sense of a greater extension of rights for newcomers.

The mid-1980s constituted a turning point in the Nationality Code debate. Extreme-right forces thought that the automatic acquisition of French nationality by foreigners' children and by having been resident for five years was too liberal. The FN and the *Club de l'Horloge* referred pejoratively to the ›*Français de papier*‹ (›French on paper‹), ›*Français sans le vouloir et sans le savoir*‹ (›French without knowing or wanting it‹), ›*Français malgré eux*‹ (›French despite themselves‹), and declared that ›*être Français, ça se mérite*‹ (›being French has to be earned‹). The more traditional right-wing forces wanted to replace automatic acquisition of French nationality with a voluntary pledge of the wish to become French. It was in that context that a commission was appointed in 1987 to reform the Nationality Code to a point mid-way between the *ius sanguinis* and the *ius soli*. The left and the ›Beurs‹ were asking for the *ius soli*, based on the ›new citizenship‹ (see below), while the right was defending the revived social contract, referring to Ernest Renan (the *vouloir vivre collectif* – the will to live together), with the nation seen as a ›*plebiscite de tous les jours*‹ (daily plebiscite). This attempt at reforming the Nationality Code was abandoned by Chirac on the eve of the 1988 presidential elections, but nevertheless remained a priority on the right's political agenda.

After the adoption of a text by the Senate in 1990, Pasqua succeeded in passing a law in July 1993 during his stay at the Ministry of the Interior, whereby acquisition of French nationality for children born in France of foreigners was based on their voluntary pledge of the wish to become French (between 16 and 21 years), and was subjected to stricter conditions. Acquisition of nationality was seen as the consequence of integration and not the

condition for it, as it had been a century earlier. The 1993 reform was the first restrictive legal action to be enforced concerning acquisition of French nationality by people born in France. It has since been replaced by the 1998 law which, in its main philosophy, is a return to the 1979 law (i.e. the automatic acquisition of nationality for those born in France). During the past decade, new political claims have been voiced by long-term immigrants and their children. At the centre of the debates were the redefinition of the social contract and plural citizenship, as an answer to the political demands of the ›Beurs‹ regarding the negotiation of collective identities, and the dissociation of nationality, citizenship and local voting rights.

Though nationality and citizenship are often associated, they are distinct notions in France. In some other countries, nationality is a precondition for citizenship. Traditional citizenship is defined in terms of membership of a state, of political rights and duties. Of the French motto *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*, the last one is closest to the French definition of citizenship. But deindustrialisation, loss of working-class trade-union solidarity through unemployment, settlement of foreigners and growing numbers of bi-nationals, sometimes of Muslim culture, have each challenged traditional citizenship. Put simply, the socio-demographic structures of the French population are undergoing radical change. In that context, the notion of ›new citizenship‹, suggesting other modes of political membership and participation, appeared in 1986. Localised at the periphery of the French political system, some ›Beur‹ leaders attempted to dissociate citizenship and nationality and to claim voting rights for their parents. As an answer to the present political participation crisis, the ›new citizenship‹ is based on local life and on residence rather than on nationality and national allegiance, and citizens are conceived as all those who share the same problems within a multicultural society. The ›Beurs‹ movement, as a consequence of the 10 October 1981 law that granted freedom of association to foreigners, has played a major role in these claims. Exogenous factors also influenced their emergence within the centre of French politics as both actors and issues (*enjeux*): The 1987 Nationality Code Reform project caused ›Beurs‹ to mobilise for local citizenship based on residence, socialisation in French schools, and integration through daily life. Since then, their real allegiance to France, and French citizenship, has been questioned due to circumstances such as the ›Rushdie affair‹²³, ›the ›headscarf affair‹, the Gulf War and the Algerian crisis, to name just a few.

Immigrant associations and decision-makers have become increasingly aware of the difficulty in using positive discrimination in reaching equality of

23 The Fatwa (religious death sentence) imposed on British author Salman Rushdie by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini led to considerable debates on the political role of Islam throughout Europe. Muslims were often seen collectively as fanatics, who could undermine secular states.

rights. On the one hand, there is no comparison between the rights enjoyed by the 3.7 million foreigners and by those who are French. For instance, foreigners are still excluded from voting and other traditional rights attached to citizenship, such as the right to participate in the civil service and in the exercise of justice. It also seems from European Union (EU) rules that the rights granted to citizens of EU member states, such as access to employment in the civil service, will influence the rights granted to non-EU immigrants. On the other hand, equality of rights implies the notion of ›duties‹: respect of secularism, priority of individualism and universalism over collective allegiances (identity, religion, culture) which are considered a part of the private life of individuals. But this debate is far from being resolved, given the crisis of traditional citizenship (citizenship is linked to nationality and assimilationism) and the collapse of the ideology class struggle and of working-class solidarity.

A further issue concerning the legal status of immigrants is French asylum policy. Up to 1960, 15,000 foreigners had applied for refugee status, and most had been accepted. However, from 1973 to 1974, a period corresponding to the end of labour migration, the number of asylum seekers increased dramatically – from 1,620 in 1973 to 61,000 in 1989. Most were from ›Third-World‹ countries, Indochina (1975/76), Zaïre, Ghana and Mali (in the mid-1980s), as well as Turkey and Sri Lanka. Refusal rates rose from 4 per cent in 1976 to 85 per cent in 1990. The increase stabilised in 1992, recording a decrease (27,500) compared to 1989 (61,000). All these changes occurred within the framework of the consistently restrictive rules imposed both by the left and right governments, the reform of the OFPRA in 1989 under the premiership of Rocard, and the tightening of access to French territory (Pasqua Law, 1993). The Weil report²⁴ proposed widening the category of refugee by incorporating the notion of territorial temporary asylum for those who did not fit the Geneva criteria (state as actor of the persecution). But it neither improved refugee policy nor the philosophy of refugees' rights.

Immigrants' Socio-Political Mobilisation

The historical, socio-economic and juridical position of foreign migrants in France leads to the sensitive issue of the ways migrants enter politics and live their political life. In fact, until the early 1980s, most migrants were concerned with politics in relation to their home country (usually a semi-dictatorship such as Morocco or a police state like Algeria) and were quite dynamic in trade-union activism. Recent research²⁵ has shown that political activists and

24 Patrick Weil, *Pour une politique de l'immigration juste et efficace*. La documentation française, September 1997.

25 Rémy Leveau/Catherine Wihtol de Wenden et al., *Associations créées dans les années quatre-vingt par de jeunes militants issus de l'immigration*. Bilan de leurs activités et

trade unionists were, in fact, accustomed to political struggles in their home country. They were not labour migrants as such. Already sharing part of the middle-class mode of life in their home countries, they acquired some of the privileges of a middle-class socio-political immigrant leadership. Political involvement of immigrants, according to C. de Wenden²⁶, has been accomplished through the mediation of this specific group, called ›intermédiaires culture‹ (cultural intermediaries), a term which has a special connotation in France. This group, while representing the interests of the larger migrant community, is not really an elite, even though some of its members may have accomplished an academic career in the traditional French elite schools.

Another issue that has gained the attention of the media and research community is the difficulty of adapting Islam in the context of a secularised society like France. Islam is part of the socio-cultural and even political heritage of the majority of the migrant communities (mainly Muslims from the Maghreb and from Turkey). Surprising developments, such as the return of second-generation immigrants to some form of radical Islam (named ›communitarianism‹ in some suburbs among the ›Beurs‹), have posed new challenges to the French political system. France's basic Republican model of assimilation, that is making French men and women out of foreigners, is today being overtly questioned. Debates have rapidly evolved between the more Republican model (based for instance on the ideas of D. Schnapper) and the ›Wieviorkan multiculturalism‹ which is only now entering the French academic world after some 20 years of testing in the Australian context.²⁷

History and Modes of Mobilisation

Socio-political mobilisation by immigrants and subsequently by their descendants has gone through three distinct phases. C. de Wenden's classification of socio-political mobilisation²⁸ in the post-1945 period is summarised as follows:

1. Immigrants as foreigners and workers: In the 1960s and 1970s, migrant workers were organised in relation to their country of origin, with a focus on home-country issues and sometimes with strong links to French or foreign unions.

de l'engagement de leurs promoteurs. Rapport de recherche CERI/FAS, Paris 1996; see also Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, *Que sont devenues les associations civiques issues de l'immigration?*, in: *Hommes et migration*, 1997, no. 1206, pp. 53–66.

26 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, *A la recherche des intermédiaires culturels*, in: *Migrations, Sociétés*, special issue, Feb.-June 1992, pp. 13–18.

27 Dominique Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens*, Paris 1996; Michel Wieviorka, *Une société fragmentée. Le multiculturalisme en débat*, Paris 1996.

28 Wihtol de Wenden, *Les immigrés et la politique*.

2. Immigrants as mediators of socio-political traditions: For Turkish, Portuguese, Black African and other first-generation immigrants, the tendency has been to maintain the traditions of their village or region of origin (in the case of Italians and Portuguese), to engage in political and religious debates and struggles from abroad (for Turks) or to recreate family social life (for Africans). About one thousand Islamic associations have contributed to the internal cohesion of foreign families but have not helped their integration in French society. The more radical and politicised associations have clashed with French authorities in local conflicts. Islam, as a specific factor in the mobilisation of immigrants, will be discussed below.
3. The children of immigrants (or ›Beurs‹) as local political actors: In the 1980s, the associative movement of the second generation of Franco-Maghrebians, set up after freedom of association was given to foreigners in 1981, generated new forms of struggle and participation. The fight against racism, the struggle for civic rights and a new definition of citizenship, the promotion of socio-cultural integration in the suburbs, mobilisation to satisfy the students' needs in the job market and new business ventures, were all prominent demands, directly related to new policy initiatives.

Immigrant political actors as foreigners and workers: From the end of World War I to the closing of the growth period in 1973, immigrants were seen either as traitors to the working-class movement, commonly known as ›jaunes‹ (›yellow‹) or scabs, or as political actors representing their home country. ›Jaunes‹ referred to the supposedly docile Chinese workers introduced during World War I who were seen as devoid of political consciousness and absorbed in saving money to further some project in the home country. Conversely, as political actors, they were viewed as a political threat rather than as actors in industrial conflict.

Between 1945 and 1970, three main analyses of post-war immigrant workers as political actors were put forward. The first, summed up as ›the past explains the present‹, focuses on the immigrant's itinerary, from the place of departure (supposedly rural and traditional) to the place of arrival (viewed as necessarily urban and modern). Immigrants are characterised in terms of their place of origin and cultural traditions, which helps to explain their political alienation and socialisation. National or regional affiliations are seen as determinants of political involvement. The second view, in which ›the present explains the present‹, sees the immigrant as a ›foreigner‹, a worker, and an excluded person. The foreigner is primarily described as a non-national, a non-member of the nation-state, and the key notion of the non-citizen reinforces a precarious status, enclosing the immigrant in a situation of political dependency with regard to the host society. Immigrant workers are further seen as belonging to the lower rungs of the working-class, and in

contrast to an increasingly middle-class French trade unionism, are seen as an emerging political force, an ›avant-garde of the advanced revolutionary proletariat‹.

The last view, based on the presumption that ›the future explains the present‹, focuses on the role and itinerary of the immigrant before and after the migration process. Migration might thus be a temporary transition between two situations. The immigrant might be seen as a peasant aiming at becoming a ›*petit bourgeois*‹ after training as a proletarian. Owing to the myth of return, immigrants are expected to settle for transitional precariousness, leading to passivity in social conflicts. During the period of economic growth, immigrants were mainly defined as social actors in labour conflicts whose demands impinged on politics. They were mainly Algerian, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish. The ideal-typical political actor was the old Algerian immigrant: an unskilled male worker, unaccompanied by his family, having strong ties with French trade unionism (the communist CGT, *Confédération Generale du Travail*) – a foreigner wishing to return home. Any political participation he might have had was home-oriented. Neither his religious belief (relegated to a hidden private sphere) nor his family life significantly influenced his political involvement.

From the politicisation of social demands to the social expansion of politics: The period from 1974 to 1981 was a turning point for immigrants in France. A population which was regarded as a labour force of isolated male workers at the periphery of the socio-political spheres gradually became part and parcel of French society. When labour migration was brought to a halt, the turnover of workers was replaced by family reunion. New issues arose as a result of this unexpected consequence, including conflicts involving both work and housing, such as the famous ›Sonacotra dispute‹ of 1976 to 1980 which involved the largest hostel-management authority for foreign workers. The rise to social salience of the second generation, and of illegals seeking legalisation, served gradually to alter the stereotype of the foreign worker.

Two groups emerged as political actors in this period: the Portuguese and the Maghrebians. Portuguese immigrants had settled in France during the 1960s, mainly as illegals who wanted to escape from both poverty and military service. They were involved in major industrial conflicts in France in the early 1970s, in which political (freedom of expression) and social demands intermingled. The real birth of immigrants' political involvement, however, was the housing-related urban conflict. Many Portuguese, especially in the suburbs of Paris, were housed in *bidonvilles* which the government of Premier Chaban-Delmas committed itself to clearing under a program started in 1969. The major conflict which ensued as a result of protests against the evictions became highly politicised and led to the emergence of a Portuguese leadership, mainly within the FASTI (*Fédération des Associations de*

Soutien aux Travailleurs Immigrés – Federation of immigrant workers' support associations). The Portuguese went on to assume political leadership among immigrant groups in France up until 1974 (when the April Revolution occurred in Portugal). Perception of the Portuguese as political leaders has since waned, as the Portuguese were increasingly identified with the lower middle-class. They were seen to maintain strong links with Portugal, as evidenced by returnees' frequent travel and the vitality of their community organisations. Since the late 1970s, the Maghrebians have gradually replaced the Portuguese as political actors, thereby creating a French mythology of the rapid and successful integration of the Portuguese.

Immigration from the Maghreb to France is a long-established phenomenon for Algerian workers, who were first recruited during World War I. The diverse social, economic and political presence of North African immigrants differs significantly from the other groups. Until 1974, Maghrebian workers on the whole had a high rate of turnover, sending remittances to their families and organising their existence in France around their workplace, hostel accommodation and trade union and, beyond work, with home-country organisations (official or dissident) and visits to cafés.

Since 1974, the socio-political situation of the Maghrebians has slowly changed. First, family reunion tended to accelerate because the workers feared France might close its borders. In the period from 1975 to 1982, the proportion of European and non-European foreigners was reversed for the first time in favour of non-Europeans, with an overwhelming majority of Maghrebians among them. Second, there was an increase in (frequently illegal) migration from Tunisia and Morocco, due to the decrease in labour migration from Southern Europe (mainly Spain). Third, as a result of family reunion, a second generation appeared. Some were born in their parents' country of origin and arrived in France as children; others were born in France. Therefore, a part of the population has neither migrated nor ever had legal status as foreigners. Maghrebians, who had traditionally been concentrated in old inner-city areas, began to acquire modern social housing in the suburbs (HLM) of large towns (Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing), while Black Africans increasingly took the place of Maghrebians in the hostels for foreign workers. The theme of immigration thus acquired political visibility at the end of the 1970s. The year 1980 heralded a period of controversy about immigration: Hunger strikes in the suburbs of Lyons underlined the problems of the second generation, and illegal residents (among them Tunisians and Moroccans) demanded legalisation of their status. The election, in May 1981, of François Mitterrand to the presidency of the French Republic brought much hope. Immigration emerged as a challenging political issue in which immigrants themselves were key players.

Politics, community action, localism and professionalism: The period from 1981 to 1986 saw a change in policy concerning immigrants. In the first years of the Socialist period (1981–1983), the emphasis was on human rights: The expulsion of young immigrants was suspended, and the rights of family reunion and freedom of association for foreigners were reaffirmed. Self-expression of immigrants and their children was thus encouraged. The March 1983 local elections, when the FN made a breakthrough, revealed that immigration had become a bargaining issue among political leaders. Simultaneously, social movements (the ›Beurs‹ marches of 1983 and 1984), made possible by the 1981 freedom of association law, stimulated new forms of political participation of the second generation. The first march, initiated by a young Harki leader of the Lyons' suburbs, aimed at fighting racism and lobbying for *le droit à la différence* (the right to be different). The second march of December 1984 focused on equal rights. This shift of emphasis reveals a progression in the immigration debate from the principle of *le droit à la différence* to *le droit à l'indifférence* with the former stressing multiculturalism. The 1983 municipal elections marked the start of growing support for the FN and corresponding opposition to multiculturalism on the ground that Franco-Maghrebians were unable to integrate. Political debates focused on the real allegiance of Franco-Maghrebians to French or Muslim culture and the platform increasingly adopted by both the government and by associations such as *France-Plus* was one of *le droit à l'indifférence*. The government favoured ending immigration, and, with the appointment of a State Secretary of Integration, put an emphasis on integration. The associations stressed the importance of including legalisation in the policy-making process (a citizenship of consensus rather than of contest and civic behaviour based on an acceptance of assimilationist values). As a result of participation in local politics, some activists gained access to the middle-classes. ›Elites‹ emerged as mediators between the suburb and elected politicians.

The structure of the Maghrebian immigrant population had meanwhile been transformed, and two categories could be distinguished. An older group who, although still active, was increasingly threatened by unemployment in the car, steel and mining industries, and a younger generation who, in spite of many difficulties (delinquency, unemployment, insufficient vocational training, failure at school), were more disposed to economic, socio-cultural and even political self-organisation. The Maghrebian population is now a highly heterogeneous group. Some Maghrebians still belong to the first generation, others are French citizens and fully integrated into various social groups. The rise of the associative movement and the new legitimacy of collective identity claims (including Islam) has developed among the ›Beurs‹, affirming the right to be a collective community within French society and not merely having individual access to the country's political rights.

At the same time, new conflicts, mainly in the car industry (Citroën, 1983)²⁹ and the increasing number of associations (approximately 650 in 1985) show that Islam has become the second religion in France, with three million believers. At a time when proletarian mobilisation has lost some of its power, religion has taken on a marked presence – one of the key changes within the Maghrebian community. Islam acquired greater visibility and legitimacy with its followers moving from assimilationist tactics aimed at gaining individual acceptance to a situation in which they could negotiate as a collective entity. The main union, the CGT, decided to recruit Muslim Renault workers, adopting a ›catch all‹ strategy.

Civic Rights, Allegiances and Identity

Another main change is the importance given to citizenship and civic rights. New forms of ›citizenship‹ appeared in the suburbs where some of the young Maghrebians claimed to be citizens by participation, without necessarily being nationals. Increased racism between 1983 and 1986 led to a rise in lobbying for citizenship to be based on residence and participation in local affairs. The theme of ›new citizenship‹ emerged in 1986 and was viewed as an answer to a crisis of democracy threatened by the conflicting tendencies of the rise of individualism and the growth of collective identities. Debates on the Nationality Code Reform led to a questioning of the link between nationality and citizenship. The reform was postponed at the end of 1987 and the immigration issue was avoided during the presidential campaign of 1988, except for François Mitterrand stating that he was not hostile to giving voting rights to foreigners at a local level. For the ›Beurs‹ associations, the planned reforms constituted a return to French mainstream politics. It also led the ›Beurs‹ to reaffirm their support for Mitterrand at the 1988 presidential elections (in the second round, he obtained more than 80 per cent of the ›Beurs‹ vote according to exit polls) and for the Socialist Party. The latter was viewed as a dominant party, credited with allocating grants and legitimacy. Some 400 ›Beurs‹ were candidates at the local elections of 1989, and 150 to 200 were elected as municipal councillors. The political parties could thus no longer ignore the ›Beurs‹, and this new awareness resulted in intense debates during the Gulf War.³⁰

Other challenges to the political system were illustrated by the ›headscarf affair‹ in October 1989, an event which was rapidly transformed into a national debate on secularism and multiculturalism, and into which were drawn the *Conseil d'Etat*, the Ministry of National Education and the King of

29 These conflicts led to the first collective fear of the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism.

30 Vincent Geisser, *Ethnicité républicaine*, Paris 1997.

Morocco, the latter giving a speech on French television. The Franco-Maghrebians' political behaviour was increasingly questioned in debates over their allegiances and legitimacy. The ›*passage au politique*‹ (trend to political inclusion), commenced in 1981, had reached its end. Moreover, integration policy was much more concerned with socio-urban policy by the early 1990s. The local associative movement had to face such challenges as the Nationality Code Reform, the ›Rushdie affair‹ and the ›headscarf affair‹. The ›Beur‹ leaders affirmed their allegiance to the French way of conducting political debate. Most of them had acquired genuine professionalism and thereby were gentrified. This fact is not generally accepted by the French public. Some second or third generation members opted to be referred to as the ›*bourgeoisie*‹. In fact, this group is very heterogeneous: Some are French; others belong to one of Maghreb's three nationalities; some define themselves mainly as Muslims; others are secularised or simply see their daily life as part of the Islamic culture; some are Harkis and identify themselves as such; some are Berbers and emphasise the distinctness of this identity in the Arab world; some are the children of mixed Franco-Maghrebians. Gender also plays an important role in self-identification, with girls often more committed than boys to the home-country's cultures and to Islam.

Identity is more often than not reconstructed; nationality is no longer the main divide, which is influenced more by socio-economic exclusion or success. As time has passed, the number of Maghrebians having foreign worker status has declined. As French nationals who have long been living in the various urban areas, they are now experiencing a situation where unemployment has destroyed the traditional avenue to social involvement and mobility, and where their home countries no longer represent a possible future or an alternative choice. Localism has thus served as a point of identification for many Franco-Maghrebians, and represents more than a mere focus for political activity. Local associationism has been challenged by a crisis of development and generations among the younger generation, since power has been taken by their elders. Another conflict has arisen between leaders of local movements promoting grassroots participation and the national leaders of large associations such as *France-Plus* and *SOS-Racisme*.

A recent trend in the ›Beurs'‹ political participation has been the use of their field experience in the associative milieus as a tool for social mobility. Compared with the 1981 situation, politics have ceased to be regarded as the most legitimate and most autonomous form of struggle. Political activity is seen as a tool to achieve other aims. Local associations have frequently had the role of managing communal resources and projects such as the para-institutional schemes financed by public funds. These were implemented to reduce the marginality, exclusion and violence attributed to the ›Beurs‹ in the media. All these institutionalised forms of collective action have also enabled

the rise of new social elites as mediators. These people are sometimes involved in public life on both sides of the Mediterranean. They seek to set up links between France and the Maghreb at a cultural and non-governmental level, and in the process impart to their group the tools of ›gentle subversion‹.

This strategy may result in greater benefits than discrete assimilation and individual social mobility. While the leaders of the 1980s allowed themselves to be absorbed into the associative movements as a substitute for political action or as a stepping stone to enter political life, the associative movement was later used to provide access to entrepreneur activities and to gentrification at a local level. Some have entered the economic field through the associations (halal businesses, Islamic bookshops, Islamic textile shops, radio stations), or through newer types of ethnic business such as the media, computer businesses, high-class restaurants, training for local administrators on multiculturalism and business consultancy. Some policies have also been directly conceived as responses to institutional demands: multicultural business (local promotions, exhibitions, publications), training, sport and leisure for children. In some contexts, specific actions were undertaken as a response to social demand, mainly from the FAS, in a delegation of power from the central administration to local associations in a colonial-style policy.

The Entry of Islam into French Politics

Undoubtedly, Islam as a religion as well as a collective identity is now part and parcel of the French political space. Public opinion has been challenged as far as French identity, secularism, citizenship, sense of membership and links between external and internal affairs are concerned. Religious affiliation has not been included in the census since 1968, so there are no exact statistical data on the number of Muslims living in France. However, some 3 to 4 million are estimated to be of Muslim culture. These include the foreign population, those who have acquired French nationality by birth and the Harkis (500,000) who fought with the French army during the Algerian War and who were repatriated to France after 1962. Among the Muslims, there are the Algerian nationals (600,000), the Moroccans (500,000), the Tunisians (250,000) and half of the Turkish (180,000) and African (180,000) immigrants. Muslims are also present among the immigrants from former Yugoslavia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Mauritius, Malagasy and the Middle-East. Quite a substantial proportion of almost 60 nationalities present in France are Muslim. France's migrant Muslim geography extends from Morocco to the Philippines via the Indian subcontinent. Despite the frequent reference to the Islamic community in France, Islam is far from homogeneous.

Muslim organisations in France: In 1986, Gilles Kepel estimated that almost 600 Islamic associations and 1,000 Mosques and prayer-rooms existed

in French secular society.³¹ More recent surveys have confirmed the trend towards religious and cultural self-organisation. The more visible infrastructure of Mosques, Coranic schools or Medersas and Islamic associations is partially described here. But there is another level which is as yet unexplored, such as the Islamic charitable action (*zakaat*) and other types of Islamic solidarity, which are integral to Muslim self-organisation.

General organisation: After successive episodes during the 1980s (see above), Islam has become one of France's key issues in political debate. Along with the associations which have emerged during Islam's increasing implantation in French society, attempts have been made to form umbrella organisations. For instance, the FNMF (*Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France* – National Federation of Muslims of France), created in 1985, represents a ›Gallican Islam‹ comprising 150 Islamic associations; the UOIF (*Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* – Union of Islamic Organisations of France) set up in 1983, which shares the Muslim Brothers' ideology³², is led by the Tunisians and challenges the supremacy of the FNMF; the GIF (*Groupement Islamique de France* – Islamic Forum of France) was set up in 1981 by the Tunisians; the AIF (*Association Islamique de France* – Islamic Forum of France) was created in 1984; and the UJM (*Union des Jeunes Musulmans* – Union of Muslim Youth) was set up by the Lyons' ›Beurs‹ in the late 1980s. At an institutional level, in 1985 Pierre Joxe, then Minister of the Interior, created the CORIF (*Conseil de Réflexion sur l'Islam en France* – Think Tank on Islam in France) to facilitate exchanges between the state and Muslim representatives. But this mediation was not pursued by Joxe's successor, Charles Pasqua.

In 1993, the Head of the Great Mosque of Paris, Dalil Boubakeur, created a new structure, the CRMF (*Conseil Représentatif des Musulmans de France* – Representative Council of Muslims in France), but this excludes the FNMF and the UOIF. In January 1995, an overview of the Muslim religion in France was prepared for the Minister of the Interior. With regard to the teaching of Islam, the UOIF set up a university in the Ain department in 1991. This was followed by the creation of a training institute, the CERISI (*Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur l'Islam* – Research Centre on Islam) by the French Muslim leader, Didier Ali Bourg, whose association is federated into the FNMF. All

31 Gilles Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam. Naissance d'une religion en France*, Paris 1987. For detailed descriptions of Muslim organisations in Europe, see Nadine Weibel, *Action caritative et Islam*, in: Gilbert Vincent (ed.), *La place des œuvres et des auteurs religieux dans les dispositifs de protection sociale. De la charité à la solidarité*, Paris 1997, pp. 159–170.

32 The Muslim Brothers' ideology refers more specifically to the fundamentalist Islamic movements, which were initiated in Egypt in the 1920s–1930s. It can, to some extent, be seen as the beginnings of Islamic integristism in the Arab world of the Middle-East, before extending to the Maghreb in the 1980s–1990s.

these organisations are more or less funded by countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Iran. The French state has hence been compelled to bring some order to these intricate networks, in circumstances where the importation of foreign conflicts such as the Algerian Civil War into French territory or even the consolidation of Iranian or Saudi *Wahhabite* influence are challenging French sovereignty.

Islamic micro-organisations: Beneath the more visible aspects of this new religion in Western Europe are dimensions which might be surprising for non-specialists: In the domain of education, religious and Arabic teaching is provided; leisure and recreational services include holiday resorts for teenagers such as Islamic guesthouses; health services include Islamic medical visits, clinics and diverse forms of nursing. Within this developing new sphere of Islamic action, the associative networks play an essential and dynamic role. Each association has, by now, a ›*caisse de zakaat*‹ (charitable fund), which is comparable to the function of local Christian parishes. Mutual help and social assistance based on the Islamic solidarity of the ›Brothers of Faith‹ are usual aspects of Islamic associations. They intervene in such varied domains as the repatriation of a dead body, financial help for a costly operation, helping a needy person, or distributing food to the poor during the Ramadan (this has been one of the *zakaat*'s traditional functions).

Even more common are the independent actions of individuals on a daily basis, such as providing assistance in dealing with administrative services, the translation of documents and the provision of advice and moral support to families in distress. An association active in these domains is the *Solidarité Musulmane* set up by a Pakistani woman in 1986. A huge solidarity network has since been developed, and cooperation is even extended to some non-Islamic institutions such as the Red Cross, the *Fondation Abbé Pierre*, the *Fondation de France* and the *Entraide Protestante* (Protestant Assistance). A second association is the *Secours Islamique* (Islamic Relief) which has attained a European scale of operation. It considers itself an NGO (Non-Governmental Organisation), carrying out actions in some of the migrants' home countries. Set up in the context of famines in Ethiopia and Sudan, it has its headquarters in Birmingham. A member of the Economic and Social Consultative Council of the United Nations, the organisation works within an Islamic ethic and is led by Dr Hani Ramadan. The French branch was created in 1989 and set up its headquarters in La Plaine St.-Denis. On a global level, there are other organisations such as the Islamic Relief Organisation based in Mecca and the Agency of Islamic Relief based in the Sudan with branches in Birmingham and France. No official data are available which could provide an accurate picture of Muslim networks in France and Europe generally.

Other important institutions, such as the Catholic Church, have done some work concerning Muslim socio-religious organisations in France. Vari-

ous groups have actively contributed to placing Islam on both political and research agendas. It is likely that through their writings and interventions in the media, researchers and the Church have led the state's institutions to be aware of the significance of Islam and of the necessity to solve the more urgent problems of the French Muslim community.

Allegiances: The problem of allegiances has also come to the fore. In the suburbs of the larger cities, the diversity of allegiances is revealed by the plethora of associations. A typology of these associations includes: municipal associations, aimed mainly at the cultural sector, which have extended their role to other purposes due to the absence of appropriate social structures; religious associations which have a pacifying role extending to proselytism; and local civic associations which have been infiltrated by Islamic leaders who have become stable mediators facilitating public administration (some wish to develop a political project similar to the Anglo-American notion of ethnic communities).

Ethnic Mobilisation and Group Identities

This subsection re-examines the already-known opposition between French republican integration, an improved version of assimilation, and the Anglo-Saxon models of ethnic minority or ethnicity supporters, also referred to as communitarians. Some recent debates have revolved around an intermediate model – known as French multiculturalism, put forward by Michel Wieviorka, an associate of Alain Touraine.

The French Republican model: According to the traditional French model, no public support for collective rights of ethnic minorities, no support for multicultural education, and no concession to ethnic groups' traditions is permissible, at least in principle. This principle explains, to a great extent, the absence of recognition of ethnicity in France. Since the times of Ernest Renan, ethnicity has been seen as an act of fate whereas the Nation is perceived as a collective wish. A consensus still prevails among scholars in France against the use of the concept of ethnicity similar to the American way of dealing with the issue (positive discrimination). In fact, the promotion of individual equality is seen as the basis of the French way of integrating foreign migrants. As Dominique Schnapper argues: »The promotion of French people of foreign origin comes about individually and not collectively through organised groups.«³³ If homogenisation is one of the dangers of the republican principle, most scholars recognise that it was never completely successful. But this principle continues to inspire state policy towards immigrants.

French scholars and politicians have argued that in France, political and social institutions have historically transformed immigrants into French citi-

33 Schnapper, *La communauté des citoyens*, p. 25.

zens while in the United States, similar institutions have legitimated and even generated a pattern of ethnic pluralism that has weakened the national community's fabric. In the context of the French debate on immigration during the past decade, the American pluricultural model has been seen largely in negative terms, a model not to be copied when dealing with immigrant incorporation. At the same time, however, there is a growing recognition that the traditional Jacobin model of integration is no longer as effective as it was once supposed to have been in the making of French citizens out of immigrants. There is growing evidence of the recognition of ethnicity in practice if not in theory. A de-facto communitarianism exists. The universalist principle, based on the distinction between private and public space, is no longer a solution to the problem of being both equal and different. The failure of universalism is now taken for granted and various ways are being explored to reach a workable solution. On the one hand, there are the partisans of multiculturalism (around Wieviorka), who link particularism and universalism based on a collective opinion. On the other hand, there are the supporters of a modulated universalism through an individualist approach (around Schnapper).

A French multiculturalism: French multiculturalism can be seen as a pedagogical attempt to get away from traditional republicanism. Wieviorka, a proponent of this system, advocated the adoption of the right to difference as an expression of a social movement designed to reshape collective life in France.³⁴ Whether it is seen as part of French political history or the reality of the 1980s, Wieviorka rejects analysing the present situation as a ›French exception‹. Indeed, while referring to the British or American model, he shows that these different countries find themselves in a situation similar to France. However, adopting a distorted view of Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism, only France finds that evolution a threat to its historical, linguistic or cultural identity. As an opponent of the republican Schnapper model, Wieviorka emphasises the necessity of escaping from the French republican exception so as to get away from the systematic and exaggerated opposition between universalism and particularism. Against the poverty of that debate, Wieviorka proffers the richness of a vision open to the experience of the other (pluralist model). He proposes a combination of the two principles in order to realise a democracy capable of dealing with difference. In the same way, Touraine does not support a pluralism of distinct and competing communities, but rather a multiculturalism which is a combination of social unity and cultural plurality in a given territory.³⁵ The problem will not be the choice between universalism and pluralism, but to know through which channels these different cultures will communicate with each other and with the world of eco-

34 Wieviorka, *Une société fragmentée*.

35 Alain Touraine, *Qu'est-ce qu'une démocratie?*, Paris 1995.

conomic reality. Multiculturalism, based on cultural contact, implies the implementation of a common language which supposes the delimitation of common frontiers.

A modulated universalism: Concerned about the chances for an egalitarian France, Schnapper opposes republican universalism, seen as the only guarantee of equality between individuals, to pluralism as a bearer of discrimination. Inspired by Renan's discourse on the nation, Schnapper bases her approach on a unitary nation, resulting from individual and collective wishes and especially concerned about the respect for the individual. While laying stress on the individual, this vision denies the cultural significance of the group. Its members have individually agreed to build the French nation which can only last through the political wish of which it is the offspring. However, Schnapper has been compelled to take into account society's quick evolution and growing gaps in the universalist model, such as the courses for children of immigrants facing school difficulties, introduced in the 1970s. According to the egalitarian model, these particularistic policies were seen as leaving a social stigma on the children. Oscillating between the necessity of the policies of positive discrimination due to real inequalities and a founding universalist principle, Schnapper has come to support a form of controlled or modulated universalism. This principle consists of accompanying measures aimed at managing the contradiction between law and reality without being transformed into legal rules or accepted practices. Moreover, in asking, ›Are we wrong to be universalists?‹, Schnapper argues that a necessary plurality should be situated in a universalist view. In her eyes, universalism is the basis for dialogue and the acknowledgement of plurality.³⁶ Whilst inverting the universalist logic, one has then to fully recognise, in an equal manner, the individual subject through respect for differences. Equality will then be replaced by the acceptance of difference which in any case represents only an instrument to reach this egalitarian ideal. The group and the difference will no longer be emphasised, but only the individual and equality.

Conclusion

Changes have taken place in such a short time that the rapid succession of scientific and political discourse can be, at times, quite detrimental to the accumulation of knowledge concerning immigrants and their children. For instance, the transition from an economic to a predominantly socio-political discourse has, since the early 1980s, partially contributed to an absence of

36 Dominique Schnapper, *Allemagne-France: Débat sur la nation*. Journée de réflexion sur la nation organisée par la Société Française de Sociologie, Paris 1995. Schnapper developed these ideas in an article: *La nation et l'universel*, in: *Raison Présente*, 1991, no. 122, pp. 9–99, here p. 52.

knowledge on the children of the second and third generation's socio-professional insertion in today's French society. It is a key issue, in that this specific age-group has a major role in showing whether the French mode of integration is successful or not. As it is usually argued that good economic insertion leads to a smooth socio-political one, unemployment is seen as one of the major causes of the Maghrebians' difficulties in today's France. But, is this socio-economic factor sufficient in explaining the immigrant population's present condition? Probably not, in that much has been said and written on the French model (assimilationist republicanism), which is increasingly being challenged at the end of the 20th century. In such circumstances, the entry of Islam has contributed to some sort of collective fear that the traditional way of assimilation or integration into the French melting pot is being questioned.

Structural Conditions, Historical Contexts and Social Effects of Post-1945 Migration to Germany

Introduction

The historical process of nation-state building in Germany and Eastern Europe as well as the development of welfare-state structures in Germany formed the decisive contexts in which migration to Germany took place. Within these contexts, three different channels of immigration were established in post-war Germany:

- citizenship: that is, belonging to the German nation in the case of the expellees and Ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*);
- the national labour market in the case of the so-called ›guestworkers‹;
- the German asylum law in the case of the foreign refugees.

Different policies towards the various migrant groups have led to different socio-structural positionings: The policy of national integration in relation to the ›German‹ immigrants created differentiated socio-structural conditions of inclusion for them. While labour migrants and their families increasingly became the object of attempts at integration within the context of their settlement and the consolidation of their residential status, asylum seekers by contrast were confronted with a systematic policy of preventing their integration. Expellees and Ethnic Germans are organised under the premises of both the nation-state and the welfare state, whereas the (self-)organisation of foreign migrants is based on the welfare-state system of ›care for foreigners‹ (*Ausländerbetreuung*).

Historical Structural Contexts

The History of Nation-state Building in Germany

The concept of a ›German nation‹ only became significant since the 15th century with the development of the Holy Roman Empire. But the idea of a monarchic-Christian, religiously legitimated universal Empire was still based on and personally embodied in a group of nobles. Until the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, one can at best speak of the existence of an ›estate nation‹ (*Standesnation*). A national consciousness aiming at the inclusion of everybody (later: of every citizen) into the corresponding political unit did

not develop until the beginning of the 19th century in the course of the anti-Napoleon wars of liberation. Although this did not lead to the formation of a German nation-state, in historical retrospect these wars can be described as the ›key event‹ of modern German national history¹, the formative context of the first German national movement.

The restoration of the old order following the 1815 Vienna Congress led to the foundation of the German Federation (*Deutscher Bund*) in 1815. This should be seen as a loose federation of principalities, in clear opposition to the claim to sovereignty of a modern civil nation.² The primary aim of German civil nationalism was to dissolve the pre-modern estate-order consciousness and to overcome the fragmentation of the territory of the former Empire and its population into a mass of small principalities. These were to be superseded by the unification of the entire German ›people‹ (*Volk*) through formation of a nation-state.³

The process of ›nation building‹⁴ was advanced by trans-regional (national), mass communication during the period preceding the democratic uprisings of March 1848 (the so-called *Vormärz*).⁵ This made the breakthrough of a national mass movement possible. Although the political revolution of

1 Otto Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770–1990*, 3rd ed. Munich 1996, p. 83.

2 Nevertheless, elements of the state, to which national demands could be addressed, can already be found. But the absolutist sovereignty of the prince and the direct relationship of domination between him and his subjects stood in contrast to the idea of ›the people‹ as a political project which implied the inclusion of the entire population into a German state to be built after the dissolution of the German Federation (see Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770–1990*, p. 33). This contradiction between the semantic claim and the existing organisational structures, which left the territorial extent of the future state open, led immediately after 1815 to a (re-)formation of oppositional national movements. Their orientation was anti-feudal and anti-absolutist (see *ibid.*, p. 87).

3 Especially in contrast to the French republican model, ethnic forms of founding a nation proved effective. These were motivated by political writers like Fichte and Herder, whose works were already widely distributed at the turn of the 18th century as a result of the so-called ›reading revolution‹. Thus the demand for a unitary German state was inspired by a ›national‹ intellectual life and expressed first by the formation of a student movement, followed by many other national movements, which nevertheless were not able to form a powerful unity; see Peter Alter, *Nationalbewußtsein und Nationalstaat der Deutschen*, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 1986, no. 1, pp. 17–30, here p. 21.

4 See Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationenbildung – Nationalstaat – Integration*, Düsseldorf 1972.

5 Such national communication was considerably accelerated and simplified by new technical means of overcoming regional boundaries, provided by the early industrialisation process. Wehler refers to this as the ›German double-revolution‹; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Von der ›Deutschen Doppelrevolution‹ bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges: 1849–1914*, Munich 1995.

1848 can be described as »mainly a national revolution«⁶, it was – in spite of its mass basis – not an anti-monarchist mass action, which might have led to the dissolution of the previous structures and the establishment of a democratic, civil nation-state. The political sovereignty of the principalities had been largely preserved, although the Federal Assembly of the German Federation was dissolved and replaced by a ›National Assembly of the German People‹.

In spite of successful nation building, the formation of a unitary German territorial and national state, which would have transformed all members of the nation into citizens, was not an immediate result. Nevertheless, in 1849, the Empire's Constitution (*Reichsverfassung*) did imply elements of a federal, democratic nation-state, which certainly contributed to the decline of the national movement after 1858 and to the ›unfinished‹ nation-state building of 1871.⁷ The development up to this date can be interpreted as a preliminary attempt to resolve the relationship between state and nation, in the sense of balancing out national claims for sovereignty in relation to territory and population and what could actually be achieved in terms of external and internal conditions.

During the Bismarck Empire under Prussian hegemony (the so-called small solution of the national question), the idea of a democratic organisation of the state was given some institutional shape, although the real power was exercised by the Chancellor of the Reich, who served as the executive organ for the Federal Council which was made up of the local princes. But, from the outset, the population of this small German Empire was not a ›state people‹ characterised by the identity of nation and territory. Nevertheless, the set of modern institutions, which had developed mainly in Prussia, was explicitly related to the idea of a nation in the sense of inclusion of all citizens. The state was constructed in such a way that it immediately became the target for uni-

6 Hagen Schulze, *Der Weg zum Nationalstaat. Die deutsche Nationalbewegung vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Reichsgründung*, 2nd ed. Munich 1986, p. 82.

7 For example, the formal abolition of all privileges for certain estates in favour of civil law (*Reichsbürgerrecht*) valid for all »members of those states, which form the German Empire«, thus for the entire »German people« (Art. 1, § 131). At the same time, the »anchorage of a guarantee of existence for national minorities on the level of a basic law« (Dann, *Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland 1770–1990*, p. 142) became necessary: The first national minority law was formulated by Article 13, § 188, which promised all other nationalities living on the Empire's territory – defined by law as »national tribes [*Volksstämme*] of Germany, which do not speak German« – the guarantee of »their national [*volkstümlich*] development, [...] namely the equality of their languages, as far as their territories reach, in the church, the class rooms, the inner administration and the administration of justice«. Thus it can be considered as a liberal law for immigrants, but not as an immigration law. It endeavoured to regulate the (tolerant) treatment of those non-German population groups who already lived on the Empire's territory: Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenians, and Italians.

versal claims of inclusion. In this way, the national ›bottom-up‹ revolution was followed by a ›top-down‹ structural revolution. Together, these two factors shaped the first German nation-state.

Historical Migration Movements in Germany up to 1945

The early ›German Federation‹ was a territory of East-West immigration (especially of Jewish intellectuals) and mass emigration⁸ at the same time. Immigration was seen as dangerous if it threatened national unity. Immigration of German-Polish workers from the Eastern border territories into the German Empire was well-established by 1890. Most settled in the rapidly industrialising Ruhr area. Although they were German citizens on the basis of territorial belonging, they formed an ethnically distinct group with a different national culture and language, together with Polish agricultural workers from Eastern Europe who actually had foreign citizenship.⁹

Although this group was homogeneous in an ethno-cultural sense, it was legally divided into foreign (Russian or Austro-Hungarian) and domestic (German) Poles. The Prussian-dominated Germany had differing policies towards the two groups: Measures of deportation and rotation could not be used in relation to the domestic Poles, but the preservation (or better: the construction) of the cultural homogeneity of the Empire's German population was a major policy aim. For this reason, the integration of German Poles into the Prussian-German ›cultural nation‹ was enforced through an authoritarian assimilation policy of strict Germanisation. On the other hand, foreign Poles were not allowed to settle, because they were suspected of lack of national loyalty.

Nearly four decades after the foundation of the Empire in 1871, the number of foreign workers living officially on its territory was five times

8 Especially to North America, due to the poverty which resulted from the breakdown of the old estate order and from the economic crisis that accompanied industrialisation.

9 Seasonal workers from east of the Elbe were recruited exclusively for short-term employment in agriculture. This sector was hit by a massive labour shortage because of the increasing rural exodus; see Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 bis 1980. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter*, Berlin/Bonn 1986, p. 21; Christoph Kleßmann, *Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 1870–1945. Soziale Integration und nationale Subkultur einer ethnischen Minderheit in der deutschen Industriegesellschaft*, Göttingen 1978; Klaus J. Bade, *Transnationale Migration und Arbeitsmarkt im Kaiserreich: Vom Agrarstaat mit starker Industrie zum Industriestaat mit starker agrarischer Basis*, in: Toni Pierenkemper/Richard Tilly (eds.), *Historische Arbeitsmarktforschung*, Göttingen 1982, pp. 182–211; idem, ›Billig und willig‹ – die ›ausländischen Wanderarbeiter‹ im kaiserlichen Deutschland, in: idem (ed.), *Deutsche im Ausland – Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 2nd ed. Munich 1992, pp. 311–324.

higher than at the beginning.¹⁰ After the breakdown of the Empire, with the end of World War I in 1918, the discrepancy between ›people‹ and territory had grown.

At the collapse of the German Empire, there was still no national idea of a state in the French-republican sense, which could have provided »a way of interpreting the fate of Germany [...] according to an idea of state and constitution«. The idea of the people therefore became »a political idea«.¹¹ Since 1913, this national (*völkisch*) concept of ethno-cultural belonging to a national community had been successfully established through the Imperial and State Nationality Law (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, RuStAG*). This concept of citizenship, which in its ethnic core was still valid until 1999, expressed the »development of the Empire explicitly on the national side«.¹² But the principle of descent did not exclude the option of belonging to a political community on the basis of choice, because the law also included quite generous arrangements for naturalisation.

The expansion of the welfare state and the corresponding regulation of the labour market and its administration by law were developed further during the years of the Weimar Republic. In contrast to the German Empire's policy of defence against a ›national danger‹¹³ which was motivated by the nation-state, the control of immigration in the Weimar Republic was based on the logic of the welfare state.¹⁴ Although the volume of foreign employment was rather small at this time, compared say to the turn of century, the

10 The census of 1910 counted a total number of 1.26 million foreigners – the majority were Poles from Russia, followed by Italians; see for the latter Adolf Wennemann, *Arbeit im Norden. Italiener im Rheinland und Westfalen des späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts* (IMIS-Schriften, Bd. 2), Osnabrück 1997. At this time, about half a million Poles from the eastern parts of Prussia who lived in the Ruhr area (*Ruhrpolen*) were employed in the industrial sector; see Ulrich Herbert, *Saisonarbeiter – Zwangsarbeiter – Gastarbeiter. Zur historischen Dimension einer aktuellen Debatte*, in: *Von der Ausländer- zur Einwanderungspolitik*, ed. Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn 1994, pp. 61–78, here p. 65.

11 Helmuth Plessner, *Die verspätete Nation. Über die politische Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes*, Frankfurt a.M. 1974, p. 51.

12 F. von Keller/P. Trautmann, *Kommentar zum Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz vom 22. Juli 1913*, Munich 1914, p. 6.

13 See Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Sozialdemokratie und Nationalstaat. Nationalitätenfragen in Deutschland 1840–1914*, Göttingen 1971, pp. 103–105.

14 In the period of constantly increasing unemployment, which had both structural and cyclical causes and which culminated in mass unemployment during the world economic crisis of 1929, ›primacy for citizens‹ (*Inländerprimat*) was legally established. This was a reaction to the repatriation of soldiers and became manifest with an uncompromising policy of priority for citizens in relation to the labour market.

structure of regulation in many respects later became »a model for foreigner policy in the Federal Republic«. ¹⁵

The expansion of the national welfare state did more than just establish administrative structures (which were later to become significant for dealing with migrants in the Federal Republic). This shift in focus also restructured the relation between immigration and the state. Now the question of in- or exclusion of labour migrants mediated by the welfare state gained priority rather than the question of national loyalty. In this way, since the turn of the 19th century, labour migration changed gradually from a primary ›problem‹ of the nation-state to a primary ›problem‹ of the welfare state. ¹⁶ The organisational structure of public labour administration was built up and developed up to 1927. ¹⁷ It implied the possibility of effectively channelling and controlling foreign employment through the welfare state. In the period of National Socialism, it was successively reformed into a totalitarian instrument of domination.

After 1937/38, recruitment of foreigners for labour service took place as part of the national-socialist strategy of mobilisation for World War II. ¹⁸ Immediately after the unconditional capitulation of Germany, most of the former ›alien workers‹, who were referred to as ›Displaced Persons‹ after the war, were repatriated by the Allied Forces. The jobs left behind by this remigration process were then taken by refugees and expellees, who had fled to Western Germany from the occupied Eastern areas and the Soviet occupation zone, the later German Democratic Republic (GDR). ¹⁹

15 Knuth Dohse, *Ausländische Arbeiter und bürgerlicher Staat. Genese und Funktion von staatlicher Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerrecht. Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Königstein i.Ts. 1981, p. 87.

16 Michael Bommes, *Migration und Ethnizität im nationalen Sozialstaat*, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 23. 1994, no. 5, pp. 364–377.

17 For an historical overview, see Volker Henschel, *Geschichte der deutschen Sozialpolitik (1880–1980). Soziale Sicherung und kollektives Arbeitsrecht*, Frankfurt a.M. 1984.

18 So-called ›alien workers‹ (*Fremdarbeiter*) were systematically deported to Germany for the ›labour service in the Empire‹ (*Arbeitseinsatz im Reich*) since the beginning of the war in autumn 1939, first from Poland and then from all other occupied European states as well. In 1944, nearly every third worker was recruited by force from foreign countries especially for the industrial, but also for the agricultural sector. This made a total of about 8 million; see Herbert, *Saisonarbeiter – Zwangsarbeiter – Gastarbeiter*, p. 66.

19 *Ibid.*

Structural Background to the Migration of Expellees and Ethnic Germans

For the process of community formation (*Vergemeinschaftung*) of German settlers in Eastern Europe, ethnic patterns of identification were almost insignificant at the end of the 18th century. Rather, groups of German settlers, in Poland for example, had developed a regional consciousness. Their common identities were based on their privileged ›exceptional position‹, which was not defined ethnically, but rather mainly on the basis of territorial belonging (to a village or region) or social status. In the 19th century, this situation assured their freedom as well as their political loyalty. For German settlers in Russia these privileges were regularly confirmed by the Russian tsars, who allowed the formation of a politically important and economically highly successful German population loyal to the tsar.

With the rise of bourgeois-revolutionary demands for emancipation during the 18th and 19th centuries, following the French Revolution, the idea of a nation-state also spread to Eastern Europe. Until the 19th century, the nation there was represented only by the nobility and referred mainly to apolitical linguistic communities. But in the context of massive socio-structural transformations, the modern nation-state replaced feudal privileges in Eastern Europe as well. The claim of sovereignty over a population by the modern nation-state implied the inclusion of the entire people independent of social status. The population was formed, and formed itself, as an ›imagined‹, historically founded community of national citizens.²⁰ The conditions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries which led eventually to the formation of the Soviet nation-state indicate that the emergence of ethnic and national semantics is connected with attempts at political homogenisation and social reform. This development can be considered as the accompanying context of modernisation processes within a dynastic society transforming itself into a modern socialist union of states. One result of this was a structural fractionalisation of the German population groups. As a reaction to the threat of the modernisation process to their ›exceptional‹ status, these groups tended to express themselves in ethno-national terms.

Within the context of the rise of Pan-Slavism and its ideology of maintaining or creating a grand-Russian Tsarist Empire, the ›German question‹ came to be conceptualised as a problem of ›feudal domination‹ by German population groups. The politics of gradual democratisation and social reform (for example, the abolition of serfdom) led to a social homogenisation and legal equalisation of large parts of the German population in the early 1860s. Part of the political program was an increasing nationalisation of the state,

20 See Benedict Anderson, *Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts*, Frankfurt a.M./New York 1988.

including harsh efforts at ›Russification‹. The lower classes, and especially the farmers, developed their national consciousness along with the institutionalisation of general military and school obligations, which meant the inclusion of a broader mass of people into the main organisations of national education.²¹ As a consequence of the policy of national homogenisation, the German privileges were almost completely abolished.²²

But ethno-cultural boundaries and potential areas of conflict gained political importance only in the first half of the 20th century. The growing political significance of the ›German question‹ was closely connected with the emergence of the German nation-state in 1871 and its territorially imperialistic ambitions. Its efforts at Germanisation²³ were regarded as a major challenge to sovereignty from the Russian point of view.²⁴ Thus the ›German question‹ was no longer just an internal political problem of privilege and discrimination by a dynastic pre-nation-state – the Tsarist Empire. With the foundation of a constitutionally democratic Russia, which lasted from 1905 to 1914, the ›German question‹ became more and more an issue of controversial national interest for the two most powerful European states. In the context of World War I, the violent inter-state conflicts between Russia and Germany concerning questions of domination, expansion of power and control over population and territory, caused open political debate in national and ethnic terms about the Germans.²⁵

The status of the Russian Germans was transformed from that of a privileged group to a national minority. Under suspicion of potential disloyalty they were now regarded as a politically closed group and as nationalistic Germans, who stood in a close relationship to Germany. As a consequence of World War I, laws were introduced which led to the liquidation of their economic basis in the form of ownership of land and property, as well as to some forced resettlement. The loss of their privileges and the worsening of their living conditions resulted in changes to their forms of self-identification. Emigration and options of exit on the one hand, and a growing identification

21 See Erhard Stölting, *Soziale Tätergruppen des Nationalismus Osteuropa*, in: Bernd Estel/Tilman Mayer (eds.), *Das Prinzip Nation in modernen Gesellschaften. Länderdiagnose und theoretische Perspektiven*, Opladen 1994, pp. 299–322, here p. 307.

22 For example, through the abolition of self-government in 1871, the introduction of general military service (*Wehrpflicht*) in 1874 and by the ›Law on Foreign Pensions‹ (*Fremdrentengesetz*) of 1887, which limited the right to own land and to vote for national minorities; see Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen im Zarenreich. Zwei Jahrhunderte deutsch-russische Kulturgemeinschaft*, Stuttgart 1986, p. 178–180.

23 Including the demands by the ›All German Movement‹ for incorporation of ›islands of Germanity‹, territorial ›rounding off‹ of the German ›linguistic nation‹ or the ›coming home‹ of those who had left the German ›cultural nation‹.

24 See Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen im Zarenreich*, p. 352–354.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 329.

as Russian citizens of German nationality on the other, were collective patterns of reaction to the political, economic and social threats to their existence.²⁶ Only much later did ethno-national patterns of identification gain ground, which were then intensified and raised to the level of a collective national consciousness of the Russian Germans.

The socialist Soviet Union, proclaimed in 1917, was from its beginning a multi-national state. In accordance with the Leninist theory of nationalities, further developed by Stalin, a homogeneous and supranational communist (world) community should arise from a melting of the peoples, the many existing nations and nationalities of the former Russian Empire. This future vision of a new world-wide historical community of all human beings as the ›final state‹ was to be reached after an ›intermediate state‹, conceptualised as a socialist nation by Stalin in a form essentially different from the idea of the civic nation.²⁷ Nevertheless, the Soviet Union took care to respond to national demands (especially of smaller units) by providing a distinct territory through a number of administrative reforms and other measures. The autonomous socialist Soviet Republic of the ›Volga Germans‹ was granted to the Russian Germans in 1924. In this way, a theory of nationalities was accepted, which respected territorial autonomy as a condition of federal balance and the equality of the peoples within the union of socialist Soviet republics.

This political and cultural egalitarianism led to a wave of ›nation building‹ in the late 1920s. The resulting national communities were considered as constitutive and equal parts of a new and supranational Soviet people that was to be built up in the future. Socialism as the political form of the state was seen as a nation-transcending element. But from 1933 onwards, Stalin's policy of ›Soviet patriotism‹ increasingly developed into a claim for hegemony of the Russian nation towards all other Soviet nations. Although this can be considered as a departure from the politics of ›nation building‹, Stalinist politics were essentially conceptualised in national categories only in relation to Russia: ›Hostile peoples‹ were punished and deported, while others were collectively privileged and rewarded.

Since the German settlers in the Soviet state became increasingly suspected of having a ›dual loyalty‹,²⁸ that is belonging to a (German) people

26 Ibid., p. 42.

27 The nation was defined as a »stable community of human beings, who are unified by a common language, territory and economic life, as well as common psychological characteristics, which are revealed in their cultural community«; cited from: Georg Brunner, *Die Rechtslage der Minderheiten nach sowjetischem Völkerrecht*, in: idem/Allan Kagedan (eds.), *Die Minderheiten in der Sowjetunion und das Völkerrecht*, Köln 1988, pp. 23–56, here p. 23.

28 Meir Buchsweiler, *Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Ein Fall doppelter Loyalität?*, Gerlingen 1984, p. 13.

and being (Soviet) citizens at the same time, the autonomous Volga Republic was dissolved in 1941 in response to the German attack against the Soviet Union. The modernisation of the economy and the collectivisation of agriculture partly destroyed their traditional social and communal structures. About 500,000 Soviet-German ›collaborators‹ from different settler regions were deported or resettled by force to Western Siberia, Middle Asia, and Kazakhstan in order to cut their national ties. They were not allowed to return until 1956 and had to work in special camps. This systematic persecution by expropriation and deportation in the period of World War II was a common experience of the Germans in the Soviet Union. Their membership in the socialist state of nationalities was linked with a policy of homogenisation and assimilation. But this effort to ›russify‹ their living conditions provoked exactly the opposite: A strong consciousness of social and political discrimination emerged among the Germans. So, paradoxically, the effects of the Stalinist policy of nationalities led to the self-identification and self-description of the Germans as part of the wider national community.²⁹

The shift to ethno-national patterns of identification, in which emphasis on the ›people‹ (*Volk*) became the predominant focus of identification for Germans in Russia, developed as one of the problems of the socialist polity of the Soviet state. Ethnic self-descriptions not only made visible the problem of effective homogenisation in a socialist Empire, which was not a nation-state, but also revealed the difficulties of the project of introducing a political centre for steering the society ›as a whole‹ – for example by violent ›cleansings‹ in order ›to keep the Empire together‹. Part of this process of political unification of former multi-national Empires (which affected the whole Europe) was the creation of ethnic and national minorities. Their emergence was closely connected with the establishment and the violent demarcation of the ›natural‹ nation towards other nations. As a result of state-building processes, historical ties to dynastic, religious, and regional traditions were replaced by ethnic and national patterns of identification. The altered structural situation defines – despite all differences – the common frame of reference for all German populations in 20th-century Europe.³⁰ Expulsion, deportation, collective

29 »Only the social and legal levelling in the Soviet Union and Stalin's politics of suppression and deportation created a feeling of belonging together and a ›national consciousness‹; Detlef Brandes, *Die Deutschen in Rußland und der Sowjetunion*, in: Bade (ed.), *Deutsche im Ausland – Fremde in Deutschland*, pp. 85–134, here p. 85.

30 The increased prevalence of ethno-national identification is thus not a structural specificity of Russian Germans in the Soviet Union. Germans – as an accompanying effect of the process of modern nation building – were identified as a national minority and then started to define themselves primarily as belonging to the German people. In spite of all kinds of differences between German population groups, they all shared the experiences of discrimination. For the relation between ethnic self-identification, structures of society and modern nation-state building, exemplified by

discrimination, and forced assimilation were a common basic experience of the German groups who, after World War II, came to the later Federal Republic as expellees and Ethnic Germans.

Structural Conditions, Volume, and Development of Migration since 1945

German Refugees and Expellees and the Immigration of Ethnic Germans

As outlined above, the ambition to create a homogeneous nation-state through annexation, secession, or expulsion must be seen as part of the tradition of nation-state building in the 19th century.³¹ On the other hand, the expulsion of Germans from various Eastern European states at the end of World War II was an exceptional event, as it was decided upon and carried out by the Allied Forces. They supported the expulsion and deportation of the Germans in order to avoid the creation of strong minorities within the newly formed states in Central and Eastern Europe.³² Even after the end of the expulsion measures in 1947/48, migration of Germans from Eastern Europe to the German Federal Republic did not stop. But in contrast to the forced migration directed by the Allied Forces, this migration was an outcome of various bilateral agreements and arrangements between the Federal Republic and the ›Eastern-Bloc‹ states concerned.

The process of migration of Ethnic Germans to the FRG (*Aussiedlung*) was confronted with difficult conditions with regard to the bilateral relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union right from the beginning. The different principles of citizenship (territorial versus ethnic) created a basic disagreement between the two states. Both regarded the Russian Germans as citizens of their own state. In the tradition of the idea of an ethnically homogeneous ›people of the state‹ (*Staatsvolk*), the FRG saw minorities of German ethnic background with foreign national status as potential citizens. Pointing

the ›Transylvanian Saxons‹ in Romania, see Armin Nassehi/Georg Weber, *Identität, Ethnizität und Gesellschaft. Über den Zusammenhang von ethnischer Selbstidentifikation und Gesellschaftsstruktur. Ein soziologischer Beitrag*, in: Marilyn McArthur (ed.), *Zum Identitätswandel der Siebenbürger Sachsen. Eine kulturanthropologische Studie*, Köln/Wien 1990, pp. 249–338.

31 See Eugen Lemberg/Gotthold Rhode/Herbert Schlenger, *Voraussetzungen und Zusammenhänge des deutschen Vertriebenenproblems*, in: Eugen Lemberg/Friedrich Edding (eds.), *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland*, Kiel 1959, pp. 8–37, here p. 23.

32 In contrast to other Eastern European states, the Soviet Union did not practice the organised deportation and expulsion of Germans. Their collective deportations before, during and after World War II were a purely internal phenomenon. This deviation from the ordinary idea of deportation must be explained by the peculiarities of the Soviet idea of the state which defined political membership on the basis of the ›supranational‹ socialist state.

to their belonging to a socialist state, the Soviet Union held the opinion that the members of the Russian-German minority were Soviet citizens. The different views of citizenship formed the background to bilateral competition over the Russian Germans, and to the changing conditions of their emigration from the Soviet Union after 1945. The emigration of the Ethnic Germans became the subject of a constantly difficult political bargaining process.

Table 1: Ethnic Germans Migrating to the FRG, 1950–1997

1950	47,165	1966	27,813	1982	47,993
1951	21,067	1967	26,227	1983	37,844
1952	5,537	1968	23,201	1984	36,387
1953	8,296	1969	29,873	1985	38,905
1954	10,390	1970	18,590	1986	42,729
1955	13,202	1971	33,272	1987	78,488
1956	25,302	1972	23,580	1988	202,673
1957	107,690	1973	22,732	1989	377,036
1958	129,660	1974	24,315	1990	397,073
1959	27,136	1975	19,327	1991	221,924
1960	18,171	1976	44,248	1992	230,565
1961	16,414	1977	54,169	1993	218,888
1962	15,733	1978	58,062	1994	222,591
1963	14,869	1979	54,802	1995	217,898
1964	20,099	1980	51,948	1996	177,751
1965	23,867	1981	69,336	1997	134,419

Sources: Gerhard Reichling, *Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen. Teil 1. Umsiedler, Verschleppte, Vertriebene, Aussiedler 1940–1985*, Bonn 1995, p. 41f.; Dieter Blaschke, *Aussiedler – Eine Problemskizze aus der Sicht der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung*, in: *Arbeit und Sozialpolitik*, 1989, no. 8/9, pp. 238–245, p. 238; Info-Dienst Deutsche Aussiedler, ed. Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für Aussiedlerfragen, 1996, no. 75, pp. 1–38, here p. 3.

In the course of the transformation of East-West relations from the Cold War to peaceful coexistence, the relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union improved since the end of the 1960s. With the breakdown of the socialist states in the mid-1980s, Eastern Europe was confronted with enormous problems resulting from new state-building processes and the revival of nationality conflicts. Especially in the former Soviet Union, national separation produced new national-territorial units with internal and external borders cutting across ethnic conflicts. These transformation processes led to the collapse of the previous forms of regulation. With the introduction of freedom of movement, the conditions of migration changed fundamentally. The so-

cialist principle of claiming a unitary population lost its validity with the dissolution of the Soviet Union into various ›closed‹ nation-states based on the principle of ethnic homogeneity. The former practice of permitting emigration only on a continuously low level was superseded. In the context of growing emigration from the former Soviet Union and its successor states since 1988 (see Table 1), ethnic differentiation was by now politically and legally permitted and sometimes even compulsory.³³

This change of the conditions for emigration needs to be interpreted in the historical context of nation-state building and ethnic self-identification. The introduction of ethnic criteria for emigration of Ethnic Germans marked an important turning point in the political self-description of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from a socialist and supranational perspective to a separatist nation-state perspective. Since then, the self-description of the German minority as (primarily) Ethnic Germans instead of Soviet citizens increasingly became politically tolerated, which legitimated their claim to emigrate.³⁴ As a result of the transformation process in Eastern Europe, the Cold-War competition between a socialist and a national concept of belonging to a state was eroded, with the effect of their increasing migration to Germany. The FRG reacted to this with an attempt to regulate and limit the immigration of Ethnic Germans by means of administrative rules concerning the modalities of application and immigration.³⁵

33 Liberalisation of the restrictive conditions for emigration had begun in the context of the politics of ›Perestroika‹ and ›Glasnost‹. Ethnic criteria were integrated in the new decree on emigration from 1987. It allowed emigration of all Soviet citizens who had professed their ›belonging to the German people‹ at the 1979 census.

34 In combination with the right to immigrate to Germany, the newly gained right to emigrate led to an enormous increase in the numbers of Ethnic Germans in Germany: The high peak was in 1989/90 with nearly 400,000 persons immigrating per year (see Table 1). Since 1991, the countries of origin have been mainly Kazakhstan, Russia, and Kirgisia.

35 The methods applied were similar to the immigration policies of classical countries of immigration like Australia, the United States of America or Canada, namely quotas and immigration procedures. From 1990, the ›Law on Admission of Ethnic Germans‹ (*Aussiedleraufnahmegesetz, AAG*) allowed immigration only on applications made in the country of origin. In this way, the immigration of Ethnic Germans was reduced from 1991 to 1993 by about 50 per cent, i.e. 220,000 persons per year. Since 1993, the ›Law Dealing with the Consequences of World War II‹ (*Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz, KfbG*) fixed the average immigration numbers for 1991/92 as a yearly contingent of immigration for Ethnic Germans. It also created the term of the ›Late Departing Ethnic German‹ (*Spätaussiedler*) as distinguished from the Ethnic German, as defined by the BVFG of 1953, and foreclosed the status of Ethnic Germans for those born after 1992. With the abolition of this status, the process of nation-state building can be seen as completed, and in this way ethnicity as the defining element of citizenship (*ius sanguinis*) becomes linked much closer to the principle of territory (*ius soli*).

›Guestworker‹ Recruitment and Employment of Foreigners

While the immigration of Ethnic Germans has to be seen in the context of nation-state building in Germany and Eastern Europe, the immigration of ›guestworkers‹ from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s was initiated by the labour-market policy of a national welfare state, linked to the ›economic miracle‹ (*Wirtschaftswunder*). During this period of constant economic growth, ›guestworkers‹ were recruited to compensate for a labour shortage, which had become evident since the mid-1950s when the immigration of refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe had nearly ceased. Additionally, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 had finally stopped the entry of Eastern Germans. Since 1953, farm employers as well as parts of the mining industries had begun calling for the recruitment of workers. In 1955, the first agreement on recruitment was signed with Italy. Further agreements with Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Tunisia, Morocco, and Yugoslavia followed in the course of the 1960s. These agreements enabled the German labour administration to recruit workers within these countries.³⁶

It was politically agreed that ›guestworkers‹ should only be recruited as long as there was full employment, on the principle of the ›primacy of citizens‹ (*Inländerprimat*). These principles were enforced by the Foreigners Police (*Ausländerpolizei*) and the Labour Administration (*Arbeitsverwaltung*).³⁷ Foreigners who applied for employment in the FRG needed both work permits and residence permits. Employment was only allowed if there was no German available for the job. The residence permit was issued by the Foreigners Office (*Ausländerbehörde*) and was generally valid only for specified periods and areas. The Foreigners Office was not legally obliged to give specific reasons for a refusal to issue or to renew a residence permit. Work and residence permits were the technical administrative means of the state to organise the recruitment of migrant workers.

36 Up to 1961, about 5.5 million foreign workers entered, making this flow an important part of post-war labour-market dynamics; see Hellmut Körner, *Der Zustrom von Arbeitskräften in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950–1972. Auswirkungen auf die Funktionsweise des Arbeitsmarktes*, Frankfurt a.M./Munich 1976. The share of foreign workers in the total labour force doubled between 1955 and 1959 (see Table 2). But recruitment of ›guestworkers‹ only gained significance since 1960. In 1960, 141,168 Italians – about 100,000 more than in 1959 – started to work in the FRG. The total number of foreign employees had grown to 279,400 in July 1960 (67.5 per cent more than in 1959, see Table 2).

37 The organisational structures of the administration were partly taken over from the Weimar Republic. The Federal Labour Administration was restored in 1952 with the establishment of the Federal Office for Employment and Unemployment Insurance (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung*). The most important laws were the ›Law on Labour Promotion‹ (*Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG*) and the ›Foreigner Law‹ (*Ausländergesetz, AuslG*) of 1965.

Table 2: Employed Foreigners in the FRG, 1954–1996

1954	72,900	1969	1,501,400	1984	1,593,000
1955	79,600	1970	1,949,000	1985	1,583,900
1956	98,800	1971	2,241,100	1986	1,592,000
1957	108,200	1972	2,352,400	1987	1,611,000
1958	127,100	1973	2,346,800	1988	1,656,000
1959	166,800	1974	2,287,000	1989	1,730,000
1960	279,400	1975	2,070,700	1990	1,837,000
1961	548,900	1976	1,921,000	1991	1,973,000
1962	711,500	1977	1,888,600	1992	2,104,000
1963	828,700	1978	1,869,300	1993	2,184,000
1964	985,600	1979	1,933,700	1994	2,141,000
1965	1,216,800	1980	2,071,700	1995	2,129,000
1966	1,313,500	1981	1,917,000	1996	2,057,000
1967	991,300	1982	1,785,000		
1968	1,089,100	1983	1,709,000		

Sources: Michael Bommers, Von ›Gastarbeitern‹ zu Einwanderern. Arbeitsmigration in Niedersachsen, in: Klaus J. Bade (ed.), *Fremde im Land* (IMIS-Schriften, Bd. 3), Osnabrück 1997, pp. 249–323, here p. 316; Statistisches Jahrbuch, ed. Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 1981ff.

›Guestworker‹ recruitment was stopped by the Federal Government in the context of the Oil Crisis of 1973, which was perceived as the start of a worldwide economic recession.³⁸ The crisis led to a rapid growth of unemployment (to more than one million). But the halting of recruitment was also an outcome of an ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of the employment of foreign labour, which had begun in 1970.³⁹ A two-pronged policy of ›consolidation of foreigners' employment‹ was declared in 1973: One aim was to promote the return of the foreign employees to their countries of origin; and

38 In the ten-year period from 1962 to 1972, about 5 million foreign employees migrated to the FRG and about 3 million left. As a consequence of the stabilisation of employment contracts (see Körner, *Der Zustrom von Arbeitskräften in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950–1972*, p. 217–219) and of the halt to recruitment, this high rate of fluctuation declined.

39 This debate focussed attention on 1) the growing use of the social infrastructure by foreigners, 2) negative effects on the modernisation of production plants because the number of foreign employees at least doubled in five years, and 3) the decreasing regional mobility of foreign employees; see Herbert, *Saisonarbeiter – Zwangsarbeiter – Gastarbeiter*, p. 216–219. This led to the questioning of a labour-market policy based on conjunctural management through use of the potential flexibility of foreign workers.

the other was to encourage the integration of those who stayed with their families in the FRG.

The decrease of foreign employment during the 1970s (see Table 2) was not a consequence of the general dynamics of the labour market, but the result of a labour-market policy, which was based on the protection of the national labour market against labour immigration from outside as well as on welfare-state measures designed to privilege citizens in comparison to foreigners. The principle of the primacy of citizens was implemented in such a way that the welfare state aimed to improve the inclusion of citizens in the labour market by means of exclusion of foreigners from the economic, legal, educational, and family spheres. As the labour market excluded a large number of employees since the early 1970s, the welfare state became restrictive against foreigners for the benefit of citizens.

The enforcement of the primacy for citizens was made possible by recourse to a law that had developed much earlier. The FRG took up and combined two different traditions which gained in significance in the context of the welfare state⁴⁰: first, the option of political arbitrariness of state power in relation to foreigners as applied in the German Empire, which had been legally fixed in the foreigners law⁴¹; and, second, the welfare-state structures of labour regulation developed in the Weimar Republic. As a consequence, the decline of labour immigration and the reduction of the number of foreign workers in the labour market were considered to be the result of a successful labour-market policy and the activities of the Labour Administration.

But the practices of the authoritarian welfare state in giving preference to citizens and treating foreign workers as a flexible and controllable labour reserve gradually came up against legal limits.⁴² The inclusion of migrant

40 Welfare states can be defined as states which orientate an important part of their political decisions and administrative activities to the advancement of participation of individuals and groups in politics, economy, law, education, health etc. and to the improvement of the conditions that allow the maintenance and foundation of families. Against this background, the policies towards migrant workers since the recruitment stop are based on a fundamental contradiction: On the one hand, foreign migrants are integrated into the social security system of the welfare state and, therefore, participate in its services; on the other hand, the aim of the welfare state to privilege citizens leads to political efforts to prevent the inclusion of foreigners in the systems of economy, law, health and family; see Michael Bommers, Von ›Gastarbeitern‹ zu Einwanderern: Arbeitsmigration in Niedersachsen, in: Klaus J. Bade (ed.), *Fremde im Land: Zuwanderung und Eingliederung im Raum Niedersachsen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (IMIS-Schriften, Bd. 3), Osnabrück 1997, pp. 249–323.

41 See Dohse, *Ausländische Arbeiter und bürgerlicher Staat*.

42 Among several other decisions of federal courts, the Federal Social Court (*Bundessozialgericht*) issued a fundamental decision in 1977, laying down the entitlement of foreigners to welfare-state services such as unemployment benefits and the right of inclusion into welfare associations; see Bommers, *Von ›Gastarbeitern‹ zu Einwanderern*, p. 271f.

workers into compulsory welfare insurance meant that they accumulated legal entitlements to social services. A consequence of this was the gradual consolidation of the residential status of foreigners. Several important reports and decisions were released, which developed the notion of a ›dual strategy‹ (recruitment stop plus integration)⁴³. The Report of the Commission of the Federal and State Governments for the Development of a Comprehensive Plan for the Employment of Foreigners in 1977, the Memorandum of the Commissioner for Foreigners (the so-called ›Kühn-Memorandum‹)⁴⁴ of 1979, and the family migration regulations of 1981 which lowered the minimum age for the immigration of children to 16 years. In this way, major elements of policy towards foreign workers and their families were fixed during the period from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. While the Commission took an ambivalent position concerning the future of foreign employment, conditions of residence, and integration for foreign workers, the ›Kühn-Memorandum‹ took a far more definite position especially with regard to the situation of the second generation. It underlined the social costs of a failure to integrate migrant children and included a number of suggestions concerning the improvement of legal and social conditions for foreigners.

The government of the FRG adopted some of these proposals, but with new growth in the number of foreigners at the beginning of the 1980s (almost 5 million altogether), political controversies about the appropriate political treatment of foreigners arose again. In connection with the crisis of the ruling social-liberal coalition, the opposition shifted foreigner policy to the centre of political debates. But despite all public pronouncements, the change of government was not accompanied by a basic shift in the labour-migration policy of the FRG. Even the initial political promotion of the return of foreigner families to their countries of origin in 1983/84 relied on planning of the former government and remained generally ineffective.

In sum, the 1980s have been described as a ›lost decade‹.⁴⁵ Until the passing of the new Foreigners Law in 1990, nothing spectacular happened.

43 These represent a compromise between more restrictive and more integrative approaches to deal with labour migrants and their families. On the one hand, the maintenance of the recruitment stop and the promotion of the return of foreigner families to their countries of origin were recommended, on the other hand it was stated that foreigners would also be employed in the long term in the FRG. They should therefore obtain the possibility of leading a legally and socially secure life with their families. Of special concern was that the so-called second generation, who grew up in Germany, should be socially and professionally integrated.

44 See Heinz Kühn, *Stand und Weiterentwicklung der Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Memorandum des Beauftragten der Bundesregierung, Bonn 1979.

45 See for example Klaus J. Bade, *Transnationale Migration, ethnonationale Diskussion und staatliche Migrationspolitik im Deutschland des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, in:

But the 1980s can also be regarded as a period of progressive and pragmatic integration of labour migrants into the welfare state. During the 1980s, and given several court decisions which secured the right of foreigner families to stay so that they were able to make use of the rights they had gained, the presence of the foreigners slowly lost its exceptional character in various fields of everyday life. They became a routine factor for political administration and in all kinds of other social fields.

The course of policy towards migrant workers in the 1980s can therefore be understood as an unspectacular, politically unintentional, but gradually implemented pragmatic practice of integration of foreigners into the social security system, which included most types of social transfer payments. If the employment of foreigners was initially managed by the welfare-state labour administration according to authoritarian traditions, labour migrants have in the meantime come to enjoy considerable individual legal entitlements. The inclusion of foreigners in the normal fields of everyday life was relatively independent of their citizenship and national belonging. It was primarily achieved through the mechanisms of the welfare state, producing the intermediate status of ›denizens‹.⁴⁶

Political Refugees and the Development of Asylum Procedures

Immigration of foreign refugees cannot be considered either as an explicit political desire (as in the case of the expellees and Ethnic Germans) or the result of bilateral agreements or arrangements (as both in the case of the ›guestworkers‹ and the case of German immigrants). Rather, it represents a form of migration appealing to international human rights law, which had taken on a unique form in Germany in 1949 due to the specific historical background. The history of German asylum law is itself one of political-legal transformation processes, which reacted to the changing streams of foreign refugees into the FRG. Thus, the principle underlying asylum decisions gradually shifted from a generous individual right to claim refugee status to an administrative ›asylum-seeker law‹.⁴⁷ This corresponded with a move from reliance on subjective fear of persecution to objective ›circumstances of flight‹ (*Fluchtatbestände*) as the decisive criteria for granting asylum. The increasing importance of administrative procedures in the treatment of asylum

idem (ed.), *Migration – Ethnizität – Konflikt: Systemfragen und Fallstudien* (IMIS-Schriften, Bd. 1), Osnabrück 1996, pp. 403–430, here p. 424.

46 Tomas Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation-state. Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration*, Aldershot 1990.

47 Kay Hailbronner, *Vom Asylrecht zum Asylbewerberrecht. Rechtspolitische Anmerkungen zu einem ungelösten Problem*, in: Walther Fürst et al. (eds.), *Festschrift für Wolfgang Zeidler*, Berlin 1987, pp. 919–937.

seekers took place within the context of increasing world-wide migrations, which were difficult to handle within the constitutional law of asylum (Article 16 of the German Basic Law). This law had been fixed in 1949 as an un-specific, subjective right with constitutional guarantee and legal protection, and was based on a moral consensus of all parties, that after the experience of the national socialist dictatorship the new state should be liberal and open to the world.

Apart from this constitutional right, the FRG has also accepted the Geneva Convention on Refugees (GCR) which was declared as international law by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1951 as the international legal basis for the treatment of foreign refugees. In contrast to German asylum law, this convention does not define a right of the individual in relation to the state, but a right of protection against deportation for individuals whose »freedom and life are threatened in their country of origin«.⁴⁸ In comparison, the asylum law in the FRG, established by the state itself, defines purely national rather than international law.

The German asylum law remained almost untouched until 1973, as only a few thousand persons per year had made use of it until then (see Table 3). The majority were Eastern European refugees, who were allowed to stay in the FRG either because of international refugee law or for reasons of the Cold War, even if they did not fulfil the conditions of the national asylum law. In contrast to the reception of refugees during the Cold War, which was publicly accepted, the numerous amendments of law and reforms of the administrative procedures since the end of the 1970s were accompanied by considerable political conflict.

Since the mid-1970s, Eastern European refugees were no longer the majority, and the number of non-European refugees increased. This marked the beginning of extensive discussions on abuse of the right to asylum. Refugees were increasingly designated as »phony asylum seekers« (»*Scheinasylanten*«) or »economic refugees« (»*Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge*«) and demands were made for their exclusion from asylum. Since then, the »asylum question« has become a recurrent problem of domestic politics.⁴⁹

Although most of the applicants were suspected of being »economic refugees«, the principle of the »subjective fear of persecution« was maintained for the time being. Since the late 1970s, a slow and continual change away from the subjective principle of asylum law in relation to the reasons for escape became manifest through a series of legislative and administrative re-

48 The so-called Non-Refoulement principle (Article 33 GCR), which was established as an international law that has to be respected by all sovereign states that have signed the treaty.

49 The »magic barrier« of 10,000 asylum seekers per year was exceeded in 1976, while the 100,000 mark was reached in 1980 (see Table 3).

forms. Article 16 of the Basic Law states without any further definition: ›politically persecuted persons enjoy the right of asylum‹. In contrast to the international definition of refugees in the Geneva Convention, the ›objective‹ persecution of individuals by states became increasingly emphasised as the decisive criterion for granting asylum.

Table 3: Asylum Seekers in the FRG, 1953–1996

1953	1,906	1968	5,608	1983	19,737
1954	2,169	1969	11,664	1984	35,278
1955	1,927	1970	8,645	1985	73,832
1956	2,284	1971	5,388	1986	99,650
1957	3,112	1972	5,289	1987	57,379
1958	2,740	1973	5,595	1988	103,076
1959	3,009	1974	9,424	1989	121,318
1960	2,980	1975	9,627	1990	193,063
1961	2,722	1976	11,123	1991	256,112
1962	2,550	1977	16,410	1992	438,191
1963	3,238	1978	33,136	1993	322,599
1964	4,542	1979	51,493	1994	127,210
1965	4,337	1980	107,818	1995	127,937
1966	4,370	1981	49,391	1996	116,367
1967	2,992	1982	37,423		

Sources: Regina Heine, Ein Grundrecht wird verwaltet, in: *Bewährungsprobe für ein Grundrecht*, ed. Amnesty International, Baden-Baden 1978, pp. 407–504, here p. 408; *Datenreport 1997*, ed. Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 1997, p. 43.

But this re-interpretation did not abolish the individual right to claim asylum. With the growing numbers of individuals claiming asylum, the administrative procedures themselves gained immense relevance. The granting of asylum increasingly depended on these procedures. Differentiated procedures of application and decision were established. The general definition of asylum had to be handled in a way that allowed specification of the criteria for decisions; for example, what exactly is political persecution? In this way the law was operationalised in describable and manageable procedures of application and decision, more or less calculable for both applicant and decision-maker.⁵⁰

50 The procedure itself became an essential part of the immigration process of asylum seekers. One could even argue that the reshaped ›asylum-seeker law‹ has replaced the original asylum law as an immigration mechanism, or as a ›pull factor‹.

The amendments to the Law on Asylum Procedures (*Asylverfahrensgesetz, AsylVfG*) in 1982 finally separated the jurisdiction concerning asylum from the general Foreigners Law of 1965. Connected to this was the abolition of what could be seen to support the social integration of asylum seekers, like the financial support for language courses. The temporary reduction of the number of new asylum seekers led to a short period during which the ›asylum problem‹ disappeared from the public agenda of domestic politics. But a new increase in numbers in the late 1980s (see Table 3) was followed by a re-politicisation of the ›asylum question‹ and was accompanied by a campaign against the abuse of asylum. In contrast to former debates, this marked the beginning of a fundamental questioning of the constitutional right to asylum and a new wave of changes in the administrative procedures.

A major result of the so-called ›asylum compromise‹ was the extensive reform of the constitutional law of asylum in 1993. This involved the limitation of the constitutional right to asylum. Such changes had been demanded since 1984. They finally specified the criteria necessary for an individual to make a justified claim for asylum. This change to constitutional law had gradually been prepared from 1977 onwards by the various changes to administrative procedures. The reform foresees the possibility of defining so-called ›safe countries‹ of origin and travel where political persecution is not regarded as an issue. Another point of the reform is that the right to asylum can no longer be claimed by refugees entering the territory of the FRG from so-called ›safe third states‹ including all neighbouring countries of Germany. In this way, the route of escape instead of its reasons came to be seen as a decisive criterion. The reform makes it much more difficult for individuals to claim asylum with the political intention of narrowing this mode of entry. Partly due to these new regulations, the number of asylum seekers levelled out to a lower level of about 130,000 persons per year after 1993 (see Table 3).

The Socio-Structural Situation of the Different Migrant Groups

The structural conditions under which immigration takes place can be described as political, juridical and social filters for chances of integration with different permeabilities depending on the group of immigrants. The specific national and welfare-state regulations of the FRG concerning immigration, residence, and citizenship lead to different migration policies resulting in different socio-structural positionings of migrants.

Socio-Structural Positioning of Expellees and Ethnic Germans: Welfare-State Policies to Promote Integration

Arriving in post-war Germany, refugees and expellees were confronted with a social infrastructure that was largely destroyed. Nevertheless, even under the difficult post-war housing and labour-market conditions, there was no alternative to their social integration. It had to be accepted as a central political aim by the newly founded FRG. One of the main characteristics of post-war development in Germany was the extension and consolidation of the national welfare state. This formed the framework for a number of special measures of integration provided for both immediate post-war refugees and expellees migrating by force, and for Ethnic Germans who were allowed to migrate voluntarily after the 1950s bilateral bargaining processes. Their political and economic discrimination in Eastern European countries led to their self-identification as ethnic minorities and, consequently, promoted their desire to live as ›Germans among Germans‹. The right of immigration was based on the right of citizenship and was coupled with different social measures of compensation laid down by the 1953 ›Federal Law on Expellees and Refugees‹ (*Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz, BVFG*). The integration of all German immigrant groups into the FRG was to be achieved through social measures designed both to compensate for deficits and to promote chances of integration.

In the course of the 1950s, the Federal Government created an extensive legal framework for the equalisation of the legal and social positions of expellees and refugees in relation to other citizens, and for their economic integration.⁵¹ These measures of social and economic support enabled their integration with few serious problems. This was the aim of a policy which declared the integration of German immigrants and the promotion of their legal entitlements towards the welfare state as a ›national task‹. One result of this was that most of the expellees could find employment and their integration was successfully accomplished by the mid-1960s.⁵²

51 In 1952, the ›Law on Burden Compensation‹ (*Lastenausgleichsgesetz, LAG*) was introduced to compensate for the (material) loss resulting from war, escape, and expulsion. Moreover, other regulations were introduced, for example, several measures on resettlement, assistance for professional integration (e.g. promotion of self-employment), assistance for incorporation in the agrarian sector, and since 1954, the promotion of housing and of the education of refugee children and young people through guarantee funds.

52 Besides the successful continuation of the Federal Republic's policy of expellee integration in the 1960s and 1970s, the professional and social upward mobility of expellees and refugees was also pushed by the growing inclusion of foreign workers in the labour market from the beginning of the 1960s.

The legal and political program regulating this integration was, with only slight modifications, valid until 1990, and also applied to Ethnic Germans who entered after 1950. In the course of the process of détente between East and West at the beginning of the 1970s, numerous bilateral agreements on immigration led to a rise in the number of Ethnic German immigrants (see Table 1). Similar to the case of the expellees, large social ›integration packets‹ mainly based on the BVFG ensured their rapid and socially inconspicuous integration in the old FRG.⁵³

This situation changed in the late 1980s with the beginning of transformation processes in Eastern Europe. The sudden increase in immigration of Ethnic Germans in 1987/88 (see Table 1) aggravated labour-market difficulties. The established measures for their integration were now publicly perceived as an exaggerated privileging of the German immigrants compared to the domestic population. This resulted in a gradual reduction of the main integration programs for Ethnic Germans and of their legal entitlements in relation to the welfare state. Basic subsistence-support measures were reduced in the context of the introduction of a special law concerning integration of Ethnic Germans (*Eingliederungsanpassungsgesetz, EinglAnpG*, 1990).⁵⁴ Rising unemployment and the resulting social problems after German reunification greatly reduced the chances of integration for a large proportion of Ethnic Germans. Employment opportunities deteriorated since the early 1990s, and they often faced difficulties because their professional qualifications did not correspond to those required. This results in frequent job changes, continuation of studies, retraining and other measures of adaptation, and also to an above-average unemployment rate.⁵⁵

53 Included were measures of language teaching, assistance for self-employment and educational measures provided by the labour administration via the AFG – especially for young Ethnic Germans. Another important measure was equalisation of the social insurance system through a ›biographical construction‹, which means that the persons concerned were treated as if they had lived, worked, and paid their contributions on the territory of the FRG; see Michael Bommers, National Welfare State, Biography and the Impact of Migration – A Case Study, in: idem/Andrew Geddes (eds.), Welfare and Immigration: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State, London [2000].

54 The unemployment benefit based on average salary levels was replaced by a general and visibly reduced ›integration payment‹ by the *EinglAnpG*, generally granted by the Federal Labour Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, BfA*) for the period of one year. Afterwards (in 1992) this was reduced even more by substituting this payment with integration assistance, financed by federal funds.

55 Unemployed Ethnic Germans increasingly depend on welfare benefits, which fall within the responsibility of the local governments. The numerous changes, modifications and restrictions of their material well-being affect the action margins and the integrative capacity of the local governments. The restructuring, decentralisation, and the shift of social risks from the Federal Government to the responsibility of the

Welfare-State Integration of Migrant Workers and their Families

In contrast to the politically promoted immigration of Ethnic Germans, ›guestworker‹ recruitment was based on an economically motivated labour-market policy. Starting from participation in the labour market, foreign workers in a kind of chain reaction also participated in most other sectors of society. Most of them are today a part of the resident population of Germany, integrated at a relatively low socio-structural level. Today family migration continues, while the former migrant workers and their families often serve as networks, which are also used by refugees and asylum seekers, particularly from Turkey and from former Yugoslavia.

Since the period of consolidation in the 1970s, foreign employees have been able to maintain their position in the labour market. Their housing situation has gradually improved to match that of the German population. The ›guestworkers‹ were almost entirely accommodated in hostels near their workplace at the beginning of recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s. By 1994, over 90 per cent of the foreign population lived in rented flats or houses (86.2 per cent) or owned their own residence (4.5 per cent).⁵⁶ They had become »a permanent and accepted part of Germany's population« as a result of a process of settlement starting in the 1970s which was supported by the halt to recruitment.⁵⁷

The consolidation of the residential status of foreign workers and their families is closely linked to increasing duration of stay in the FRG and legal recognition of their settlement.⁵⁸ Another indicator of gradual stabilisation of the residential status of most foreigners who permanently settled is their integration into the national educational system especially in the course of the 1980s, a period in which a pragmatic policy of integration obtained. Since then, and in contrast to the case of the Ethnic Germans who are statistically ›invisible‹, there exists ample statistical information particularly concerning

local governments not only restricts the budget of the latter, but also leads to a serious restriction of their social services.

56 See the report of the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners, Bericht über die Lage der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer, Bonn 1995, p. 18f.

57 Ibid., p. 19.

58 This recognition could take place in form of an unlimited residence permit, a residence authorisation exceeding this or even naturalisation as the safest status, transforming foreigners into full citizens. The former ›guestworkers‹ and their families surely have the longest residential duration, on average, compared to other foreigners who stayed in the FRG. The new foreigner law of 1991 has considerably facilitated naturalisation regulations for young foreigners and those who stay in the FRG for a long time. Turkish migrant groups, in particular, could profit from this. Moreover, the total number of naturalisations of foreigners has grown since 1991.

foreign children and young people. The gradual normalisation of the treatment of the consequences of labour migration and the inclusion of labour migrants into the regulatory institutions of the welfare state enabled the migrant workers and their families to take responsibility for organising their own lives. But the gradual equalisation process during the 1980s started to stagnate in the early 1990s. This is possibly connected with a more frequent use of ›ethnic‹ patterns of description in relation to the children of migrant workers, who were increasingly regarded as ethnically different.⁵⁹ Together with an above-average unemployment rate (see Table 4) and the corresponding lack of opportunities, this may offer potential for processes of ethnic mobilisation in the future.

Table 4: Unemployment Rates for Total Labour Force and for Foreigners (per cent), 1965–1996

	total foreign		total foreign			total foreign		
1965	0.7	0.2	1976	4.6	5.1	1987	8.9	14.3
1966	0.7	0.3	1977	4.5	4.9	1988	8.7	14.4
1967	2.1	1.5	1978	4.3	5.3	1989	7.9	12.2
1968	1.5	0.6	1979	3.8	4.7	1990	7.2	10.9
1969	0.9	0.2	1980	3.8	5.0	1991	6.3	10.7
1970	0.7	0.3	1981	5.5	8.2	1992	6.6	12.2
1971	0.8	0.6	1982	7.5	11.9	1993	8.2	15.1
1972	1.1	0.7	1983	9.1	14.7	1994	9.2	16.2
1973	1.2	0.8	1984	9.1	14.0	1995	9.3	16.6
1974	2.6	2.9	1985	9.3	13.9	1996	10.1	17.3
1975	4.7	6.8	1986	9.0	13.7			

Source: Bommes, Von ›Gastarbeitern‹ zu Einwanderern, p. 318; Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Amtliche Nachrichten, Sondernummer, Nürnberg 1995f.

The Policy of Preventing Integration of Asylum Seekers

The policy of preventing integration of refugees is in stark contrast to the fairly successful integration policies towards foreign workers and their families and even more so towards German immigrants. Evidence for this assessment is to be found in asylum policies which aggravate the housing and

59 See David Baker/Gero Lenhardt, Ausländerintegration, Schule und Staat, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 40. 1988, pp. 40–61; Michael Bommes/Frank-Olaf Radtke, Institutionalisierte Diskriminierung von Migrant*innen, in: Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 39. 1993, no. 3, pp. 483–497.

living conditions of asylum seekers, making their insecure residential status even more problematic. Through such measures, an already weak legal status is compounded by a marginal social status, so that asylum seekers have no chance of organising their lives independently.

Such policies began in the early 1980s.⁶⁰ The so-called immediate social measures introduced in 1980 profoundly affected the material living conditions of asylum seekers dependent on ›subsistence support‹.⁶¹ Since 1982, this minimum social assistance was successively shifted from cash payments into material provision of foodstuffs, accommodation, and other basic necessities. This systematically prevented independent and price-oriented consumption, thus leading to a situation of almost total control which, together with the complex asylum procedures, virtually neutralised the asylum seekers as persons. The 1993 Law on Benefits for Asylum Seekers (*Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, AsylbewLG*) went even further: It was a law which created a special status for asylum seekers, and removed them from the scope of the Federal Social Assistance Law (*Bundessozialhilfegesetz, BSHG*). It established material instead of monetary provision as a basic principle, rather than just as a possible priority, providing a legal basis to the prevention of integration of asylum seekers.

Furthermore, compulsory housing of asylum seekers in collective accommodations prevented social integration and made them constantly available for political control and legal procedures.⁶² The restrictive accommodation policy can, together with the restrictions on employment during the procedure, be interpreted as a political strategy of deterrence resulting from the growing suspicion of asylum abuse since the early 1980s. Apart from such an interpretation, which is in itself political, it should be pointed out that the administrative context of the asylum procedures systematically blocks chances of integration in other sectors. These measures were seen as a political success in that they led to a systematic restriction of life chances and a growing deterioration of the socio-structural and local situation of asylum seekers. Their exclusion from any claim to the welfare state persists until the asylum claim is decided by the courts. In the meantime, subsistence for asy-

60 That is, parallel to the gradual change of asylum policy into a policy of administrative procedures and the corresponding transformation of the law on asylum into a law for asylum seekers.

61 As a general minimum form of social security assistance, this limits payments to those absolutely necessary for subsistence and excludes any other social security benefits.

62 Their freedom of movement and mobility became restricted in that they were not allowed to leave the sphere of responsibility of the foreigners office during the proceedings (residential obligation).

lum seekers is provided without any social integration measures by the state – a marked contrast to practices towards Ethnic Germans.⁶³

Organisational Forms of the Various Migrant Groups

The various groups of immigrants developed different forms of organisation depending on their political status in the FRG and resulting social situation. All these organisational forms have in common the social objective of community formation as well as the aim of improving participation in the German welfare state.

The Organisation of Expellees and Ethnic Germans under the Conditions of the National Welfare State

The difficult living conditions and extensive social distress and tension of post-war Germany neither led to ethnic mobilisation nor to other forms of collective mobilisation among the refugees and expellees. While ethnicity was hardly used as a resource for mobilisation, it played an important role in the formation of organisations in various economic, social, and political contexts.⁶⁴ Because of their common experience of expulsion, the expellees defined themselves as a ›collective community of fate‹. Their self-understanding of being expelled members of the German people motivated them to unify in political organisations in order to defend their interests.

These organisations represented a framework for dealing with problems following forced migration and material loss. Because the refugees and expellees felt themselves as part of the German people, their central aim was to achieve social and legal equality with other German citizens. The ›Central Union of Expelled Germans‹ (*Zentralverband der vertriebenen Deutschen, ZvD*), and its successor founded in 1954, the ›Union of Expelled Germans‹ (*Bund der vertriebenen Deutschen, BvD*) had many members in view of their efforts to solve integration problems. They also had an important influence on national

63 See Michael Bommers/Ulrich Rotthoff, Europäische Migrationsbewegungen im kommunalen Kontext, in: Kommunen vor neuen sozialen Herausforderungen, ed. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin 1994, pp. 93–145. The restrictions are lifted once residential status as ›asylum seeker‹ is consolidated. A special work permit leads to a high degree of labour-market equality compared with the domestic population. In contrast to this, most of the ›de-facto refugees‹, whose presence is ›tolerated‹ on the basis of international law (i.e. persons not granted refugee status, but who cannot be deported for various reasons), remain inferior within the labour market, because they are only entitled to a general work permit.

64 See Michael Bommers, Ethnizität als praktische Organisationsressource, in: Mohssen Massarrat et al. (eds.), Die Dritte Welt und Wir, Freiburg i.Br. 1993, pp. 355–365.

politics, especially through consultations on the law for sharing the burden of expulsion (*Lastenausgleich*) and on laws promoting integration of expellees.

The ethnic ›community of fate‹ was politically articulated through the establishment of the ›Union of Expellee Organisations‹ (*Verband der Landsmannschaften, VdL*), which was a federation of all twenty regional expellee organisations (*Landsmannschaften*) with about one million members altogether.⁶⁵ In contrast to the BvD, these were organised on the basis of common areas of origin. They saw their task more in the field of foreign policy. Articulating the ›right to return home‹ (*Heimatrecht*) was the core of the VdL's political action.⁶⁶ VdL and BvD unified in December 1958. The newly founded ›Union of Expellees – United Regional Associations‹ (*Bund der Vertriebenen – Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände, BdV*) saw its tasks in influencing both domestic and foreign policy.⁶⁷

Until the mid-1960s, the policy of the ›right to return home‹ was able to integrate a large number of expellees on the organisational level. Subsequently, in the context of enduring economic growth and improving living standards, the ethnically-based category of ›collective fate‹ lost its potential as an organisational binding force, as integration of expellees into the modern welfare state took place. Affective notions of belonging and ethnic semantics thus lost their significance. In this way, the expellee organisations lost their political influence and power during the 1960s. Hitherto, in the context of the ›economic miracle‹, they had formed a socially significant and politically conspicuous pressure group, which had been able to impose successful claims on the welfare state for benefits to facilitate the integration of German refugees and expellees. Since the early 1950s, several integration measures promoted their incorporation in different societal contexts. In this way, the welfare state contributed to the compensation of latent tensions and social disparities by the creation and mediation of chances of participation. This proved to be an effective brake on processes of collective mobilisation and ethnic movements.

Today, Ethnic Germans are mainly organised in church congregations and regional expellee organisations. But membership in such organisations is no longer a matter of course and is losing its attractiveness, especially for the second and third generations born in the FRG. Even though the entry of Ethnic Germans rose sharply at the end of the 1980s due to the processes of transformation in Eastern Europe (see Table 1), today it is mainly the older generation who are organised in the BdV. The fact that the younger ones do

65 See Manfred Wambach, *Verbändestaat und Parteienoligopol. Macht und Ohnmacht der Vertriebenenverbände*, Stuttgart 1971, pp. 47–51.

66 Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, *Anmerkungen zur Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten*, Stuttgart 1987, p. 188.

67 It demanded German reunification as well as the realisation of the ›*Heimatrecht*‹.

not follow them as paying members can be interpreted as an indicator of the decreasing importance and attraction of the political principles of the BdV.⁶⁸

With the successful integration of expellees, their organisations gradually lost the functions for which they had originally been established. They were no longer an important political factor, but instead became cultural associations. However, since the 1990s, the situation of Ethnic Germans has been characterised by difficult labour-market conditions and restriction of social benefits and integration measures. Under such conditions, it is unclear whether integration is possible or whether the changed situation may contribute to the construction and mobilisation of a social risk group. But in contrast to other migrants, who define themselves as ethnically different, such a self-description obviously seems to be hard for Ethnic Germans. In public and political discourses, they are often assumed to have mainly economic motives for their immigration. This uncertainty about the general fate of Ethnic German expellees goes along with a suspicion of abuse of ethnicity and thus contests the legitimacy of their immigration.

The Organisation of Foreigners under the Welfare System of ›Care for Foreigners‹ (*Ausländerbetreuung*)

In contrast to the German immigrant groups, the foreigners are primarily not organised in federations, but in clubs and associations. The organisational structure of the labour migrants and their families is characterised by ›free‹ association-building instead of membership in the established political and welfare organisations. Originally, their integration was brought about by self-initiated social advisory and care services, but those were encouraged and supported by major welfare agencies like Caritas (linked to the Catholic Church), Workers' Welfare (*Arbeiterwohlfahrt*) – a social-democratic agency –, or the Protestant churches' Deacon Agency (*Diakonisches Werk*). These agencies negotiated a broader conception of ›care for foreigners‹ with the Federal Government during the 1960s.⁶⁹ Since then, several organisational structures

68 See Leonie Herwatz-Emden/Manuela Westphal, Die fremden Deutschen. Einwanderung und Eingliederung von Aussiedlern in Niedersachsen, in: Bade (ed.), *Fremde im Land*, pp. 167–213, here p. 195.

69 This conception foresaw an attachment of each national migrant group to just one welfare agency. In this way, it stood in the tradition of (ecclesiastical) care for foreign workers, especially Poles, and Italians, since the 19th century; see Dietrich Thränhardt, Die Selbstorganisation von Türken, Griechen und Spaniern im Vergleich, in: idem (ed.), *Ausländerpolitik und Ausländerintegration in Belgien, den Niederlanden und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Düsseldorf 1986, pp. 130–160, here p. 151. Each agency is responsible for the welfare of one particular migrant group, and usually experiences complementary or direct support by corresponding migrant associations. This points to the fact that the central aim of the latter is not to act as a counter-movement, but in cooperation with the organisations of the welfare state.

have been established by foreign migrants. Besides economic, political, and religious forms of organisation, the self-organisation of foreigners in cultural, leisure, and self-help associations at the neighbourhood level can be seen as a basic social form of organisation. The historical predecessors of this kind of association-building are the workers' associations (*Arbeitervereine*) established in the German Empire especially by the Polish workers, mainly as social clubs.⁷⁰ But with the growth of family migration, the picture of the foreigner's associational structure changed.

The number and significance of associations mainly concerned with work issues decreased considerably in the course of the 1970s. The main reason was a growing importance of matters concerning the family, education, health, etc. after the end of the ›guestworker‹ period and the beginning of long-term settlement.⁷¹ The emergence of new organisational forms resulted from everyday problems of migrants in different spheres of life concerning their social situation in the receiving country. Within this development, many ethnic sports, youth, and women's clubs as well as parents' associations were founded since the early 1980s. Encouraged by the national system of specific social care and advice for each migrant group, ethnicity is in this context used primarily as a »practical resource of organisation«. ⁷² Parallel to this, it is channelled by organisation-building so that it serves as a harmless way of organising everyday life without promoting social movements or provoking conflict. The activities of the migrant associations were shifted away from political activities oriented to the country of origin to social activities oriented to the country of immigration.⁷³ They mainly have »functions of protection and of orientation and assistance for newcomers«⁷⁴, and, at the same time, are often concerned to maintain and promote a specific religion or regional culture.⁷⁵

70 See Christoph Kleßmann, Einwanderungsprobleme im Auswanderungsland: das Beispiel der ›Ruhrpolen‹, in: Bade (ed.), *Deutsche im Ausland – Fremde in Deutschland*, pp. 303–311, here p. 306.

71 See Helmuth Schweitzer, *Der Mythos vom interkulturellen Lernen. Zur Kritik der sozialwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen interkultureller Erziehung und subkultureller Selbstorganisation ethnischer Minderheiten am Beispiel der USA und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Münster/Hamburg 1994, p. 239.

72 Bommers, *Ethnizität als praktische Organisationsressource*, p. 355.

73 For the Turkish associations see Ahmet Necati Sezer, *Die türkischen Organisationen im Wandel 1960–1990*, Frankfurt a.M. 1996.

74 Barbara von Breitenbach, *Ausländervereine und Interessenvertretung. Funktion der Selbstorganisation von Ausländern im Kommunalbereich*, in: *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 1986, no. 2, pp. 181–199, here p. 181.

75 Regional associations (*Heimatvereine*) define themselves as providing organisational resources like social services, financial help, meeting rooms or coffee houses for ethnically homogeneous groups from specific regions of origin; see Friedrich Heck-

In a similar way, the economic form of organisation usually described as ›ethnic business‹ often has, apart from its central purpose of earning money, the function of stabilising an ›ethnic community‹ in the receiving country. The growing number of self-employed small ethnic entrepreneurs is very important for the social integration of such communities.⁷⁶ As the products or services they offer often respond to a special demand, which cannot be provided by domestic suppliers, some authors speak of the emergence of ethnically differentiated supplementary economies.⁷⁷ But the increase of self-employment among foreign workers can also be interpreted as a reaction to growing unemployment since the 1980s (see Table 4). The second generation of the former ›guestworkers‹, which is in a weaker position in the labour market, often has no chance of earning a living other than to ›escape‹ into often ethnicised⁷⁸ forms of self-employment.⁷⁹ The number of ›ethnic businesses‹ which have increasingly adjusted to the structure of demand of the domestic population (described as ethnic niche economies)⁸⁰ does not represent ›special‹ economic behaviour. They have simply been able to take advantage of chances offered by the market⁸¹ which, furthermore, supports the (social) integration of immigrants.

While these economic and social forms of organisation of foreign immigrants arise in the specific context of immigration, most of the political groups still refer to the political situation in their country of origin. But the more such political associations lose their collective binding force due to

mann, *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation. Soziologie inter-ethnischer Beziehungen*, Stuttgart 1992, p. 105.

- 76 See, for example, Wolf-Dietrich Bukow, *Leben in der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Die Entstehung kleiner Unternehmer und der Umgang mit ethnischen Minderheiten*, Opladen 1993.
- 77 For example Heckmann, *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation*, p. 109.
- 78 For example Felicitas Hillmann/Hedwig Rudolph, *Redistributing the Cake? Ethnicisation Processes in the Berlin Food Sector*, Berlin 1997.
- 79 But even though, for example, the personnel structure of small ethnic businesses is often shaped by strong family bonds, the overall structure of ›ethnic business‹ in the FRG does not allow one to speak of a protected or closed market. Differing, for example, from the Asian minorities in the United States, neither price agreements nor a complete ethnic homogeneity of business relations or anything similar could be found at least to the end of the 1980s; see Regine Erichsen, *Selbständige Erwerbstätigkeit von Ausländern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am Beispiel der Türken*, in: Informationsdienst zur Ausländerarbeit, 1988, no. 3, pp. 21–27, here p. 26.
- 80 Heckmann, *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation*, p. 109.
- 81 Ethnic labelling of services or products can be regarded as similar to all other labellings, for example, of certain firms as trademarks or brands.

growing social integration in the receiving country⁸², the more this function may in the future be fulfilled by religious organisations, which are increasingly taking on social functions.⁸³

Many foreign immigrant organisations have accommodated themselves to the structural conditions of the FRG, characterised among other things by the social forms of care for foreigners mentioned above.⁸⁴ This accommodation is based on the opportunity structures of the German welfare state and not on the national structures of the countries of origin. The internal differentiation of the migrants' organisational structure under ethnic labels has to be seen in the context of ›internal integration‹.⁸⁵ It is only likely to become a potential for ethnic mobilisation in the future if problems of poverty and exclusion become more acute.

82 See Ibrahim Özak/Ahmet Sezer, Türkische Organisationen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Informationsdienst zur Ausländerarbeit, 1987, no. 3/4, pp. 54–62, here p. 62.

83 For Islamic associations, see Heckmann, *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation*, p. 106f.

84 Concerning the asylum seekers, there is in contrast to this and for reasons outlined above no system of care organised by the state. But instead of this, there are different non-governmental organisations like Amnesty International or, on the national level, Pro Asyl, which care for the rights of foreign refugees.

85 Georg Elwert, Probleme der Ausländerintegration. Gesellschaftliche Integration durch Binnenintegration?, in: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 34. 1982, no. 4, pp. 717–731.

Comparative Dimensions

Despite their distinct socio-political histories and opposed philosophies concerning nationality and citizenship, France, Germany and Australia do share some major similarities: All three are democratic countries where citizenship and multiculturalism linked to immigration and identity are being intensely debated. However, they are three immigration countries which, in some vital domains, differ considerably. In the post-1945 period, Australia had to achieve its full sovereignty, Germany had to deal with a situation of lost sovereignty, and France was enjoying its full and stable sovereignty despite being confronted with the decolonisation process. Whilst German ethnic allegiance has been until recently a prerequisite for the defining process of German identity, it has become an issue in France only in its definition of citizenship and frontiers, whilst in Australia it is still a very open issue. National traditions or myths in their Hobsbawmian dimension are still working in the three cases, while being more overtly and increasingly challenged by the consequences of labour migration.

Australia has been marked by gaps in citizenship-defining processes, which have resulted from the instrumental role of the state and its ties with the former British Empire. Citizenship was linked to *ius soli* and to ethnicity. For instance, from 1901 to 1967, Aborigines were not Australian citizens, according to the Australian Constitution. Civic identity as such has been for long a missing concept in Australia which, in that respect, comes closer to the United Kingdom's model. However, the old approach was not adequate for a country where one quarter of the population were immigrants. Multicultural citizenship has, after a long and strongly marked assimilationist period, come to be regarded as a *conditio sine qua non*. The possibility of Australian citizenship for newcomers would otherwise have been rendered null and void. The mode of incorporation has hence been crucial in the Australian identity definition.

In order to achieve full sovereignty, Australia first had to clarify the citizenship issue, through accession to legal status, to citizenship itself, to welfare, to the labour market and political mobilisation (1945–1972). And, from 1972 to the early 1980s, it has had to define its national identity, that is the identity of the people already there, the ›others‹ being seen as a threat. Thus, immigration has been confounded with permanent settlement in a faraway island, where human resources are a key factor, taking into account ethnicity and diversity. What does it mean to be a citizen in Australia? What is the meaning of ›us‹ in that country? Australia has hence gradually moved from assimilationism up to the late 1960s, to multiculturalism from the 1970s

to 1996, and a period of ambivalence since then. Citizenship is one of the main issues in Australia as we approach the 21st century: Modern definitions of citizenship focus on being a member of the Australian nation, allowing all citizens to enjoy equal rights.

France is one of the oldest immigration countries in Europe. Its demography and military power caused heavy immigration from near neighbours since the mid-19th century. Assimilation was the watchword, coupled with a progressive opening of the Nationality Code to newcomers (1867, 1889), based on the status conferred by residence and birth in France. A second period can be distinguished in the inter-war and war years (1918–1945). Restrictions on entry (law of 1932), the hierarchical classification of the diverse nationalities comprising French society, a rise in anti-Semitism, and a defensive identity due to the economic crisis in an assimilationist context were the main characteristics.

A third period (1945–1974) is marked by a more voluntary policy on immigration. For instance, migrant labour recruitment was monopolised by the state, which set up the ONI (*Office National d'Immigration* – National Office of Immigration); a new Nationality Code was adopted in 1965, and in the long run, state control on migrant labour flows was eroded by the increasing demands of the economic boom. Assimilationism was outdated and replaced by such terms as ›insertion‹, implying a ›utilitarian‹ access to work and welfare. Immigrants, predominantly incorporated in the working-classes, succeeded in obtaining equality of social rights (the laws of 1972 and 1975). Moreover, it was decided to halt the legalisation of undocumented immigrants in 1972 (Marcellin-Fontanet circular). Citizenship and identity were then absent from the debate, except in relation to the immigrants' belonging to the working-class, as immigrants were then viewed essentially as temporary workers. Further changes in the 1973 Nationality Reform did not bring about any major public reaction.

A fourth and final period (from 1974 to the 1990s) has been a major turning point, in which the links between immigration, citizenship, identity, and interculturalism have been confirmed. Firstly, immigrants were viewed as being settled groups. This gave rise to the successive integration policies (1980/81, 1986, 1993, 1997/98). The Nationality Reform was coupled with a nation-wide debate concerning citizenship, allegiances, Islam, and the European identity (1993 and 1998), as if the entry policies had influenced French ›vivre ensemble‹ (will to live together). Citizenship was updated on a national, local, and also on a European scale. Associationism helped immigrant political participation. However, looking beyond the workplace and constructing civic and religious networks, immigrant leaderships were more committed to an evolving and negotiated identity and citizenship.

Intercultural relations are marked by two contrary debates. Republicanism based on the social contract and a new assimilationist approach is opposed to multiculturalism, questioning the unique allegiances to the nation-state and enriched by the European environment. New categories of immigrants are contributing to diversifying the French migrant geography (middle-class professionals, refugees, brain drain from ›Third-World‹ countries). However, the Maghrebians are still at the centre of debates concerning French identity, especially in negotiations with the public services.

In Germany, pre- and post-World War II history had a major impact on the subtle links between immigration, citizenship and identity definition. The immigration of the ›*Gastarbeiter*‹ followed in the wake of the German refugees and expellees after World War II, trying to meet the demands of the booming German economy. The Ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*), as a third relevant form of migration, originated from the conflictual history of state building processes in Middle and Eastern Europe and the forced transfers of the German ethnic minority under Stalin's rule during World War II. The fourth important migratory flow of asylum seekers during the 1980s and early 1990s results from article 16 of the German Constitution, as it was valid until 1993, whose generosity was a moral reaction to the Nazi murder of the Jewish population. The recent immigration of Soviet Jews, classified as ›quota refugees‹ (*Kontingentflüchtlinge*), has its origins in this history and in the historically specific Soviet-German relations.

Different forms and paths of immigration imply different ways of social integration. Ethnic Germans are legally counted as nationals and thereby meet the *ius sanguinis* requirements of the Citizenship Law until recently (1999) based in the Nationality Code of 1913. The status of the former ›guestworkers‹ has been improved successively during their continuous settlement process since the mid-1970s based on their integration in the labour market and the linked welfare systems. As a consequence of this development, the 1990 and 1993 amendments of the law on foreigners and the eventual reform of the citizenship law in 1999 provided the right for foreigners and their children to become naturalised if they fulfil certain legal prerequisites. Asylum seekers have only legally restricted access to the labour market, and the legal status ascribed to them aims to limit their opportunities of social participation in a way that forecloses social integration.

In Germany, where national membership has long been influenced by *ius sanguinis*, the changes from the late 1980s onwards up to the recent reform of the Nationality Code provided to a growing extent the conditions for the political integration of legally resident migrants. This may speed up social integration and processes of identity change affecting the migrants as well as the Germans themselves.

This comparative overview of the three countries shows how far migratory processes lead to identity issues. In all three countries, transnationalism and citizenship are influenced by migration and international relations, leading to situations of plural loyalties. In the three countries, expectations of assimilation centered around the state's philosophy in Australia, around the labour market in Germany and around social networks and citizenship in France, have been weakened. Starting from different socio-historical backgrounds, processes of integration have taken place in all three countries, whilst the nation-states are evolving into decreasingly homogeneous entities. Approaches to national identity are normative in the sense that they seek to define the basis of the unity of society. But groups and even individuals committed to a specific socio-political system become increasingly involved in internationalisation and globalisation processes (transnational networking and pluralistic citizenship). However, resistance can be observed among the extreme right: Nationalist groups challenged by the impact of migration on identity and citizenship are putting up resistance to these processes in each of the three societies.

Nevertheless, there are substantial differences between the three countries which should be taken into account. In contrast to Australia, where immigration played a constitutive role in the evolving definition of national identity, Germany and France have been challenged differently by the consequences of immigration on membership and the incorporation processes operating in them since immigration played no constitutive role in defining their national identities. Furthermore, these two countries are involved in a process of European integration which erodes the marked opposition between ethnicity (Germany) and citizenship (France). And, in parallel, a new form of citizenship defining another internal frontier between Europeans and non-Europeans is becoming increasingly instrumental. Hence, it is high time to give up the myths and other national traditions which have long differentiated France and Germany, especially as far as immigrants' political incorporation and the definition of citizenship are concerned.

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